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ABSTRACT
The goal of this research was to examine the effectiveness of persuasive language in the
protective action recommendation of an emergency warning, which instructs people how to
prepare and stay safe. Study 1 was a pilot study, which suggested that participants were able to
make distinctions between hurricane categories. In study 2, the presence of fear language and
second-person personal pronouns (i.e., “you”) in a recommendation was manipulated. Overall,
fear language was more influential than a pronoun on risk perceptions.
To understand how context influences risk perceptions, participants in study 3 made
decisions after each piece of information received. The severity of the hurricane increased,
decreased, or stayed the same before decision point 2 and a recommendation containing fear or
neutral language was presented before decision point 3. Those who read the fear message were
more likely to be in the danger control process than those in the neutral language condition,
which suggested that the fear message emphasized threat but did not diminish participants’
perception of efficacy. Behavioral compliance with the warning was high in all conditions. In
terms of change in perceived threat from decision point 2 to 3, participants in the decrease
condition who read the fear appeal had the largest increase in perceived threat. In contrast, the
hurricane increasing in intensity may be fear provoking enough that a fear appeal does not
enhance risk perceptions. When examining individual differences, high Need for Cognition
women had the largest increase in perceived message persuasiveness in the decrease and increase
conditions.
Phrasing guidelines for emergency management are discussed, along with the theoretical
contributions of using social psychological methodology to examine emergency warnings. While
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individual differences are important predictors of warning interpretation, future research needs to
reconcile the conundrum of emergency management’s current limitations regarding
individualized warnings.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

There are many different areas of research that approach the practical problem of people
failing to take emergency warnings seriously. This has created an obstacle in the literature where
these different areas are not cross-communicating or collaborating. For instance, the area of
human factors psychology has largely focused on the design of hazard labels on household
products or a population’s risk perceptions after a storm has passed. In addition, the area of
health psychology has examined people’s risk perception and behavioral intentions in response
to health warnings in pamphlet-style communications. Social psychological research has
examined how people respond to persuasive language and fear appeals. Finally, research in
cognitive psychology has examined how people process self-relevant information and
instructions. One goal of this dissertation is to integrate these literatures in order to inform the
present research and experimental designs.
When people fail to take emergency warnings seriously, there can be fatal consequences.
Some people use humor as a way to cope with crises (Dixon, 1980) or they simply ignore
threatening messages (Drabek, 1985). Unfortunately, people failing to heed warnings, such as
residents failing to evacuate before an approaching hurricane, is a common news report after a
natural disaster that is recounted as a preventable situation. Therefore, when emergency
management distributes emergency alerts to subscribers’ cell phones, their goal is to provide
users with the relevant information about a crisis and suggestions about what to do to avoid
danger or stay safe. This can be problematic when a warning provides recommendations (e.g.,
evacuate, shelter in place, get supplies, etc.) that the user is not motivated to follow. Although
emergency management departments are well-organized, Kapucu, Berman, and Wang (2008)
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argue that there is still room for improvement in risk communication delivery. A significant gap
in the literature of risk perception is examining whether the content of the recommendations in
an emergency warning has an influential impact on behavior and warning interpretation. This can
have strong practical implications for emergency management departments and public policy. If
risk perception and behavior is influenced by the way a protective action recommendation is
phrased, using the right language can save lives and government resources.
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine if the language in a protective action
recommendation about a hurricane influences risk perception. A protective action
recommendation provides recommendations or instructions about what actions to take to be safe.
There is a strong impetus in the risk perception literature to examine “impact-based warnings,”
which emphasize the severity of the storm using words such as “considerable” or “catastrophic”
to describe the weather crisis. It should be noted that the style of the warning that is studied in
this area is not like the warnings that people typically receive on their cell phones. Instead, the
warning is in all uppercase, long, and is not written in full sentences. The content of the warning
examined in the impact-based warnings literature is the details of the crisis. However, it is
problematic to provide emergency management with recommendations about how to describe a
crisis because the details of an emergency are highly situation-dependent. For example, Potter et
al. (2018) found differences in risk perception between a warning that described the winds of the
storm (i.e., “gusts of 140 km/h”) and an “Impact Based Warning” that said the “westerly winds
[are] strong enough to bring down trees and power lines, and make driving hazardous for highsided vehicles and motorcycles, are expected.” It seems logical that providing more specific
detail may heighten risk perception. However, it does not seem realistic that emergency
management could use these suggestions in a template format where they might “fill-in” the
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relevant details. Instead of focusing on the details that are situation-dependent, it may be more
useful to look at how phrasing protective action recommendations, which can be applied to many
situations, influence people’s perception of the risk, and their behavioral intentions.
This dissertation examined the phrasing of phrasing protective action recommendations
in a series of three studies. The first study served as a pilot study to examine participants’
perceptions of hurricanes in order to determine if people perceive the various categories of
hurricanes differently in terms of severity. This informed study 2, which examined the effects
that fear language and second-person personal pronouns (i.e., “you”) in a protective action
recommendation had on risk perception and personalization of a warning. The findings of study
1 and study 2 informed the design and stimuli used in study 3. Study 3 examined the influence of
fear language in a protective action recommendation in different contexts, such that the hurricane
increased, decreased, or stayed the same in its intensity and participants had to make multiple
decisions as they received additional information.
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

Emergency warnings are an important source of information during emergency
situations. The warnings provide details about the location and extent of the emergency, and
most importantly, what to do to avoid danger. A problem arises when people fail to heed these
warnings in the face of a disaster. For instance, many Galveston, Texas residents did not
evacuate after several official orders prior to Hurricane Ike’s landfall in 2008, with some reports
suggesting over 100,000 people stayed in their homes (Krauss & McKinley, 2008). Many
popular press articles (Ash, 2016; Brady, 2017; Cochran, 2013; Resnick, 2017) and research
papers (Breznitz, 1984; LeClerc & Joslyn, 2015; Mackie, 2013; Simmons & Sutter, 2009; Wang
& Kapucu, 2007) suggest that the reason why people ignore emergency warnings is due to
complacency or repeated false alarms (i.e., cry-wolf effect). While false alarms are an issue, the
problem of people not taking emergency warnings seriously deserves further investigation
because these conclusions about false alarms have not solved the problems of people heeding
warnings and these conclusions about false alarms decreasing risk perception have been
repeatedly challenged (Barnes, Gruntfest, Hayden, Schultz, & Benight, 2007; Donner,
Rodriguez, & Diaz, 2012; Dow & Cutter, 1998; Janis, 1962; Mileti & Peek, 2000; Ripberger et
al., 2015a; Whitmer, Schroeder, Bailey, & Sims, 2017).
An important consideration from the area of human factors psychology is that one cannot
change the human operator, but instead one can improve or design technology to compensate for
the human’s limitations (i.e., user-centered design). As such, it would be nearly impossible to
eliminate people’s sense of complacency, but it may be possible to improve the way warnings
are written to induce a sense of personalization with the crisis. There is a need for more
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systematic research that examines if certain warning elements improve emergency response. The
goal of the current research was to determine if the phrasing of protective action
recommendations (i.e., the component of warnings that provides information on how to stay safe
during an emergency) influences the likelihood that someone will heed a warning. Specifically,
this research examined such tactics as using second-person personal pronouns (i.e., “you”) and
fear language to determine if these factors increase the persuasiveness of an emergency warning
and increase a sense of personalization with an emergency in different contexts.

History of Emergency Warnings
The term “emergency warning” is a broad term that refers to any type of communication
that informs one of an imminent threat (Mileti & Sorenson, 1990). Short-term warnings used to
inform the public of an imminent or ongoing emergency situation are often called “alerts.” An
alert refers to a text-based or written message sent via a wireless emergency alert system to
digital communication devices with internet and/or short message service (i.e., texting)
capabilities (Bean et al., 2015, 2016; Casteel & Downing, 2015; Moore, 2010). Emergency alerts
are used to notify the public of an emergency. Before modern wireless systems existed, the
President of the United States used the “Emergency Broadcast System” to announce emergency
messages to citizens. This government alerting system was expanded to state and local
authorities in 1963 and the name changed in the 1990s to “Emergency Alert System” (Moore,
2010). More recently, federal authorities have revised these existing systems to include web links
and pictures, as well as increase the character limits (Fermino, 2016). Now, these federal textbased alerts are used for imminent threats, AMBER alerts, and presidential messages
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(“Emergency Alerts,” n.d.). It should be noted that the term “alert” is used interchangeably with
“warning” throughout the literature.
College-age participants are accustomed to receiving emergency warnings. Universities
have set up their own emergency alert systems for students, faculty and staff (Kopel, Sims, &
Chin, 2014; Stephens, Ford, Barrett, & Mahometa, 2014; Wu, Qu, & Preece, 2008). This is a
result of the Jeanne Clery Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and Crime Statistics Act (Clery
Act, 1990), which mandates that federally funded universities publish crime statistics annually
and distribute emergency warnings to their campuses in a timely manner. Universities collect
phone numbers and email addresses through registration or payroll to enroll their stakeholders in
the emergency alert system. Emergency warnings are sent via email and text messages on
specific crimes that the university is required to report (i.e., murder, forcible sex offense, nonforcible sex offense, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, motor vehicle theft, manslaughter,
arson, damage to property, and hate crime) and other “significant” emergencies (e.g., tornado,
hurricane, gas leak, etc.). Texting has become a vital source of information in emergency
situations (Stephens, Ford, Barrett, & Mohetta, 2014) and is the way most people communicate,
especially young adults (Bailey, Schroeder, Whitmer, & Sims, 2016; Harley, Winn, Pemberton,
& Wilcox, 2007; Haste, 2005; Skierkowski & Wood, 2011). College students have the ability to
opt out of the emergency alert system, but an overwhelming majority of students are enrolled in
the University of Central Florida’s system (J. Thalheimer, personal communication, December,
2017) and do receive emergency alerts via text and/or email. Thus, studying this population’s
perception of text-based emergency warnings is beneficial to the literature. Likewise, some argue
that universities need a comprehensive risk communication plan in order to have a prepared
campus (Kapucu & Khosa, 2013).
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Due to the relatively modern nature of this type of alerting (i.e., with texting and internet
connection on cell phones), there is not a large or systematic literature for the area of warning
perception and response. However, older work (Sorenson, 2000) did suggest that alert systems
would improve with technology and additional research. Furthermore, some research has
examined how users perceive and comprehend modern alerts in an effort to improve the
messages (e.g., Kopel, Sims, & Chin, 2014; Lee, Chung, & Kim, 2013; McGee & Gow, 2012;
Schroeder, Whitmer, & Sims, 2017; Sheldon, 2018; Wu, Qu, & Preece, 2008) with findings
related to system acceptance and individual differences that influence alert perceptions. In
general, this research suggests that college students want to receive emergency alerts via text
messages and that people’s acceptance of this technology is related to individual differences. In
contrast, other work in this area has focused on warnings labels on products (Edworthy, Hellier,
Morley, Aldrich, & Lee, 2004; Laughery & Wogalter, 2006; Kaskutas, 1995; Wogalter et al.,
1987) or on the perceptions of false alarms (Barnes et al., 2006; Ripberger et al., 2015). There
have not yet been many empirical studies that have systematically examined warning
components in an effort to write better messages.

Warning Components
Emergency warnings can contain several components. For instance, Wogalter et al.
(1987) suggested that there are four components of a message: 1) a word that indicates there is
an emergency and attracts attention (e.g., “WARNING!”), 2) a statement that identifies and
describes the emergency, 3) a statement that describes the consequences of not heeding the
warning, and 4) directions that tell people what to do to stay safe (or what not to do to avoid
danger). Mileti and Peek (2000) outlined five similar components: 1) a statement that identifies
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the emergency, 2) the location of the emergency, 3) what to do to protect oneself from the
emergency (i.e., protective action recommendation), 4) information that conveys the time
individuals have to take protective actions, and 5) the source of warning in order to convey
credibility. Although these components are slightly different, a warning must at least have both a
description with varying levels of detail and a protective action recommendation.
In addition, Mileti and Peek (2000) suggested that there are certain message factors that
determine how people respond to a warning. When the details of a warning message are specific
and accurate as possible, there is an increased likelihood that someone will personalize the
message and follow protective actions. Likewise, the warning should contain sufficient
information that informs the public about the emergency and what to do. Warnings should have
consistent style and protective action recommendations. The message should also convey
certainty and clarity that the source is confident about the information in such a way that the
layperson can understand. Additionally, the authors suggested that the medium (i.e., voice, print,
alarms, etc.) from which the warning is delivered may influence emergency response, and that
multiple channels may lead to the best response.
Understanding the components of a warning is a meaningful part of designing research to
improve emergency response. The factors just described by Mileti and Peek (2000) provide good
recommendations about being specific, clear, and accurate about warnings details. I argue that
providing specific phrasing recommendations regarding the details about an emergency situation
(i.e., location, extent of the crisis) is not a realistic suggestion because the details are situationdependent. Instead, there is potential to provide emergency management with specific guidelines
on how to phrase protective action recommendations because they can be applied to many
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situations. Providing emergency management with recommendations based on empirical findings
is paramount for emergency reporting and response.

Protective Action Recommendations and Warning Language
As previously stated, a protective action recommendation is the component of a warning
that advises people about what to do to stay safe. People rely on protective action
recommendations from emergency management in order to prepare and make safe decisions
(Huang, Lindell, & Prater, 2016). The most common protective action recommendation is to
evacuate (Sorenson, 2000). Other examples include getting supplies or avoiding a particular area.
The action recommendation is crucial to emergency response because it can be a source of
training or continued emergency education. For instance, imagine a Florida native traveling to
California and an earthquake occurs. This hypothetical individual has never experienced an
earthquake and has had no reason to learn earthquake protection behaviors. Due to GPS on cell
phones, this individual gets a local alert saying “WARNING: Earthquake predicted in one
minute. Protect your head and neck by getting under a sturdy structure like a desk. If you are
outdoors, avoid structures and falling debris. Drop, cover, and hold on” (“Earthquakes,” n.d.).
Similarly, the protective action recommendation in a separate warning may serve as continued
training for that same Florida native for hurricane preparation: “WARNING: Hurricane Amy is
approaching Naples on Friday. Stock up on water, non-perishable food, and medicine.”
Furthermore, Lindell and Perry’s (2012) Protective Action Decision Model outlines the
decision making associated with taking protective actions. This model considers warnings from
three sources: environmental cues, social cues, and socially transmitted warnings. These
warnings trigger predecisional processes (i.e., exposure, attention, and comprehension) which
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initiate threat perceptions, protective action perceptions, and stakeholder perceptions. These
perceptions lead to protective action decision-making which then results in a behavioral
response. In summary, the model can be summarized as a sequential process that involves
receiving the message, processing the message, perceiving and making judgements about the
message, making decisions, and acting on those decisions. Lindell and Perry explain that
behavioral responses can be influenced by situational factors that facilitate or impede protective
actions. This model does an adequate job of encapsulating the empirical work done on threat
perceptions and risk assessments to explain what influences people to take protections to avoid a
hazard. A flaw with this model is that it does not consider the recommendation in the message as
a source of the decision making. The model does include that the warning message should be
simple to understand, provide specific advice, and come from a credible source. However, the
Protective Action Decision Model fails to include the language of a warning as a component that
may inform threat perceptions and lead one to take protective action. The next section will
review research on protective action recommendations, with a focus on the language used in
these recommendations and warnings.

Hazard Labels
Much of the research in the area of designing warnings has been in the contexts of health
warnings or labels (e.g., reduce smoking or household products). Hazard labels are different
from “alerts” because hazard labels are typically on physical products whereas alerts are short
warnings that describe imminent threats. However, there are useful guidelines from the literature
worth noting in regard to instructional language and risk perception. There are several review
papers that provide suggestions for hazard labels. For instance, Wogalter, Conzola, and Smith-
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Jackson (2002) reviewed guidelines for warning design that included details such as the look of a
warning label, placement, and individual differences that may influence warning perception.
Laughery and Wogalter (2006) reviewed what makes warning labels effective, such as size,
placement, color, pictorials, and message length. These review papers take a usability approach
to hazard labels of household products, which is a useful perspective to improve the warning of
short-term, imminent threats.
Experimental work has been conducted to get a better understanding of how people
perceive warning labels. Edworthy et al. (2004) examined the perceptions of pesticide warning
labels and found that in addition to placing the safety information in the directions of how to use
the product, phrasing safety information as personal instructions (e.g., “you must not use near
animals or animal environments”) was more effective for compliance with the instructions than
warnings without a personal pronoun. Heaps and Henley (1999) examined wording and
placement on a household cleaning product and found that the most believable and credible
warning labels contained 1) explicit information on the danger (i.e., referring to the hazardous
agent by name) instead of an implicit statement, 2) explicit statements of its consequences (i.e.,
stating that the product may be “harmful or fatal”) instead of an implicit statement, and 3)
instructions expressed definitively (e.g., “Do not get in eyes or on skin. Do not swallow”) instead
of probabilistically (e.g., “Avoid contact with eyes or skin. Avoid taking internally”).
Additionally, Wogalter et al. (1987) described a series of experiments and field studies
that suggested a warning should be salient, concise, and contain important details. This means
that a warning should contain the important information, but should not take long for an
individual to read and understand what to do. The authors suggested that even if a warning has
all the aforementioned features, one’s motivation to comply may negatively influence response.
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Wogalter et al. (1987) defined motivation in terms of convenient actions, such as an emergency
exit being located nearby or being provided with protective gloves at the time of purchase of
hazardous materials. However, the warnings in these studies did not describe imminent
emergencies (i.e., mixing hazardous materials, wet floor signs, water contamination, broken copy
machine or telephone, etc.). Considering motivation could be an important factor for emergency
warnings. However, motivation to comply could be defined differently, such as the willingness
to follow protective action recommendations due to a sense of personalization with the crisis
(i.e., thinking the emergency could happen to oneself or loved ones). Personalizing a warning has
been shown to positively affect warning response and compliance (Dash, 2002; Dash &
Gladwin, 2007; Mileti & Sorenson, 1987; Wogalter, Racicot, Kalsher, & Simpson, 1993), with
some suggesting that it provides the motivation to take protective actions (Lindell & Perry,
2012).

Impact-based Warnings
In recent years, a new term, “impact-based warnings,” has been making headway in the
emergency warning literature. “Impact-based warnings” provide explicit information about the
impact or consequences about a particular weather emergency. The National Weather Service
states that the initiative behind promoting the use of impact-based warnings is to “motivate
proper response to warnings by distinguishing situational urgency” and “communicate
recommended actions and precautions more precisely” (“Impact Based Warning Goals,” n.d.).
The logic behind impact-based warnings is that if the emergency is conveyed to be more severe,
it is more likely that people will take protective actions. More specifically, impact-based
warnings use specific phrasing to convey the severity and impact of the hazard. Unlike the more
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traditional emergency warning literature, this new area of research is considering the style and
wording of emergency warnings as an important component that influences emergency response.
Specifically, Ripberger et al. (2015b) found that providing impact-based warnings for an
upcoming storm increased the likelihood that people intended to follow protective action
recommendations. Measuring behavioral intentions is a standard measure in the literature
(Casteel, 2016; Schultz et al., 2010; Wogalter & Dingus, 1999) because it would otherwise be
unethical and unsafe to expose research participants to real danger. Casteel (2016) found similar
results that impact-based warnings positively influenced taking protective actions. It should be
noted that impact-based warnings are not in the same format as text or email alerts. The warnings
in this area of research are typical of what one could read on the National Weather Service’s
website. The warnings are written in all uppercase, not in formal sentences, and are exceptionally
long. This style may be problematic because these warnings may be hard to read and are not
consistent with the previously discussed recommendations for warning design by Wogalter et al.
(1987) or Mileti and Peek (2000). Likewise, Wogalter and Vigilante (2006) suggest that
warnings that have a mixed-case (i.e., both uppercase and lowercase) are easier to read and
comprehend than those written in all uppercase.
In Casteel’s (2016) methodology, participants had to imagine that they were a plant
manager responsible for employees’ safety and for keeping a production line going. At three
decision points in the study, the participants were faced with weather warnings from the National
Weather Service and had to decide whether to stop production to keep the employees safe (i.e.,
shelter-in-place). It should be noted that the impact-based warning information appeared before
decision point two. Participants were more likely to decide to shelter in place when provided
with impact-based warnings than non-impact-based warnings, regardless of previous tornado
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knowledge. In addition, participants’ intention to shelter in place significantly increased over the
three decision points. Casteel (2016) suggested that the details in impact-based warnings may
have induced fear in participants, which may have been an important motivating factor in
behavioral intention to shelter in place. In follow-up work using the same paradigm, Casteel
(2018) manipulated the impact-based warning (i.e., low and high intensity) and threat tags (i.e.,
“catastrophic” or “considerable”) to describe the tornado. He suggested that communicating the
impact is better than “extreme language” for shelter-in-place decisions. Casteel suggested that
the language in the threat tags was scary but had no evidence to support that claim. It is unclear
how words such as “catastrophic” or “considerable” induce more fear than words such as
“dangerous.” Additionally, it is unclear if these words were noticed by participants given that the
style of the warnings may be hard to read. Casteel (2018) conceded that one limitation of his
research was that he was unable to tease apart the threat tag from “extreme language.”
In a recently published study, participants who were affected by Hurricane Sandy were
presented with a hypothetical hurricane and warning communication (Morss et al., 2018). The
researchers manipulated the hazard type (i.e., wind, flood, storm surge, or storm surge with
descriptor), impact (i.e., low or high), and fear-based language (i.e., neutral or fear language) in a
between-subjects design. The fear statement said the following:
“People in at-risk locations will experience life-threatening conditions during the storm.
This is a powerful storm that will cause people who do not have shelter to suffer
devastating injuries or be killed. If you stay, you may die.”
The neutral statement said, “People in at-risk locations will experience dangerous conditions
during the storm.” It should be noted that Morss et al. (2018) manipulated information that
would typically be factual information in risk communication and that the fear language
appeared a statement describing the consequences of the storm, but not in the protective action
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recommendation. All participants received the same protective action recommendation: to
evacuate if they lived in an evacuation zone. Both the impact and fear statements positively
influenced evacuation intentions. Those who received the high impact message had higher levels
of fear than those who received the low impact message. However, there were no significant
differences on reported levels of fear between those who received the fear message and those
who received the neutral message. The fear message led to perceptions that the communication
was overblown. In addition, they measured individual differences in past experience, such that
those who had an evacuation plan, have had property damage, or had evacuated before were
more likely to evacuate. They suggested that impact-based warnings were more effective than
fear-based messaging, but effect sizes were small. There are several important limitations of
Morss et al. (2018) that should be emphasized. First, the fear language was used in statements of
consequences, not in a protective action recommendation that tell people what to do in an
emergency. Second, the authors did not explain how the fear statements were generated and if
they were piloted with a separate group of participants. Likewise, it may be the case that the
authors overemphasized death in their fear warnings which contrasts the findings of Wei,
Lindell, and Prater (2014) and increased the likelihood of maladaptive coping behaviors (see
Fear Appeals section). Third, their data suggested the impact statements induced fear, not the
fear statements, so it appears that additional research would be required to tease apart the effects
of fear from a storm’s intensity or warning language.
The significance of the research on impact-based warnings and the National Weather
Service’s motive behind funding this thrust is that language matters. The way warnings are
phrased can have an impact on behavioral intentions because they influence people to consider
their own safety and decisions (Ripberger et al., 2015b). The goal of protective action
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recommendations is to persuade people to take safe actions. It is imperative to determine if the
language (i.e., fear or severity) in a protective action recommendation persuades people to take
safe actions and motivates them to personalize the warning message.

Persuasion
One way to use language to influence behavior is through persuasion. This classic
research in social psychology focuses on how people’s attitudes change toward a message
through the use of careful tactics. Greenwald (1968) argued that cognition was the most
important part of persuasion. In his cognitive response model of persuasion, he argued that
people were more likely to be persuaded or convinced by a message if they had more positive
thoughts to the message than negative ones. One of Greenwald’s students, John Cacioppo, and a
fellow graduate student, Richard Petty, developed a dual process theory of persuasion called the
Elaboration Likelihood Model of Persuasion (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). This has become the
most prominent persuasion model in the field (Barrett, 2017) with over 9000 citations in over 30
years. This theory suggests that there are two routes to persuasion which depend on the type of
message processing (i.e., deep or shallow) that occurs. The first route is called central
processing, which is the deeper type of message processing that is slow and deliberate. The
second route is called peripheral processing, which is the type of message processing that is fast,
superficial, and shallow. When following the central route, the Elaboration Likelihood Model
suggests that persuasion is likely to occur if the message quality (e.g., strong arguments and valid
evidence) is strong due to the careful scrutiny of the message. On the other hand, non-argument
features are more useful for persuasion for those processing a message peripherally due to the
fast and superficial nature of this type of processing. The Elaboration Likelihood Model explains
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that the non-argument features include the number of people that agree with the message, the
number of arguments in favor of the message, and attributes of the message source (Barrett,
2017). However, the message quality or non-argument features only matter if people are
motivated and able to process the message (Cacioppo & Petty, 1986). Central processing occurs
when a person is motivated and has the ability to think deliberately. Peripheral processing occurs
when a person is not motivated or does not have the ability think deliberately. Research suggests
that the factor that motivates people to analyze a message is how self-relevant the topic is to
them (Boninger, Krosnick, & Brent, 1995). That is, it is more likely that people will consider the
message as meaningful if it is likely to affect them (i.e., personalization). Likewise, people’s
ability to process the message can affect how they process the message and prevent them from
scrutinizing the message content. For instance, one may be under a time pressure or may be too
distracted to concentrate and will rely on heuristics to make a decision (e.g., how many people
agree with the message). The Elaboration Likelihood Model makes two main arguments:
persuasion depends on individual differences in cognition (i.e., motivation and ability) and that
the quality of the message is only persuasive when one is engaged in central processing, whereas
the quantity of arguments or non-argument features are only persuasive when one is engaged in
peripheral processing.

Need for Cognition
An individual difference that has received a great deal of attention in the persuasion and
warning literature is “Need for Cognition.” Someone who has a high Need for Cognition enjoys
thinking, performing mentally effortful tasks, and seeks out cognitive activities (Cacioppo &
Petty, 1982; Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984; Cacioppo, Petty, Kao, & Rodriguez, 1986). Due to
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this type of effortful thinking, a high Need for Cognition individual is more likely to engage in
central processing and consider the quality of a message (Cacioppo, Petty, & Morris, 1983;
Haugtvedt, Petty, & Cacioppo, 1992). Research has shown that people with a high Need for
Cognition rate warnings on products as more important than those with a low Need for Cognition
(Conzola & Klein, 1998). However, high Need for Cognition individuals are less likely to
change their attitude (Haugtvedt & Petty, 1992). Some have argued that Need for Cognition is a
type of intrinsic motivation to process information more deeply (Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, &
Jarvis, 1996). It is also possible that individual differences in cognition is a key factor in warning
effectiveness. That is, if warning design has little effect on risk perception and following
protective action recommendations, differences in Need for Cognition and other individual
differences in cognition may explain for whom a warning is effective. For example, fear is a
commonly used persuasive tool for health campaigns. But fear appeals may only be a wise tactic
to employ on those who are high in Need for Cognition. Ruiter, Verplanken, De Cremer, and
Kok (2004) showed that threatening information motivated high Need for Cognition individuals
to follow protective action recommendations. However, fear tactics are far from perfect. Ruiter et
al. (2004) also found that regardless of Need for Cognition, threatening messages can lead to
denial and avoidance. The role of fear in persuasive messages will be discussed next.

Fear Appeals
A strategy that is often used to persuade people to do something is to induce fear. Fear
appeals emphasize risk, harm, and/or death in an attempt to influence or motivate people to take
safe actions (Ruiter, Abraham, & Kok, 2001). These threatening messages can take the form of
text, images, or videos. One example of a fear appeal is a “don’t drink and drive” campaign. This
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type of advertisement typically has text that describes negative consequences (e.g., “drive drunk
and you may not make it home”). Additionally, it might contain an image that directly shows the
consequences (e.g., a person injured from a drunk driver, a demolished car, etc.).
There are several interrelated theories about fear. One of the earliest theories was the
Fear-as-Acquired-Drive model (Hovland, Janis, & Kelly, 1953; Janis, 1967). This model
suggested that fear motivates people to take action to reduce unpleasant feelings and emotions. If
that action is successful in reducing fear, it becomes reinforced, and this action becomes a
habitual or learned response to the threat. Janis (1967) explained that there are two types of
actions that can reduce fear: adaptive and maladaptive behaviors. Adaptive behaviors are
generally positive actions that involve behavioral changes whereas maladaptive behaviors
involve denial and avoidance. Janis suggested that whichever behavior successfully reduced fear
would be reinforced and become the learned response.
The Parallel Process Model (Leventhal, 1970) proposed that there are two possible
responses to fear appeals. The danger control response occurs when people believe a threat is
serious and think they have the self-efficacy to avert a danger and follow protective action
recommendations to deal with their fear. The fear control occurs when people do not think they
are able to handle a threat, become defensive, and deny the threat as a way to deal with their fear.
Leventhal suggested that adaptive behaviors are a result of cognitions to avert the danger (i.e.,
danger control) whereas maladaptive behaviors occur because emotional responses are used to
control the fear (i.e., fear control).
The Protection Motivation Theory (Rogers, 1975) proposed that there are two cognitive
appraisals that occur when one is faced with a fear appeal. The threat appraisal involves thinking
about the severity of the hazard and thinking about personal susceptibility, whereas the coping
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appraisal involves considering one’s self-efficacy to deal with the hazard. It was theorized that
these appraisals motivate people to take protective actions, particularly when people believe the
threat is serious, they are likely to be affected, and they can perform the protective actions.
The most commonly referred to fear model in the literature is the Extended Parallel
Process Model (Witte, 1992). It is inspired by the three previously discussed models. It combines
the behavioral components from Janis’ model (1967), the response component from Leventhal’s
model (1970), and the cognitive appraisals component from Roger’s model (1975) into one
summary model. The main argument of all of these models is that fear motivates people to take
action to reduce the unpleasant feelings associated with being afraid.
According to the Extended Parallel Process Model (Witte, 1992), there are two theorized
appraisals that occur: perceived threat and perceived efficacy. Perceived threat is combination of
perceived severity and susceptibility to the threat. Perceived efficacy is a combination of
response efficacy (i.e., how successful a response will be in avoiding a threat) and self-efficacy.
These perceptions can lead to one of three outcomes: message acceptance, message rejection, or
no action. No response occurs when the threat is not perceived as serious, no fear is evoked, so
there is no motivation to process the message further. Danger control responses (i.e., cognitive
considerations of how to avoid the threat; adaptive behaviors) are a result of a high degree of
perceived threat and perceived efficacy. Danger control responses can motivate people to take
protective actions and accept a message. However, fear control responses (i.e., emotional
response involving denial; maladaptive behaviors) are the result of a high degree of perceived
threat and a low perception of efficacy. Fear control results in defensive motivations and
message rejection. The Extended Parallel Process Model suggests that it is important to regulate
fear because too much fear may lead people to think they are unable to handle the threat and
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change their perspective from a cognitive one (i.e., danger control) to an emotional one (i.e., fear
control). If people think they cannot effectively avoid a danger, it is likely they will try to control
or reduce their fear by engaging in maladaptive coping behaviors (e.g., denial, avoidance)
instead of performing the appropriate behaviors and applying protective actions.
Studies have empirically tested the effects of threat and efficacy information on warning
compliance. For instance, Neuwirth, Dunwoody, and Griffin (2000) found that information about
the severity of the threat, threat likelihood, and efficacy information led to an increase in
intentions to take protective actions. McKay, Berkowitz, Blumberg, and Goldberg (2004) found
that health messages with high-threat (e.g., emphasizing the severity and seriousness of topic)
and high-efficacy (e.g., easy, practical actions to take) recommendations were more likely to
motivate people to take self-protective actions to prevent cardiovascular disease than low-threat
and low-efficacy messages. Rimal and Real (2003) also found that people were more motivated
to take self-protective actions to avoid skin cancer when risk (e.g., “you are highly vulnerable”)
and efficacy (e.g., “highly effective preventative measures) were emphasized. It should be noted
that the majority of studies that have empirically tested the Extended Parallel Process Model
have examined health topics.
In the contexts of risk communication for hurricanes, Wei, Lindell, and Prater (2014)
examined whether real-life fear appeals impacted later perceptions of a similar threat. These
researchers compared data collected from Texans after Hurricane Rita in 2005 (which reached a
category 5 and made landfall at a category 3) and after Hurricane Ike in 2008 (which reached a
category 4 and made landfall at a category 2 with a larger wind field). Hurricane Ike was
particularly unique because many of the warning messages included a statement that suggested if
people did not evacuate, the consequence would result in “certain death.” Comparing the post-
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Ike data to post-Rita data, Lindell and Prater (2008) found that residents had approximately the
same expectations of damage, but actual damage was fairly low. However, it is possible that the
researchers were unable to contact residents who were severely impacted by either or both
storms. Evacuation rates were lower for Ike (“certain death” warnings) than for Rita. They
suggest that a warning that suggests “certain death” may not have an effect on evacuation
decisions. However, it should be noted that these data are not experimental, and the cause of
these perceptions is unclear. Wei et al. (2014) suggest that future research systematically
compare the effects of warning messages on risk perception.
Popova (2012) recently called many of the Extended Parallel Process Model’s
assumptions into question. Specifically related to this dissertation, Popova recommends that
future research should not continue to examine the effects of individual differences on risk
perceptions and persuasion because it has found mixed support. For instance, some studies have
shown that those with a high Need for Cognition (Ruiter et al., 2004) and those with a low need
to seek sensation (Witte & Morrison, 1995) were more likely to take protective actions.
However, McKay et al. (2004) showed that some individual differences such as older age and
lower health status were associated with not taking protective actions due to a sense of
helplessness or apathy. Witte and Morrison (2000) showed that trait anxiety had no effect on
behavioral intentions or outcomes. Along the same lines as Popova, Witte and Allen (2000)
boldly claimed that researchers should no longer examine individual differences in health
campaigns and fear appeals. In their 2000 meta-analysis they suggested that “individual
differences such as personality traits or demographic characteristics (e.g., gender) do not appear
to influence processing of fear appeal messages, except on rare occasions” (p. 606). However,
there are many individual differences that have yet to be examined in contexts other than health
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campaigns. It is unwise to suggest that this line of research come to an end, as unexplored
individual differences may explain for whom a fear appeal or warning is effective and in what
contexts.

Second-Person Personal Pronouns and Personalization
Another linguistic tool that has been shown to influence behavior and motivate people to
personalize a message is using second-person personal pronouns. Research has shown that when
people read action statements that use pronouns such as “you,” they take the performer’s
perspective, mentally simulate the events being described, and have more detailed mental
representations (Brunyé, Ditman, Mahoney, Augustyn, & Taylor, 2009; Brunyé, Ditman,
Mahoney, & Taylor, 2011). These linguistic cues guide people to embody the perspective and
create mental representations of the actions. Likewise, research has shown that people had better
memory for actions stated using second-person personal pronouns over a one hour and a threeday period (as compared to first and third-person), suggesting there were “retraceable” mental
simulations that took place (Ditman, Brunyé, Mahoney, & Taylor, 2010).
The use of personal pronouns in persuasive messages may be related to a classic topic of
research in cognitive psychology, known as self-referent processing. This theory suggests that
information that is related to oneself is easier to interpret and organize into one’s schema (Craik
& Lockhart, 1972). Likewise, the “elaborative processing hypothesis” suggests that self-relevant
information is easier recalled because it has elaborative qualities in which one encodes selfrelevant information and creates several “retraceable” cues making retrieval easier (Craik &
Tulving, 1975; Klein & Loftus, 1988; Rogers, Kuiper, & Kirker, 1977). In particular, selfrelevant information has the strongest associations in memory because the information is related
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to oneself, as opposed to associations tied to semantics, phonemes, or orthography (Craik &
Tulving, 1975). As it relates to warning messages, self-referent processing may suggest that it is
easier to interpret and encode information when it is stated in a self-relevant manner than when
statements are not applicable or relatable to oneself.
The effects of using second-person personal pronouns has yet to be investigated in the
contexts of emergency warnings, other than hazard labels (Edworthy et al., 2004). However, in
the contexts of anti-smoking messages, personalization in the form of the participant’s name has
been shown to increase the perception of personal relevance and persuade individuals to stop
smoking when presented with strong arguments (Dijkstra & Ballast, 2012). Similarly, selfrelevant messages have been shown to be persuasive, especially if the argument is of high quality
(Petty, Cacioppo, & Goldman, 1981). Thus, it may be the case that personalized messaging is
more persuasive when the argument is strong because an individual is highly motivated to
carefully consider the message. This motivation may be the result of personalization, in that an
individual feels likely to be affected by the outcome so he or she analyzes the message with more
scrutiny than one that would likely not affect them (Johnson & Eagly, 1989).
It seems that making a warning more self-relevant would increase a sense of
personalization and may motivate one to take protective actions. For example, a self-relevant
warning may be phrased as: “TORNADO WARNING: You should seek cover immediately. You
should go under a table and cover your head and neck.” This may be more influential than a
warning phrased with no pronouns: “TORNADO WARNING: Seek cover immediately. Go
under a table and cover the head and neck.”
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Individual Differences in Risk Perception
Individual differences are how people vary from one another (e.g., personality or
cognition) and provide a more nuanced description of the psychology of the individuals being
studied. This section will describe individual differences that have been demonstrated to
influence risk perception. It should be noted that Need for Cognition was previously discussed in
the contexts of persuasion and fear appeals.

Sex Differences
Another individual difference that has been shown to have an influence on risk
perceptions is sex differences. There is a large body of research that has examined whether men
and women respond to emergency situations differently. In general, findings suggest that women
avoid risky situations whereas men are more likely to be risk-takers (Cutter, Tiefenbacher, &
Solecki, 1992). In addition, women tend to be more interested in safety, endure more stress
during emergencies, and seek out additional information when they receive an emergency alert
than men (Kopel, Sims, & Chin, 2014; McIntyre, Spence, & Lachlan, 2011; Weber, Blais, &
Betz, 2002). Women also report that they want more specific or detailed warnings (Whitmer,
Sims, & Torres, 2017) and are more likely to evacuate than men (Bateman & Edwards, 2002).
Furthermore, men report that they have had more experience dealing with emergency situations
than women (Whitmer, Sims, & Torres, 2017) and exhibit different helping behaviors during
emergencies than women (see Whitmer, LaGoy, & Sims, 2018 for a review). Some research has
shown that women are more vulnerable to fear messages than men (Leventhal, Jones, &
Trembly, 1966), but this is not a consistent finding (c.f., Witte & Allen, 2000). Finally, some
suggest that men and women may have different mental models of emergencies due to past
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emergency experiences (Gustafod, 1998), which may be why women have a higher fear of crime
than men (Franklin & Franklin, 2009). Some recent evidence suggests that men and women do
have different mental models of emergencies, such that men’s representation of emergencies has
largely to do with property damage whereas women’s representation has to do with crimes that
result in loss of life (Whitmer, Sims, & Torres, 2017).

Storm Fear
A particularly important individual difference that is relevant to studying people’s
perceptions of weather emergencies and risk communication is their fear of storms. Nelson,
Vorstenbosch, and Antony (2014) recently created and validated their 15-item Storm Fear
Questionnaire. This phobia is an individual difference that has yet to be accounted for in
published studies related to warnings and risk perception. However, this scale is relatively new
and may explain why this individual difference measure has yet to be incorporated into modern
risk perception studies. Likewise, Nelson and colleagues (2014) note that research on storm
phobia is limited.
Based on the interpretation of the authors’ paper, it seems that the authors posit it is a
trait-based measure. Therefore, it was originally intended that Storm Fear would be used as a
covariate in the analyses of this dissertation. However, the results of study 3 suggested that this
variable might be a state-based measure and was therefore not used as a covariate in the
following analyses (see Chapter Six). More examination of this variable will be included in the
general discussion.
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CHAPTER THREE: PRESENT RESEARCH
In order to determine whether the phrasing of risk communication influences people’s
likelihood to take protective action recommendations, the current research investigated tactics
that past research suggests can be persuasive and increase a sense of personalization with a
hurricane emergency. The goal of the study 1 was to determine which type of hurricane stimuli
would be most appropriate to use for studies 2 and 3. Hurricanes were chosen as the weather
crisis to study for several reasons. First, hurricanes can be predicted several days in advance
which provides emergency management the opportunity to formulate warnings in a careful
manner. Second, hurricanes are dynamic situations and the prediction models that suggest where
the storm will make landfall can change drastically from one day to another. There is a need to
study how the potential changes in the predictions of a hurricane may influence risk perception
in conjunction with instructional messages in the warning. Third, the content in hurricane
warnings is understudied. Most of the research in the warning literature has been on tornados,
which are only predictable by hours, sometime minutes, and only travel a few miles before
disintegrating (Edwards, 2018), whereas hurricanes cover much larger areas.
In study 2, the presence of fear language and second-person personal pronouns (i.e.,
“you”) was manipulated to determine which aspects positively influence risk perceptions and
taking the protective action recommendations. It should be noted that the fear language used in
study 2 was based on previous research (Morss et al., 2018), but was modified 1) to deemphasize the implication of death based on the recommendations from Wei et al. (2014) and 2)
the fear language appeared only in the protective action recommendation. Likewise, Morss et
al.’s (2018) stimuli were not pilot tested, nor is there any data reported in their paper to suggest
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that participants found the stimuli scary. It was essential to determine if these stimuli were
worthwhile to use for the main experiment in study 3 or if the conclusions drawn from Morss
and colleagues should be reinterpreted.
The goal of study 3 was to examine how these protective action recommendations
interact with a dynamic environment. In study 3, an experience that one would typically
experience by receiving hurricane warnings over a period of a few days with changing
information was simulated. Participants received a protective action recommendation with fear
language or neutral language and the severity of the hurricane increased, decreased, or stayed the
same. In addition, participants had to make decisions at 3 different points, as they received
additional information about the approaching hurricane.

Research Questions
1. Are pairs of hurricanes significantly different from one another in terms of perceived
severity?
2. Does fear language and the use of pronouns in a protective action recommendation lead
to an increased likelihood that people will follow the recommendation in a hurricane
warning? Are these tactics persuasive, such that they increase the likelihood that people
will interpret the emergency as a threat and have adaptive behaviors, instead of
maladaptive behaviors?
3. Does the context of a hurricane with changing intensity influence one’s risk perception of
the storm and of a protective action recommendation over time?
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General Hypotheses
1. On the “hurricane category spectrum,” hurricanes that are farther from each other
(numerically) will be significantly different from each other on ratings of perceived
severity (e.g., category 1 hurricane from a category 5 hurricane).
2. Protective action recommendations for a hurricane warning that contain fear language
and second-person personal pronouns (i.e., you) will result in participants interpreting the
emergency as a threat (i.e., higher risk perceptions) and following the recommended
actions to a higher degree than warnings without fear appeals and pronouns.
3. Risk perceptions will be highest when a hurricane increases in intensity and is
accompanied by a warning with a protective action recommendation with fear language
and second-person personal pronouns.
4. Risk perceptions will be lowest when a hurricane decreases in intensity and is
accompanied by a warning with a protective action recommendation without fear
language and second-person personal pronouns.
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CHAPTER FOUR: STUDY ONE
The purpose of study 1 was to determine which stimuli would be most appropriate to use
for study 2 and study 3. In study 1, participants were asked to rate the severity, seriousness, and
scariness of the different categories of hurricanes in order to determine how these storms are
perceived. The research question was: to what extent are various categories of hurricanes
perceived differently in terms of severity? For example, is a category 4 hurricane different than a
category 5 hurricane in terms of how people perceive the severity, seriousness, and scariness of
the storms? According to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, a category 4
hurricane has sustained wind speeds between 130 to 156 miles per hour, whereas a category 5
hurricane has wind speeds of 157 miles per hour or higher (“Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Wind
Scale,” n.d.). However, they are both described as “major” hurricanes with predictions of
“catastrophic damage.” Each hurricane category has a semantic difference from another
category, but there is no research to date that suggests how people perceive the different storms,
or if there is an understood difference among all pairs.

Method
Participants
The sample size was estimated by conducting a power analysis using G*Power 3.1 (Faul,
Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). A small to medium effect size for a F-test was estimated (η2
= 0.15) at a 0.05 alpha level with 80% power for 1 group and 7 repeated measurements.
Although a medium effect size is common practice for a power analysis when there is no
previous literature to provide a recommended effect size, a small to medium effect size was used
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for study 1 because the effect was hypothesized to be small and additional participants would be
needed to find an effect. The power analysis recommended a total sample size of 93 participants.
In sum, 103 participants were collected. However, 5 were eliminated from the data for
failing to follow instructions. The final data set included 98 undergraduate participants recruited
through the psychology department’s sample pool via an online experiment management system
(SONA). Participants received partial course credit in exchange for their participation.
Approximately 44.3% of the sample were male (n = 43) and 55.1% were female (n = 54).
One participant chose not to respond to the question about their biological sex. The average age
of participants was approximately 20 years of age (M = 20.30, SD = 3.69). Approximately 34.7%
of the sample were freshmen, 25.5% sophomores, 23.5% juniors, and 15.3% seniors. One
participant chose not to respond to the question regarding their college standing. Participants
were asked if they had ever experienced a hurricane, to which 98% of the sample indicated they
had.

Materials
Participants were directed to a Qualtrics link to complete this online study on their
personal computer. They were asked about the types of hurricanes and hurricane-related storms:
a tropical depression, tropical storm, and hurricanes ranging from a category 1 hurricane to a
category 5 hurricane.
Participants completed the following individual difference measures: Need for Cognition
and the Storm Fear Questionnaire.
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Need for Cognition
Need for Cognition (Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984) is an 18-item scale that asks
participants to rate statements such as “I prefer complex to simple problems” and “I like to have
the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot of thinking” on a 1 (extremely
uncharacteristic of me) to 5 (extremely characteristic of me) scale.

Storm Fear Questionnaire
The Storm Fear Questionnaire (Nelson, Vorstenbosch, & Antony, 2014) is a 15-item
scale that asks participants to rate statements on the extent that the statement describes them such
as “I worry about storms more than other people” and “I avoid being in a car during a storm for
fear that something bad may happen” on a 0 (not at all) to 4 (always) scale.

Demographics
Participants were asked demographic questions that included their sex, age, ethnicity,
year in college, if they had had previous experience with hurricanes or evacuations, and the zip
code of their current residence and high school residence.

Procedure
After agreeing to participate, participants were asked to rate their agreement on a 1
(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) scale with several statements. The statements and the
type of storm were presented in a random order. The statements included “I believe a ____ is
severe,” “I believe a ____ is scary,” and “I believe a ____ is serious.” The blanks were filled
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with one of the storms (e.g., tropical storm, category 3 storm, etc.). Participants’ responses were
recorded.
Next, participants completed Need for Cognition and the Storm Fear Questionnaire. Also,
participants were asked to define the hurricane storms in terms of wind speed (i.e., “Knowledge
of Hurricanes”) as an assessment that participants could make distinctions between the storms.
Their responses were assessed based on the definitions provided by the National Weather
Service (“Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Wind Scale,” n.d.).

Hypotheses
H1: It was expected that a category 3 hurricane would be rated as the hurricane that is closest to
“medium” on levels of severity, seriousness, and scariness because it is the hurricane with the
most “average” wind speed.
H2: See Table 1 for the specific hypothesized differences between all pairs of hurricane-related
storms on all dependent measures. It was expected that close pairs (e.g., category 1 and category
2, or category 2 and category 3, etc.) would not be significantly different from each other. It was
expected that these pairs would be rated similarly because the difference in the average wind
speeds between each hurricane type. For example, the difference between the average wind
speeds of a category 1 and category 2 hurricane is small (i.e., 19 mph), whereas the difference
between the average wind speeds between a category 1 and a category 3 hurricane is larger (i.e.,
36 mph).

33

Table 1. Study 1 Hypotheses
TD

TS

C1

C2

Category 2 Hurricane

*

*

Category 3 Hurricane

*

*

*

Category 4 Hurricane

*

*

*

*

Category 5 Hurricane

*

*

*

*

C3

C4

C5

Tropical Depression (TD)
Tropical Storm (TS)
Category 1 Hurricane

*

Note: An asterisk (*) indicates a hypothesized significant difference between the pair.

Results
The analyses conducted were within-subjects ANOVAs, using the 7 types of hurricanerelated storms (i.e., a tropical depression, tropical storm, and hurricanes ranging from a category
1 hurricane to a category 5 hurricane) as the within-subjects variable. The dependent variables
used in the analyses were “I believe a ____ is severe,” “I believe a ____ is scary,” and “I believe
a ____ is serious.” The Bonferroni correction (α = .05/7 = .007) was used when examining the
post-hocs in order to be conservative due to the 7 comparisons being made.

Severity
The main effect of severity was significant, F(6, 570) = 172.21, p < .001, ηp2 = .64.
Pairwise comparisons indicated that the category 1 through category 5 hurricanes were all
significantly different from each other (p < .001) with a positive linear relationship between the
category of the storm and perceived severity. However, the non-significant differences were
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between tropical depression and tropical storm (p = 1.00), a tropical depression and a category 2
hurricane (p = 1.00), and a tropical storm and a category 2 hurricane (p = 1.00). See Figure 1.

Perceived Severity
Strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7)

7

6

5

4

3

2

1
Series1

tropical
depression
3.406

tropical storm

Cat 1

Cat 2

Cat 3

Cat 4

Cat 5

3.51

2.802

3.792

5.135

6.177

6.76

Figure 1. Main Effect of Perceived Severity.

Scariness
The main effect of perceived scariness was significant, F(6, 576) = 162.55, p < .001, ηp2
= .63. Pairwise comparisons indicated that the category 1 through category 5 hurricanes were all
significantly different from each other (p < .001) with a positive linear relationship between the
category of the storm and perceived scariness. The non-significant differences were between
tropical depression and tropical storm (p = 1.00), tropical depression and a category 1 hurricane
(p = .25), tropical depression and a category 2 hurricane (p = 1.00), tropical storm and a category
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1 hurricane (p = .03, based on Bonferroni correction), and tropical storm and a category 2
hurricane (p = 1.00). See Figure 2.

Perceived Scariness
Strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7)

7

6

5

4

3

2

1
Series1

tropical
depression
3.268

tropical storm

Cat 1

Cat 2

Cat 3

Cat 4

Cat 5

3.361

2.814

3.619

4.918

5.866

6.485

Figure 2. Main Effect of Perceived Scariness.

Seriousness
The main effect of perceived seriousness was significant, F(6, 576) = 139.98, p < .001,
ηp2 = .59. Pairwise comparisons indicated that the category 1 through category 5 hurricanes were
all significantly different from each other (p < .001) with a positive linear relationship between
the category of the storm and perceived scariness. The non-significant differences were between
tropical depression and tropical storm (p = 1.00), tropical depression and a category 2 hurricane
(p = .53), and a tropical storm and a category 2 hurricane (p = 1.00). See Figure 3.
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Perceived Seriousness
Strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7)

7
6
5
4
3
2

1
Series1

tropical
depression
3.732

tropical storm

Cat 1

Cat 2

Cat 3

Cat 4

Cat 5

3.887

3.041

4.186

5.392

6.258

6.763

Figure 3. Main Effect of Perceived Seriousness.

Individual Differences
Need for Cognition
In a follow-up exploratory analysis, Need for Cognition was used as a between-subjects
factor. A median split was conducted on this variable (Mdn = 8.00), creating a dichotomous
variable. Independent samples t-tests were conducted to determine if there were differences
between those high and low on Need for Cognition on their ratings of the storms and hurricanes.
The following sections are organized by the dependent variable in the aforementioned analysis.
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Severity
The independent sample t-test showed that those with a low Need for Cognition had
higher ratings of severity for a tropical depression (M = 3.96, SD = 1.85) than those with a high
Need for Cognition (M = 2.96, SD = 1.75), t(95) = 2.72, p = .01, Cohen’s d = 0.55. Likewise,
those with a low Need for Cognition had higher ratings of severity for a tropical storm (M = 3.85,
SD = 1.72) than those with a high Need for Cognition (M = 3.16, SD = 1.61), t(95) = 2.05, p =
.04, d = 0.41. Lastly, those with a high Need for Cognition had higher ratings of severity for a
category 4 hurricane (M = 6.34, SD = 0.69) than those with a low Need for Cognition (M = 6.00,
SD = .90), t(95) = -2.11, p = .04, d = 0.43. There were no other significant differences between
the storm categories.

Scariness
The independent sample t-test showed that those with a low Need for Cognition had
higher ratings of scariness for a tropical depression (M = 3.83, SD = 1.75) than those with a high
Need for Cognition (M = 2.74, SD = 1.66), t(95) = 3.15, p = .002, d = 0.64. Likewise, those with
a low Need for Cognition had higher ratings of severity for a tropical storm (M = 3.72, SD =
1.78) than those with a high Need for Cognition (M = 3.02, SD = 1.55), t(95) = 2.08, p = .04, d =
0.42. There were no other significant differences between the storm categories.

Seriousness
The independent sample t-test showed that there were no differences between those high
and low on Need for Cognition on their perceptions of the storms being serious.
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Sex Differences
In a follow-up exploratory analysis, participants’ biological sex was used as a betweensubjects factor. An independent samples t-test was conducted to determine if there were
differences between men and women on their ratings of the storms and hurricanes. There were
no significant differences between men and women on perceived severity, scariness, or
seriousness.

Knowledge of Hurricanes
Participants’ defined the hurricanes by average wind speed and this was assessed using
the definitions provided by the National Weather Service (“Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Wind
Scale,” n.d.). Definitions of a tropical depression and tropical storm were provided by the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (Landsea, 2011). See Table 2 for a summary
of these definitions. Responses were scored as correct if they were within 5 miles per hour (i.e.,
lower or higher, +/- 5mph) of the Saffir-Simpson Scale definitions. Across the 7 storms,
participants indicated that there was a linear relationship between the storms’ wind speeds. For
example, they rated a category 1 storm lower than a category 2 storm, and a category 2 storm
lower than a category 3 storm. However, participants only got an average of 2 out of 7 responses
correct (M = 2.56, SD = 1.44). Based on the definitions from NOAA, participants were more
likely to get tropical depression and tropical storm correct because participants often answered
with low wind speeds for these storms. After removing tropical depression and tropical storm
from the analysis, participants got an average of 1 out of 5 responses correct (M = 1.12, SD =
1.71). Additionally, the median and mode for correct responses was 0.
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Table 2: Definitions of Hurricane Storms for “Knowledge of Hurricanes” Assessment
Tropical Depression

less than 38 miles per hour (mph)

Tropical Storm

39 - 73 mph

Category 1 Hurricane

74 - 95 mph

Category 2 Hurricane

96 - 110 mph

Category 3 Hurricane

111 - 129 mph

Category 4 Hurricane

130 - 156 mph

Category 5 Hurricane

157 mph or higher

Discussion
Across the 3 dependent measures, a category 3 hurricane was rated as most “average”
and was therefore used as the hurricane stimuli for study 2. In addition, all hurricane storms (i.e.,
category 1 through category 5 hurricanes) were rated as significantly different from one another.
Therefore, a category 1 hurricane was planned to be used in study 3 when the hurricane
decreased in severity and a category 5 hurricane when the hurricane increased in severity (i.e.,
change in severity manipulation). The data also suggested that there were no sex differences on
ratings of perceived severity, scariness, or seriousness.
Although participants were unable to define the hurricanes based on wind speed, they
understood that there is a meaningful difference between the categories. This suggests that there
might be a more implicit understanding of the different hurricane categories. Likewise, it might
be simple for one to make sense of the hurricane categories, because it is logical that a category 2
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hurricane is more severe than a category 1 hurricane. This is the main benefit of using the
standardized Saffir-Thompson Scale to communicate a hurricane’s intensity.
However, it was unexpected that participants rated a tropical storm and a tropical
depression as more severe, serious, and scary than a category 1 hurricane. This suggests that
perhaps participants do not know what these storms are or what types of effects they could have.
Follow-up analyses suggested that those with a low Need for Cognition rated a tropical
depression and a tropical storm higher across the 3 dependent measures than those with a high
Need for Cognition. It is possible that those with a high Need for Cognition were more
intrinsically motivated to process effortfully the information than those with a low Need for
Cognition (Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996; Cacioppo, Petty, & Morris, 1983;
Haugtvedt, Petty, & Cacioppo, 1992). This suggests that those with a low Need for Cognition
likely rely on simple cues to make their determinations of risk and therefore any approaching
storm would be more likely to be perceived as a threat. Due to the effortful processing by those
with a high Need for Cognition, their risk assessment may not be based on simple cues, but
instead be based on gathering as many relevant details as possible. Likewise, it is likely that
those with a high Need for Cognition may have previously sought out this information the first
time they encountered a tropical storm or tropical depression in the real-world and incorporated
it into their mental models.

41

CHAPTER FIVE: STUDY TWO
The hurricane that was rated at a “medium” level of severity from study 1 was a category
3 hurricane and was used in the risk communication in study 2. The purpose of this was to
suggest that the approaching hurricane was severe and a serious threat, without exaggerating or
deemphasizing the severity of the storm. In addition, it was planned that the severity of the
hurricane would change in study 3 (i.e., increase, decrease, or stay the same during the narrative)
before a participant was faced with a protective action recommendation. The results of study 2
informed study 3 by determining what type language to use in the protective action
recommendation.
The research question of study 2 was: do fear appeals and second-person personal
pronouns influence persuasion and a sense of personalization to take protective actions
recommended in an emergency warning? In addition, the goal of study 2 was to determine if
modified fear stimuli used in previously published work (Morss et al., 2018) actually evoke fear
from participants or influence risk perceptions. The fear stimuli were modified so that they
appear in the protective action recommendation and de-emphasize the implication of death. The
authors of these fear stimuli do not show evidence of pilot testing the stimuli or any validation
that the stimuli were perceived as scary. Study 2 examined if these stimuli used in a protective
action recommendation are perceived as scary or persuasive. Likewise, pronouns were used in
the protective action recommendation to determine if this tactic causes people to personalize the
message and increase risk perception.
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Method
Participants
The sample size was estimated by conducting a power analysis using G*Power 3.1 (Faul,
Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). A medium effect size for a F-test was estimated (η2 = 0.25)
at a 0.05 alpha level with 80% power for 4 groups and a numerator degrees of freedom of 1. This
medium effect size and power level are common practice for power analyses when the past
literature does not have recommendations for expected effect sizes. The power analysis
recommended a total sample size of 128 participants, resulting in 32 participants in each of the
four conditions.
165 total participants were collected. However, 21 were eliminated from the data for
failing to follow instructions. The final data set included 144 undergraduate participants recruited
through the psychology department’s sample pool via an online experiment management system
(SONA). It should be noted that students who participated in study 1 were excluded from
participating in study 2. Participants received partial course credit in exchange for their
participation.
Approximately 48.6% of the sample were male (n = 70) and 51.4% were female (n = 74).
The average age of participants was approximately 20 years of age (M = 20.06, SD = 5.72).
Fifty-nine percent of the sample were freshmen, 20% sophomores, 12.5% juniors, and 8.3%
seniors. Participants were asked if they had ever experienced a hurricane, to which 96.5% of the
sample indicated they had. No participants indicated that they had previously been a resident
assistant.
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Design
This experiment was a 2 (fear or neutral language) x 2 (pronoun or noun) betweensubjects design. The variables were fully crossed, resulting in 4 conditions. Table 3 outlines the
language that was used in the protective action recommendation across the 4 conditions. This
language was derived from Morss et al. (2018).
Table 3. Four Conditions in Study 2
Condition 1: Fear & pronoun

“You should avoid windows and relocate to the UCF Arena. If you
are in an at-risk location and do not seek shelter, you may face life
threatening conditions during the storm. You may be injured or die
from the winds of this storm.”

Condition 2: Fear & noun

“People should avoid windows and relocate to the UCF Arena. If
people are in an at-risk location and do not seek shelter, people may
face life threatening conditions during the storm. People may be
injured or die from the winds of this storm.”

Condition 3: Neutral & noun

“People should avoid windows and relocate to the UCF Arena. If
people are in an at-risk location and do not seek shelter, people may
experience dangerous conditions during the storm.”

Condition 4: Neutral & pronoun

“You should avoid windows and relocate to the UCF Arena. If you
are in an at-risk location and do not seek shelter, you may experience
dangerous conditions during the storm.”

Materials
Participants were directed to a Qualtrics link to complete this online experiment on their
personal computer. Participants completed the same individual differences from study 1 (i.e.,
Need for Cognition and Storm Fear). In addition to the demographic questions from study 1,
participants were asked if they have had prior leadership experience or previous experience as a
resident assistant.
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Procedure
The methodology of study 2 is based on past work by Casteel (2018) and Morss and
colleagues (2018). After agreeing to participate, participants were given the following
instructions and introduction to the task:
“Imagine you are a resident assistant of one of the dorms at UCF, responsible for 50
undergraduate students and there is a hurricane approaching. During this study, you will
receive information from UCF based on the National Weather Service’s advisories. Your
role is to keep the students safe in the event of severe weather impacting Orlando.”
This is similar to Casteel’s (2016, 2018) methodology with a minor change. In Casteel’s
work, participants had to imagine that they were a plant manager and had to decide whether to
halt production and direct the employees to shelter-in-place in the event of severe weather or
keep the production line moving. In this dissertation, participants had to imagine that they were a
resident assistant and were responsible for undergraduate students living in a dormitory. The
intention of this was to provide college-aged participants with a more plausible scenario to
imagine and increase the ecological validity of the findings. According to email correspondence
with the university’s student housing staff, resident assistants are responsible for an average of
50 students. It should be noted that careful consideration was taken when altering the instructions
from Casteel’s methodology (2016, 2018). It may be the case that making a decision for other
people may be different than making a decision for one’s self. However, it is likely that college
students are accustomed to their parents making decisions on their behalf during hurricanes.
Leadership positions, such as a resident assistant, may be one opportunity for college students to
take agency in making such decisions themselves.
After the initial instructions, all participants read the following:
“SEPT 22, 11AM: WARNING: Hurricane Jamie is expected to make landfall in central Florida
at 2PM at a category 3.”
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Based on random assignment to conditions, participants then received one of the
recommendations described in Table 2. It should be noted that the protective action
recommendation was changed from Casteel’s methodology (i.e., shelter-in-place) to relocating to
another UCF building. It was hypothesized that sheltering in place would not be an appropriate
behavior in response to major hurricanes and that sheltering would be perceived as an “easy”
action to take because it would not involve as much effort as relocating would.
After the recommendation, participants were asked to rate their agreement on a 1
(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) “Likert” scale to the following statements, presented in a
random order:
BEHAVIORAL INTENTIONS
1. I would evacuate
2. I would relocate to the UCF arena to take shelter
3. I would shelter in place in the dorms
PERCEPTIONS OF STORM AND WARNING
4. I believe the hurricane is serious
5. I believe the hurricane is scary
6. This warning is persuasive
COMPOSITE VARIABLES
7. I believe the hurricane is severe (*Perceived Threat)
8. I feel that I am susceptible to the storm* (*Perceived Threat)
9. Relocating to the UCF arena works in preventing being affected by the storm (*Perceived
Efficacy)
10. I am able to do the recommended action to prevent being affected by the storm
(*Perceived Efficacy)
Participants’ responses were recorded. Then, participants completed the individual
difference measures and demographics.
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Composite Variables
Based on the recommendations of Witte et al. (1996) and Popova (2012), some
dependent variables were summed and standardized (i.e., observed score - mean / standard
deviation) to create new composite variables. Specifically, the “perceived threat” variable is the
sum of participants’ response to “perceived severity” and “perceived susceptibility” (i.e.,
questions 7 and 8, respectively). The “perceived efficacy” variable is the sum of participants’
response to “response efficacy” and “self-efficacy” (i.e., questions 9 and 10). Next, the
standardized “perceived threat” variable is subtracted from the standardized “perceived efficacy”
variable for each participant (i.e., Zefficacy - Zthreat). This new value is referred to as the
“discriminating value.” If the value is positive, it suggests that the individual was in the danger
control process (i.e., perceptions of efficacy exceed perceptions of the threat). This is ultimately
the goal of a fear message because people engaging in danger control processes are more likely
to apply protective actions. On the other hand, if the value is negative, it suggests that the
individual was in the fear control process. This may suggest that the message is too threatening
and does not emphasize the individual’s ability to deal with the threat (i.e., the perception of the
threat exceeds perception of efficacy). Those in the danger control process are less likely to
apply protective actions in the face of a threatening message.

Hypotheses
H1: There will be a main effect of fear, such that those who read the warning with the fear
language will have higher relocation intentions, higher levels of fear, and higher levels of
perceived threat than those who read the warning containing neutral language.
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H2: There will be a main effect of pronoun, such that those who read the warning with the
second-person personal pronoun will have higher relocation intentions, higher levels of fear, and
higher levels of perceived threat than those who read the warning containing the noun.
H3: There will be a fear by pronoun interaction, such that the effect of fear language on all
dependent variables will depend on the presence of second-person personal pronouns. The most
effective recommendation will be one that contains fear language and pronouns, whereas the
least effective recommendation will be the one that contains neutral language and nouns. The
most effective warning should influence people to consider a threat as serious (i.e., fear appeal)
and be self-relevant (i.e., second-person personal pronoun) in order to motivate them to consider
the message and personalize the threat.
H4: It is expected that the effect that the fear stimuli has on whether people undergo the danger
or fear control process will depend on participants’ Need for Cognition (i.e., interaction effect),
such that those with a high Need for Cognition who read a fear message will likely be in the
danger control process and those with a low Need for Cognition will be in the fear control
process after reading a fear message. Ruiter, Verplanken, De Cremer, and Kok (2004) showed
that threatening information motivates individuals high in Need for Cognition to follow
protective action recommendations.

Results
Analysis Approach
The dependent variables were separated into three groups: 1) composite variables of
perceived threat and perceived efficacy, 2) behavioral intentions, and 3) perceptions of the storm
and warning. First, a correlation analysis was conducted between dependent measures in each
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group in order to decide whether MANOVA or ANOVA analyses were more appropriate. Field
(2013) suggests that MANOVAs are more appropriate than ANOVAs when variables are
correlated. See Tables 4 through 6 for the results of these correlation analyses.

Table 4. Composite Variables: Correlations
Perceived Threat

Perceived Efficacy

Perceived Threat
Perceived Efficacy

r = .09 (p > .05)

Table 5. Perceptions of the Storm and Warning: Correlations
Seriousness
Seriousness
Scariness
Persuasiveness

Scariness
r = .43 (p < .001)

Persuasiveness
r = .35 (p < .001)
r = .28 (p < .001)

Relocate
r = .34 (p < .001)

Shelter-in-Place
r = -.30 (p < .001)
r = -.33 (p < .001)

Table 6. Behavioral Intentions: Correlations
Evacuate
Evacuate
Relocate
Shelter-in-Place

Two individual 2 (fear language or neutral language) x 2 (pronoun or noun) betweensubjects ANOVAs were conducted on perceived threat and perceived efficacy because these
variables were not correlated with each other. Following that analysis, the discriminating value
was examined as both a continuous and dichotomous variable in order to better understand if the
manipulations led participants into the danger control or fear control process.
The next analysis was 2 (fear language or neutral language) x 2 (pronoun or noun)
between-subjects MANOVA using the behavioral intentions dependent variables. Then, a 2 (fear
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language or neutral language) x 2 (pronoun or noun) between-subjects MANOVA using the
storm and warning perceptions dependent variables was conducted.
Then, the interaction between participants’ Need for Cognition and exposure to fear
language was examined to determine if one’s likelihood of being in the fear control process was
dependent on one’s Need for Cognition. Lastly, individual differences were examined in a series
of exploratory analyses.

Perceived Threat
There was a main effect of fear on perceived threat, F(1, 140) = 5.96, p = .02, ηp2 = .04.
Those who read a fear message had a higher degree of perceived threat (M = 10.45, SD = 2.28)
than those who read a neutral message (M = 9.40, SD = 2.68). There was no main effect of
pronoun, F(1, 140) = 2.42, p = .12, ηp2 = .02, nor was there an interaction, F(1, 140) = 0.02, p =
.89, ηp2 < .01. Perceived threat is a composite variable that is comprised of perceived severity
and perceived susceptibility, which were examined next using follow-up ANOVAs in order to
understand what components of the composite variable drove the main effect of fear.

Severity
There was a main effect of pronoun on participants’ perceptions that the hurricane was
severe, F(1, 140) = 5.34, p = .02, ηp2 = .04, such that those who read the message that contained
the noun (i.e., “People should….”) believed the hurricane was more severe (M = 5.39, SD =
1.41) than those who read the message that contained a pronoun (M = 4.81, SD = 1.50).
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There was no main effect of fear on participants’ perceptions that the hurricane was
severe, F(1, 140) = 2.44, p = .12, ηp2 = .02, nor was there an interaction, F(1, 140) = 1.15, p =
.29, ηp2 = .01.

Susceptibility
There was a main effect of fear on participants’ perceptions that they were susceptible to
the hurricane, F(1, 140) = 6.56, p = .01, ηp2 = .05. Those who received the fear message felt
more susceptible (M = 5.13, SD = 1.34) than those who received the neutral message (M = 4.49,
SD = 1.61). According to a one-sample t-test using the midpoint of the scale (M = 4), both of
these means were significantly higher than the midpoint (fear: t(70) = 7.08, p < .001, Cohen’s d
= 0.84; neutral: t(72) = 2.62, p = .01, d = 0.30).
There was no main effect of pronoun, F(1, 140) = 0.13, p = .72, ηp2 = .01, and there was
no interaction, F(1, 140) = 0.64, p = .43, ηp2 = .01.

Perceived Efficacy
There was no main effect of fear on perceived efficacy, F(1, 140) = 0.60, p = .81, ηp2 <
.01. There was also no main effect of pronoun, F(1, 140) = 2.96, p = .09, ηp2 = .02 and no
interaction, F(1, 140) = 1.52, p = .22, ηp2 = .01. Perceived efficacy is a composite variable that is
comprised of self-efficacy and response efficacy. These were not examined due to the nonsignificant results as a composite variable.
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Discriminating Value
Based on the calculations described in the Composite Variables section, the
discriminating value was calculated in order to understand if people were in the fear control
(positive value) or danger control process (negative value) as a result of the manipulation. This
value was first calculated as a continuous variable and used as the dependent variable in a 2 (fear
language or neutral language) x 2 (pronoun or noun) between-subjects ANOVA. There was no
main effect of fear, F(1, 140) = 2.55, p = .11, ηp2 = .02. There was also no main effect of
pronoun, F(1, 140) = 0.02, p = .89, ηp2< .01 and no interaction, F(1, 140) = 1.05, p = .31, ηp2 =
.01.
Next, the discriminating value was coded into a dichotomous variable, such that all
positive values were coded as “1” and all negative values coded as “0.” A binary logistic
regression was conducted using the enter method of variable entry and using fear and pronoun as
the independent variables, which were dummy coded into categorical variables. The first model
included the fear variable, the second model included both independent variables, and the third
model included both independent variables and their interaction. Model 1 was not significant
X2(1, N = 144) = 3.40, p = .07. The block of Model 2 was also not significant X2(1, N = 144) =
0.08, p = .77, which indicated the addition of the pronoun to the model was not significant. The
block in Model 3 was not significant, X2(1, N = 144) = 0.20, p = .66, which indicated the nonsignificant interaction.

Behavioral Intentions
The next analysis was a 2 (fear language or neutral language) x 2 (pronoun or noun)
between-subjects MANOVA using the behavioral intentions dependent variables. There was no
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main effect of fear, F(3, 138) = 0.93, p = .43, ηp2 = .02, no main effect of pronoun F(3, 138) =
0.98, p = .41, ηp2 = .02, and no interaction F(3, 138) = 1.73, p = .17, ηp2 = .04. Overall
descriptive statistics are provided next.

Evacuation
The overall mean for evacuation intentions was high (M = 5.29, SD = 1.58), which
according to a one-samples t-test was significantly higher than the midpoint of the scale, t(143) =
9.83, p < .001, d = 0.82.

Relocation
The overall mean for relocation intentions was high (M = 5.42, SD = 1.70), which
according to a one-samples t-test was significantly higher than the midpoint of the scale, t(143) =
10.05, p < .001, d = 0.84.

Shelter-in-Place
The overall mean for sheltering in place was low (M = 3.52, SD = 1.75), which according
to a one-samples t-test was significantly lower than the midpoint of the scale, t(143) = -3.28, p =
.001, d = -0.27.

Perceptions of the Storm and Warning
Next, a 2 (fear language or neutral language) x 2 (pronoun or noun) between-subjects
MANOVA using the storm and warning perceptions dependent variables was conducted. There
was no main effect of pronoun, F(3, 138) = 0.98, p = .41, ηp2 = .02, and no interaction, F(3, 138)
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= 1.73, p = .17, ηp2 = .04. However, there was a significant multivariate main effect of fear, F(3,
138) = 3.27, p = .02, ηp2 = .07.
A follow-up discriminant analysis was conducted to interpret the results of the
multivariate main effect of fear because MANOVAs examine the relationship between the
grouping variables and a linear composite of the outcome variables (Field, 2013, p. 654). The
results of the analysis confirmed the MANOVA; there was a significant difference between those
who read the fear language and the neutral language (λ = .93, X²(3) = 9.95, p = .02), R²canonical =
.07 and 59% correct re-classification. Table 7 shows the standardized canonical coefficients and
the structure weights, revealing that perceived scariness and perceived message persuasiveness
contributed to the multivariate effect. Perceived seriousness did not contribute to this effect as its
standardized canonical coefficient is less than the absolute value of .30. The unstandardized
canonical discriminant function at group means demonstrates that those in the fear language
condition had higher ratings (function = .27) than those in the neutral language condition
(function = -.27). Follow-up descriptive statistics are provided next for a better understanding of
group means.

Table 7. Standardized Canonical Coefficients and Structure Weights from the Discriminant Model
Variable
Persuasiveness
Scariness
Seriousness

Standardized Canonical
Coefficients
.67
.48
.15
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Structure Weights
.84
.71
.58

Perceived Scariness
Those who read the message containing a fear appeal believed the hurricane was scarier
(M = 4.90, SD = 1.70) than those who read the neutral message (M = 4.25, SD = 1.71). A onesample t-test was conducted in order to determine if these means were significantly different than
the neutral midpoint of the Likert scale (M = 4). The average for those who read the fear message
was significantly different than the midpoint t(70) = 4.47, p < .001, d = 0.53. However, the
average rating of perceived scariness for those who read the neutral message was not
significantly different than the midpoint, t(72) = 1.23, p = .22, d = 0.15.

Perceived Seriousness
The overall mean for perceived seriousness was high (M = 5.72, SD = 1.23), which
according to a one-samples t-test was significantly higher than the midpoint of the scale, t(143) =
15.98, p < .001, d = 1.40.

Perceived Message Persuasiveness
Those who received the fear message believed the warning was more persuasive (M =
5.63, SD = 1.33) than those who received the neutral message (M = 4.97, SD = 1.57). Both of
these means were significantly different than the midpoint (fear: t(70) = 10.32, p < .001, d =
1.23; neutral: t(72) = 5.29, p < .001, d = 0.62).
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Need for Cognition
Discriminating Value
The next goal of the analysis was to understand the relationship between the language in
the warning message and participants’ Need for Cognition. A median split was conducted on
Need for Cognition to transform it into a dichotomous variable (Mdn = 10.50).
First, a planned 2 (fear language or neutral language) x 2 (pronoun or noun) x 2 (low
Need for Cognition or high Need for Cognition) between-subjects ANOVA was conducted using
the discriminating value (i.e., continuous variable) as the dependent variable to determine
whether the effect that fear stimuli has on whether people undergo the danger or fear control
process depends on one’s Need for Cognition. There was no significant 3-way interaction, F(1,
136) = 0.01, p = .97, ηp2 < .01, no interaction between Need for Cognition and pronoun, F(1,
136) = 0.01, p = .97, ηp2 < .01, no interaction between Need for Cognition and fear language,
F(1, 136) = 1.63, p = .20, ηp2 = .01, and no main effect of Need for Cognition, F(1, 136) = 0.59,
p = .44, ηp2 = .01.

Perceived Threat
A 2 (fear language or neutral language) x 2 (pronoun or noun) x 2 (low Need for
Cognition or high Need for Cognition) between-subjects ANOVA was conducted using
perceived threat as the dependent variable. There was a significant pronoun by Need for
Cognition interaction, F(1, 136) = 4.03, p = .04, ηp2 = .03, such that those with a low Need for
Cognition had higher perceived threat when message contained a noun (M = 10.60, SD = 2.30)
than when it contained a pronoun (M = 9.16, SD = 2.40). Those with a high need for Cognition
had approximately the same perceived threat ratings when the message contained a noun (M =
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9.86, SD = 2.80) or a pronoun (M = 9.89, SD = 2.55). There was no main effect of Need for
Cognition, F(1, 136) = 0.00, p = 1.00, ηp2 < .01, no fear by Need for Cognition interaction, F(1,
136) = 1.19 , p = .27, ηp2 = .01 and no 3-way interaction, F(1, 136) = 0.09, p = .79, ηp2 = .01.

Perceived Efficacy
A 2 (fear language or neutral language) x 2 (pronoun or noun) x 2 (low Need for
Cognition or high Need for Cognition) between-subjects ANOVA was conducted using
perceived efficacy as the dependent variable. There was a significant fear by Need for Cognition
interaction, F(1, 136) = 8.42, p = .01, ηp2 = .06, such that those with a low Need for Cognition
had higher perceived efficacy when message contained fear language (M = 11.67, SD = 1.64)
than when it contained neutral language (M = 10.75, SD = 2.10). Those with a high need for
Cognition had approximately the same perceived threat ratings when the message contained fear
language (M = 11.06, SD = 2.03) or neutral language (M = 11.78, SD = 1.73). There was no main
effect of Need for Cognition, F(1, 136) = 1.17, p = 0.28, ηp2 = .01, no pronoun by Need for
Cognition interaction, F(1, 136) = 3.93 , p = .05, ηp2 = .03, and no 3-way interaction, F(1, 136) =
0.06, p = .60, ηp2 < .01.

Behavioral Intentions
In order to understand how one’s Need for Cognition might influence one’s perceptions
behavioral intentions, an exploratory 2 (fear language or neutral language) x 2 (pronoun or noun)
x 2 (low Need for Cognition or high Need for Cognition) between-subjects MANOVA was
conducted.
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There was no 3-way interaction, F(3, 134) = 0.42, p = .74, ηp2 = .01, no interaction
between pronoun and Need for Cognition, F(3, 134) = 1.72, p = .17, ηp2 = .04, and no interaction
between fear language and Need for Cognition, F(3, 134) = 1.44, p = .24, ηp2 = .03.
However, due to the exploratory nature of these analyses, the univariate ANOVAs were
examined next due to the interest in the independent variables’ unique effect on each dependent
variable. The univariate ANOVAs did not reveal any significant interaction effects between the
variables in this analysis.

Perceptions of the Storm and Warning
In order to understand how one’s Need for Cognition might influence one’s perceptions
of the hurricane and the warning, an exploratory 2 (fear language or neutral language) x 2
(pronoun or noun) x 2 (low Need for Cognition or high Need for Cognition) between-subjects
MANOVA was conducted.
There was no 3-way interaction, F(3, 134) = 0.95, p = .42, ηp2 = .02, no interaction
between fear language and Need for Cognition, F(3, 134) = 2.27, p = .33, ηp2 = .02, no
interaction between pronoun and Need for Cognition, F(3, 134) = 2.30, p = .08, ηp2 = .04, and no
main effect of Need for Cognition, F(3, 134) = 1.71, p = .29, ηp2 = .03.
However, due to the exploratory nature of these analyses, the univariate ANOVAs were
examined next due to the interest in the independent variables’ unique effect on each dependent
variable of storm and warning perception. The results of the significant follow-up interactions
are reported next, organized by dependent variable.
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Scariness
The interaction between pronoun and Need for Cognition was significant on perceived
seriousness, F(1, 136) = 4.78, p = .03, ηp2 = .03, such that those with a low Need for Cognition
who read the message containing a noun believed the hurricane was scarier (M = 5.28, SD =
1.36) than those with a high Need for Cognition (M = 4.29, SD = 1.93). Those with a low Need
for Cognition who read the message containing a pronoun (M = 4.25, SD = 1.65) rated the
hurricane approximately the same as those with a high Need for Cognition (M = 4.35, SD =
1.81). See Figure 4.

Perceived Scariness: Pronoun x Need for Cognition
1 (strongly disagree) to 1 (strongly agree) scale

7

6

5

Low NFC

4

High NFC
3

2

1
Noun

Pronoun

Figure 4. Perceived Scariness: Pronoun by Need for Cognition Interaction

Seriousness
The interaction between fear language and Need for Cognition was significant on
perceived seriousness, F(1, 136) = 4.27, p = .04, ηp2 = .03, such that those with a low Need for
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Cognition who read the fear language believed the hurricane was more serious (M = 6.25, SD =
0.87) than those with a high Need for Cognition (M = 5.57, SD = 1.36). Those with a low Need
for Cognition who read the neutral message (M = 5.47, SD = 1.36) rated the hurricane
approximately the same as those with a high Need for Cognition (M = 5.57, SD = 1.39). See
Figure 5.

Seriousness: Fear Language x NFC
1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree)
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Figure 5. Perceived Seriousness: Fear Language by Need for Cognition Interaction

Persuasiveness
The interaction between fear language and Need for Cognition was significant on
perceived message persuasiveness, F(1, 136) = 3.96, p = .04, ηp2 = .03, such that those with a
low Need for Cognition who read the fear language (M = 6.00, SD = 1.17) believed the warning
was more persuasive than those with a high Need for Cognition (M = 5.26, SD = 1.40). Those
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with a low Need for Cognition who read the neutral message (M = 4.89, SD = 1.56) rated the
hurricane approximately the same as those with a high Need for Cognition (M = 5.05, SD =
1.60). See Figure 6.

Persuasiveness: Fear x NFC
1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree)
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Figure 6. Perceived Message Persuasiveness: Fear Language by Need for Cognition Interaction

Sex Differences
Discriminating Value
The next goal of the analysis was to understand the relationship between the language in
the warning message and participants’ biological sex on the discriminating value (i.e., whether
participants were in the danger or fear control process). An exploratory 2 (fear language or
neutral language) x 2 (pronoun or noun) x 2 (male or female) between-subjects ANOVA was
conducted. The interactions were of particular interest in this analysis.
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There was no 3-way interaction F(1, 136) = 1.68, p = .20, ηp2 = .01, no interaction
between pronoun and sex, F(1, 136) = 1.50, p = .22, ηp2 = .01, no interaction between fear and
sex, F(1, 136) = 0.41, p = .52, ηp2 = .01, and no main effect of sex, F(1, 136) = 0.16, p = .67, ηp2
= .01.

Perceived Threat
The same analysis was conducted using perceived threat as the dependent measure. There
was no 3-way interaction F(1, 136) = 2.04, p = .16, ηp2 = .02, no interaction between pronoun
and sex, F(1, 136) = 0.56, p = .46, ηp2 = .01, no interaction between fear and sex, F(1, 136) =
2.34, p = .13, ηp2 = .02, and no main effect of sex, F(1, 136) = 0.50, p = .48, ηp2 = .01.

Perceived Efficacy
The same analysis was conducted using perceived efficacy as the dependent measure.
There was no 3-way interaction F(1, 136) = 0.12, p = .73, ηp2 = .01, no interaction between
pronoun and sex, F(1, 136) = 0.85, p = .36, ηp2 = .01, no interaction between fear and sex, F(1,
136) = 0.41, p = .53, ηp2 = .01, and no main effect of sex, F(1, 136) = 1.53, p = .22, ηp2 = .01.

Behavioral Intentions
In order to understand how one’s sex might influence one’s behavioral intentions, an
exploratory 2 (fear language or neutral language) x 2 (pronoun or noun) x 2 (male or female)
between-subjects MANOVA was conducted using participants’ evacuation intentions, relocation
intentions, and sheltering in place intentions as the dependent measures.
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There was no significant 3-way interaction, F(3, 134) = 0.38, p = .77, ηp2 = .01, no
interaction between sex and pronoun, F(3, 134) = 0.60, p = .61, ηp2 = .01, and no interaction
between fear language and sex, F(3, 134) = 0.17, p = .92, ηp2 = .01, and no main effect of sex
F(3, 134) = 2.13, p = .10, ηp2 = .05.
However, due to the exploratory nature of these analyses, the univariate ANOVAs were
examined next due to the interest in the independent variables’ unique effect on each dependent
variable. The results of the significant follow-up main effects and interactions are reported next,
organized by dependent variable.

Evacuation Intentions
There was a significant main effect of sex on evacuation intentions, F(1, 136) = 4.78, p =
.03, ηp2 = .03, such that women had higher evacuation intentions (M = 5.58, SD = 1.53) than men
(M = 4.99, SD = 1.58).

Perceptions of the Storm and Warning
In order to understand how one’s biological sex might influence one’s perceptions of the
hurricane and the warning, an exploratory 2 (fear language or neutral language) x 2 (pronoun or
noun) x 2 (male or female) between-subjects MANOVA was conducted using participants’
perceived seriousness, perceived scariness, and perceived message persuasiveness as the
dependent measures.
There was no significant 3-way interaction, F(3, 134) = 2.22, p = .09, ηp2 = .05, no
interaction between sex and pronoun, F(3, 134) = 1.37, p = .26, ηp2 = .03, no interaction between
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fear language and sex, F(3, 134) = 1.01, p = .39, ηp2 = .03, and no main effect of sex, F(3, 134) =
2.22, p = .09, ηp2 = .05.
However, due to the exploratory nature of these analyses, the univariate ANOVAs were
examined next due to the interest in the independent variables’ unique effect on each dependent
variable. The results of the significant follow-up main effects and interactions are reported next,
organized by dependent variable.

Scariness
There was a main effect of sex, F(1, 136) = 3.63, p = .03, ηp2 = .03, such that women (M
= 4.86, SD = 1.72) believed the hurricane was scarier than men (M = 4.26, SD = 1.70).

Seriousness
There was a main effect of sex, F(1, 136) = 4.61, p = .03, ηp2 = .03, such that women (M
= 5.97, SD = 1.12) believed the hurricane was more serious than men (M = 5.44, SD = 1.40).

Persuasiveness
There was a significant 3-way interaction between fear language, pronoun, and sex on
perceived message persuasiveness, F(1, 136) = 4.68, p = .02, ηp2 = .03. Men’s ratings of
perceived message persuasiveness were higher when the message contained fear language and a
pronoun (M = 6.06, SD = 1.03) than when it contained a fear message and a noun (M = 5.06, SD
= 1.39). Men’s ratings were similar when the message was neutral and contained a noun (M =
5.29, SD = 1.49) or a pronoun (M = 4.70, SD = 1.56). For women, their ratings were higher when
the message contained fear language and a noun (M = 5.96, SD = 1.11) than when it contained
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fear language and a pronoun (M = 5.27, SD = 1.67). Additionally, women’s ratings were
approximately the same when the message contained neutral language with a noun (M = 5.05,
SD = 1.65) and a pronoun (M = 4.88, SD = 1.65). Women were more influenced to think the
message was persuasive by fear language when it contained a noun and men were more
influenced by fear language when it contained a pronoun. See Figures 7 and 8.

Men: Perceived Message Persuasiveness
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Figure 7. Men’s Perceived Message Persuasiveness: 3-way Interaction Between Fear Language, Pronoun, and Sex
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Women: Perceived Message Persuasiveness
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Figure 8. Women’s Perceived Message Persuasiveness: 3-way Interaction Between Fear Language, Pronoun, and
Sex.

Need for Cognition and Sex Differences on Persuasion
The next goal of the analysis was to examine the combined effect of participants’ Need
for Cognition and biological sex on the perception that the message was persuasive. See Table 8
for a frequency distribution of those high and low on Need for Cognition by sex. An exploratory
2 (fear language or neutral language) x 2 (pronoun or noun) x 2 (participants’ biological sex) x 2
(low Need for Cognition or high Need for Cognition) between-subjects ANOVA was conducted.
A custom model was built to examine only the 4-way interaction between all the variables and
the 3-way interaction between fear, sex, and Need for Cognition. There was no 4-way interaction
F(1, 128) = 0.00, p = .99, ηp2 < .01.
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Table 8. Frequency Distribution of Need for Cognition by Sex

Low Need for Cognition
High Need for Cognition

Men
36
34

Women
36
38

There was a significant 3-way interaction between fear, sex, and Need for Cognition, F(1,
128) = 4.73, p = .03, ηp2 = .04, such that women with a low Need for Cognition rated the warning
as more persuasive if the message contained fear language (M = 6.33, SD = 0.86) than women
who had a high Need for Cognition (M = 4.88, SD = 1.50). Women with a low Need for
Cognition rated the warning similarly when it contained neutral language (M = 4.80, SD =1.57)
to women with a high Need for Cognition (M = 5.10, SD = 1.70). For men, there were no
differences between those high and low on Need for Cognition, although men had slightly higher
ratings of perceived message persuasiveness when the message contained fear. Men with a low
Need for Cognition rated the warning similarly when it contained fear language (M = 5.53, SD =
1.41) to men with a high Need for Cognition (M = 5.61, SD = 1.24). Likewise, men with a low
Need for Cognition rated the warning similarly when it contained neutral language (M = 4.95,
SD = 1.60) to men with a high Need for Cognition (M = 5.00, SD = 1.51). See Figures 9 and 10.
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Men's Perceived Message Persuasiveness:
The Role of Need for Cognition (NFC) and Fear Language
1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree)
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Figure 9. Men’s Perceived Message Persuasiveness: 3-way Interaction Between Fear Language, Need for Cognition,
and Sex
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Women's Perceived Message Persuasiveness:
The Role of Need for Cognition (NFC) and Fear Language
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Figure 10. Women’s Perceived Message Persuasiveness: 3-way Interaction Between Fear Language, Need for
Cognition, and Sex

Discussion
Overall, it seems that fear language, not the presence of a second-person personal
pronoun, influenced persuasion and personalization of the protective action recommendation.
Those who read the fear language in the recommendation believed the hurricane was scarier and
more persuasive than those who read the neutral message. This suggests that the fear messages,
derived from Morss et al. (2018) and re-worded, induced fear. In addition, there was an effect of
fear language on participants’ perceived threat, such that those who received a fear message had
higher degrees of perceived threat than those who read the neutral message. An examination of
the variables that comprise this composite variable suggests that this effect is driven by
participants’ perceived susceptibility, not their perceived severity. There was an effect of the use
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of pronouns on participants’ perceived severity, such that participants believed the hurricane was
more severe if the message contained a noun instead of a second-person personal pronoun. In
general, however, it seems that the use of a pronoun or noun is not a driving force in participants’
perceptions of the storm or their interpretations of the warning message. It is possible that
participants interpreted the warning containing the word “you” as a threat to one person whereas
the warning containing “people” was a threat to many. Likewise, it may have been the case that
making the warning self-relevant was not influential in the parameters of current research
because participants were acting as resident assistants and making decisions on behalf of
students living in a dorm. However, this was an important component of comparing the current
work to Casteel’s (2016, 2018) work. As a result, only the manipulation of fear language using
nouns in a protective action recommendation was further explored in study 3.
There were no effects of fear language or the use of a pronoun on evacuation intentions,
relocation intentions, or shelter-in-place decisions. However, these findings are promising
because both evacuation and relocation intentions were significantly higher than the midpoint of
the scale and shelter-in-place intentions were significantly lower than the midpoint. This
suggests that the recommendations are promoting the appropriate behaviors and there was no
ceiling or floor effect. Additionally, there were no significant effects of fear language or the use
of a pronoun on the discriminating value (i.e., fear control or danger control process). This may
have been due to the short exposure to the scenario and warning, such that participants did not
have enough time to undergo a danger control of fear control process. This was addressed in
study 3, where participants were presented with a longer and more dynamic hurricane scenario.
Next, Need for Cognition was examined to determine if the effect that fear language has
on whether people undergo the danger or fear control process was dependent on participants’
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motivation to engage in mentally effortful tasks. There was no significant interaction between
Need for Cognition and fear language on the discriminating value. Next, participants’
perceptions of the hurricane and the warning were examined to get a better understanding of the
effects of Need for Cognition. Those who had a low Need for Cognition were more susceptible
to the fear language, as these individuals believed the hurricane was more serious and the
message was more persuasive when the message contained fear language than those who with a
high Need for Cognition. Much like in study 1, it seems that those with a low Need for Cognition
rely on simple cues, and therefore may be more susceptible to fear messages. It is possible that
those with a low Need for Cognition read such words as “die” or “injury” and quickly decide that
they should be interested in the situation because it might affect them personally, whereas those
with a high Need for Cognition need more information or justification for this type of fear
language used in a recommendation.
Overall, women were more susceptible to the fear language, as they believed the
hurricane was more serious and scarier than men when presented with the fear language in the
recommendation. This is consistent with past research that women are generally more fearful
than men (Bateman & Edwards, 2002; Kopel, Sims, & Chin, 2014). When Need for Cognition
and sex differences were examined together, an interesting pattern emerged. After reading a
recommendation with fear language, women who had a low Need for Cognition believed the
message was more persuasive than women who had a high Need for Cognition who read the
same message. Perhaps women who have a low Need for Cognition are the most vulnerable to
the persuasive effects of fear appeals in risk communication. This combined vulnerability may be
due to women having different mental models of risk than men (Gustafod, 1998; Whitmer, Sims,
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& Torres, 2017) and relying on simple heuristics (i.e., fear cues in messages), which results in an
increased likelihood to follow the protective action recommendation and personalize a message.
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CHAPTER SIX: STUDY THREE
Study 3 was designed based on the findings of study 1 and study 2. In study 3, the
storm’s intensity changed during the course of the experiment. The hurricane started at a
“medium” level of intensity, and either increased in intensity (i.e., category 3 hurricane to
category 5), decreased (i.e., category 3 hurricane to category 1), or stayed the same. The findings
of study 2 suggested that fear language influenced persuasion and personalization of the
protective action recommendation, not the presence of second-person personal pronouns.
Therefore, the presence of fear language with nouns in the protective action recommendation
was manipulated.
The goal of study 3 was to determine how the change in severity of a storm, combined
with a fear appeal in a recommendation, influences decision-making over three periods of time.
The use of three decision points is based on Casteel’s methodology (2016, 2018). The purpose of
this was to examine participants’ decision-making, and if those decisions change as they received
additional information. The research question was: how does a simulated hurricane scenario with
changing intensity of the storm influence one’s risk perception the storm and of a protective
action recommendation over time?

Method
Participants
The sample size was estimated by conducting a power analysis using G*Power 3.1 (Faul,
Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). A medium effect size for a F-test was estimated (η2 = 0.25)
at a 0.05 alpha level with 80% power for 6 groups, 3 repeated measurements, and .75 correlation
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among repeated measures. This medium effect size and power level are common practice for
power analyses when the past literature does not have recommendations for expected effect
sizes. The correlation among repeated measures was expected to be moderate to high because
participants answered the same questions three times. The power analysis recommended a total
sample size of 180 participants, for a total of 30 participants in each of the six conditions.
204 total participants were collected. However, 10 were eliminated from the data for
failing to follow instructions. The final data set included 194 undergraduate participants recruited
through the psychology department’s sample pool via an online experiment management system
(SONA). It should be noted that students who participated in study 1 and study 2 were excluded
from participating in study 3. Participants received partial course credit in exchange for their
participation.
Approximately 46.9% of the sample were male (n = 91) and 53.1% were female (n =
103). The average age of participants was approximately 19 years of age (M = 18.97, SD = 2.43).
Approximately 70.6% percent of the sample were freshmen, 14.4% sophomores, 9.3% juniors,
and 5.7% seniors. Participants were asked if they had ever experienced a hurricane, to which
89.2% of the sample indicated they had. No participants indicated that they had previously been
a resident assistant.

Design
This experiment was a 3 (change in severity: increase, decrease, or no change) x 2 (fear
language or neutral language) x 3 (decision point) mixed design. The severity and fear variables
were between-subjects variables, whereas the decision points were within-subjects variables.
There were 6 fully crossed conditions and 3 repeated measures throughout the experiment.

74

Materials
Participants completed this experiment on a laboratory PC computer with a standard
mouse and QWERTY keyboard. Participants completed the same individual difference measures
and demographics as study 2.

Procedure
After agreeing to participate, participants in study 3 received the same instructions from
study 2 that they would need to imagine they are a resident assistant responsible for 50 students.
Next, participants received this information:
“SEPT 20, 11AM: WARNING: Hurricane Jamie is expected to make landfall 2 days
from now. The hurricane is currently a category 3 storm in the Gulf of Mexico moving
N-NE at 15 mph.”
Following this, participants were at decision point 1. They rated their agreement on a 1 (strongly
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) “Likert” scale to the following statements:
BEHAVIORAL INTENTIONS
1. I would evacuate
2. I would relocate to the UCF arena to take shelter
3. I would shelter in place in the dorms
PERCEPTIONS OF STORM AND WARNING
4. I believe the hurricane is serious
5. I believe the hurricane is scary
6. This warning is persuasive
COMPOSITE VARIABLES
7. I believe the hurricane is severe (*Perceived Threat)
8. I feel that I am susceptible to the storm* (*Perceived Threat)
In order to simulate the passage of time, participants played an unrelated game of Tetris
for 5 minutes between decision points 1 and 2 and decision points 2 and 3. Participants were told
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how long they were going to play Tetris. It should be noted that Casteel (2016, 2018) did not
simulate the passage of time with a secondary task and this is a significant limitation of his work.
Next, participants received this information:
“SEPT 21, 11AM: WARNING: Hurricane Jamie is now a category 1, 3, or 5 (decrease,
no change, or increase in intensity) around the west coast of Florida, expected to impact
central Florida and cross the state tomorrow.”
This information contained the change in severity. Based on random assignment to
condition, some participants read that the hurricane had increased in intensity, decreased, or
stayed the same. Following this information, participants were at decision point 2 and responded
to the same statements as decision point 1. After decision point 2, they played Tetris for another
5 minutes.
The last information participants received before decision point 3 was intended to
examine the added effect of the change in severity and the language in a protective action
recommendation. It should be noted that the category of the storm did not change a second time.
Participants received a warning that suggested the storm is approaching in a few hours (at the
same intensity as the previous warning) and received a recommendation. There were two
recommendations: one with a fear appeal and one without a fear appeal.
“SEPT 22, 11AM: WARNING: Hurricane Jamie is expected to make landfall in central
Florida at 2PM at a category ___ (same as previous).
“People should avoid windows and relocate to the UCF Arena. If people are in an at-risk
location and do not seek shelter, people may face life threatening conditions during the
storm. People may be injured or die from the winds of this storm.”

OR
“People should avoid windows and relocate to the UCF Arena. If people are in an at-risk
location and do not seek shelter, they may experience dangerous conditions during the
storm.”
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In addition to the questions from decision points 1 and 2, decision point 3 included two
extra questions to examine perceptions of the recommendation rated on the same 1 to 7 scale of
agreement:
COMPOSITE VARIABLES
9. Relocating to the UCF arena works in preventing being affected by the storm (*Perceived
Efficacy)
10. I am able to do the recommended action to prevent being affected by the storm
(*Perceived Efficacy)
Participants’ responses were recorded. Then, participants completed the individual
difference measures (the same as study 1 and 2) and demographics.

Hypotheses
H1: There will be a main effect of fear language. Those who read the fear messages will have
higher ratings of perceived threat and relocation intentions than those who read the neutral
messages.
H2: There will be a main effect of change in severity. Those who are in the increase condition
will have the highest ratings of perceived threat and relocation intentions. Those in the decrease
condition will have the lowest ratings of perceived threat and relocation intentions.
H3: There will be a fear language by change in severity interaction. Those who read the fear
message in the increase condition will have highest ratings in perceived threat and relocation
intentions. Those in the decrease condition who read the neutral message will have the lowest
ratings of perceived threat and relocation intentions.
H4: There will be a fear language by Need for Cognition interaction. It is expected that the effect
that the fear stimuli has on whether people undergo the danger or fear control process will
depend on participants’ Need for Cognition, such that those with a high Need for Cognition will
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likely be in the danger control process if they read the fear message and those with a low Need
for Cognition will be in the fear control process if they read the neutral message.

Results
Storm Fear
Storm Fear was not used as a covariate in any analyses in this dissertation because
homogeneity of regression slopes was violated during the initial analyses for study 3. The
covariate interacted with the independent variables in study 3 using perceived threat and efficacy
as the dependent measures (p < .05). Upon further investigation, a 3 (change in severity:
increase, decrease, or no change) x 2 (fear language or neutral language) between-subjects
ANOVA was conducted using Storm Fear as the dependent measure. There was a significant
main effect of change in severity, F(1, 188) = 3.450, p = .03, ηp2 = .04. The post-hocs indicated
that those in the decrease condition had lower levels of storm fear (M = 11.20, SD = 7.90) than
those in the no change condition (M = 15.29, SD = 9.81; p = .01). There was a marginal
difference between those in increase condition (M = 14.34, SD = 10.39) and those in the decrease
condition (p = .05). There was no significant difference between those in the increase and no
change condition (p = .60). There was no main effect of fear, F(1, 188) = 0.15, p = .70, ηp2 = .01,
or interaction, F(1, 188) = 2.77, p = .07, ηp2 = .03. The utility of this variable in future research
will be reviewed in the discussion.

Analysis Approach
The analyses in the following sections are organized by dependent variables. Initial
analyses were 3 (change in severity: increase, decrease, or no change) x 2 (recommendation: fear
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language or neutral language) x 3 (decision point) mixed ANOVAs. The change in severity and
the recommendation were between-subjects variables, whereas the decision points were withinsubjects variables. First, the composite variable of perceived threat was examined. It should be
noted that perceived efficacy can only be examined at decision point 3 because the items relate
specifically to the protective action recommendation. As a result, only participants’ final
discriminating value at decision point 3 was examined. The analyses that used perceived efficacy
and the discriminating value as dependent measures were 3x2 between-subjects ANOVAs,
without the repeated-measures component. Next, the behavioral intentions and perceptions of the
hurricane and the warning were examined across the three decision points.
After each analysis examining the three decision points, a follow-up analysis was
conducted to understand how participants’ ratings changed based on the recommendation that
included fear language or neutral language just before decision point 3. First, a difference score
was computed by subtracting participants’ ratings for each dependent variable at decision point 3
from decision point 2 (e.g., D3threat- D2threat). Then, a 3 (change in severity: increase, decrease, or
no change) x 2 (recommendation: fear language or neutral language) ANOVA was conducted
using each difference score as the dependent measure. It should be noted that ANOVAs were
used for these follow-up analyses to investigate how the independent variables affected each
dependent measure, which in this case was the unique change score for each variable.
Lastly, exploratory analyses were conducted using individual difference measures to get a
better understanding of who was likely to change their perceptions from decision point 2 to
decision point 3.
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Perceived Threat
There was a significant main effect of decision point, F(2, 376) = 21.66, p < .001, ηp2 =
.10. Post-hocs indicated that decision point 1 (M = 9.44, SD = 2.30) was significantly lower than
decision point 3 (M = 10.41, SD = 3.11; p < .001), and decision point 2 (M = 9.55, SD = 3.51)
was significantly lower than decision point 3 (p < .001). However, there was no difference
between decision point 1 and decision point 2 (p = .47).
There was a significant main effect of change in severity, F(1, 188) =37.76, p < .001, ηp2
= .29. All levels of this independent variable were significantly different from each other (p <
.001). The increase condition had the highest level of perceived threat (M = 11.38, SD = 1.60),
followed by the no change condition (M = 9.88, SD = 2.04), and the decrease condition had the
lowest perceived threat (M = 8.15, SD = 2.57).
There was a significant change in severity by decision point interaction, F(4, 376) =
69.54, p < .001, ηp2 = .43. Post-hocs from follow-up paired samples t-test show that there were
significant changes in participants’ perceived threat between the three decision points for those
in the decrease condition (p < .001). At the first decision point, the average perceived threat was
9.74 (SD = 2.30), which significantly decreased at decision point 2 (M = 6.57, SD = 3.36), and
then significantly increased at decision point 3 (M = 8.15, SD =3.27). For the no change
condition, participants’ perceived threat significantly increased at each decision point. At the first
decision point, the average perceived threat was 9.31 (SD = 2.27), which significantly increased
at decision point 2 (M = 9.78, SD = 2.25), and then significantly increased at decision point 3 (M
= 10.57, SD =2.40). For those in the increase condition, participants’ perceived threat
significantly increased from decision point 1 (M = 9.27, SD = 2.33) to decision point 2 (M =
12.33, SD = 2.02; p < .001), but not from decision point 2 to decision point 3 (M = 12.53, SD =
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1.75; p = .36). Perceived threat at decision point 1 and 3 were significantly different from each
other (p < .001). See Table 9 and Figure 11.

Table 9. Perceived Threat, Decision Point by Change in Severity Interaction: Statistics from Follow-up Paired
Samples t-test
Condition
Decrease

Pair

t-statistic

df

p-value

Cohen’s d

Perceived Threat D1 & D2
Perceived Threat D2 & D3
Perceived Threat D1 & D3

8.80
-5.00
4.76

64
64
64

< .001
< .001
< .001

1.42
-0.61
0.75

Perceived Threat D1 & D2
Perceived Threat D2 & D3
Perceived Threat D1 & D3

-2.40
-3.34
-5.02

64
64
64

.02
.001
< .001

-0.29
-0.43
-0.65

Perceived Threat D1 & D2
Perceived Threat D2 & D3
Perceived Threat D1 & D3

-2.44
0.24
-2.70

63
63
63

< .001
.36
< .001

-1.14
0.11
-1.29

No Change

Increase

Perceived Threat: Decision Point x Change

Perceived Threat: Severity + Susceptibility

14

12

10
Decision point 1
8

Decision point 2
Decision point 3

6

4

2

DECREASE

NO CHANGE

INCREASE

Figure 11. Perceived Threat: A Decision Point by Change in Severity Interaction.
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There was a significant fear by decision point interaction, F(2, 376) = 7.16, p = .001, ηp2
= .04. Post-hocs from a paired sample t-test indicated that there were no significant differences
between the decision points for those in the neutral language condition. For those in the fear
language condition, there were no significant differences between decision point 1 and decision
point 2 (p = .94), but there were significant differences between decision point 1 (M = 9.38, SD =
2.24) and decision point 3 (M = 10.79, SD = 2.62; p < .001), and decision point 2 (M = 9.35, SD
= 3.41) and from decision point 3 (p < .001). See Table 10 and Figure 12.

Table 10. Perceived Threat, Decision Point by Fear Language Interaction: Statistics from Follow-up Paired
Samples t-test
Condition
Fear Language

Pair

t-statistic

df

p-value

Cohen’s d

Perceived Threat D1 & D2
Perceived Threat D2 & D3
Perceived Threat D1 & D3

0.08
-5.93
-4.82

98
98
98

.94
< .001
< .001

0.01
-0.72
-0.46

Perceived Threat D1 & D2
Perceived Threat D2 & D3
Perceived Threat D1 & D3

-0.74
-1.51
-1.58

94
94
94

.46
.14
.12

-0.09
-0.16
-0.14

Neutral Language
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Perceived Threat: Decision Point x Fear

Perceived Threat: Severity + Susceptibility

14

12

10

Neutral

8

Fear
6

4

2
Decision point 1

Decision point 2

Decision point 3

Figure 12. Perceived Threat: A Decision Point by Fear Language Interaction.

There was no significant 3-way interaction between change in severity, fear, and decision
point on perceived threat, F(4, 376) = 1.94, p = .10, ηp2 = .02, nor was there a fear language by
change in severity interaction, F(2, 188) = 1.24, p = .29, ηp2 = .01. There was no main effect of
fear on perceived threat, F(1, 188) = 0.54, p =.82, ηp2 < .01.

Change Score
There was a significant fear by change in severity interaction, F(2, 188) = 4.50, p =.01,
ηp2 = .05. Those who were in the decrease condition and read the fear recommendation had the
largest change in perceived threat (M = 2.76, SD = 2.44) from decision point 2 to decision point
3. See Figure 13 for a summary.
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4

Change in Perceived Threat: Fear x Change

Change in Perceived Threat

3

2

1

Neutral
Fear

0

-1

-2

DECREASE

NO CHANGE

INCREASE

Neutral

0.375

0.4688

-0.0645

Fear

2.7576

1.0909

0.4545

Figure 13. Change in Perceived Threat: A Fear Language by Change in Severity Interaction

There was a main effect of fear on change in perceived threat, F(1, 188) = 16.94, p <
.001, ηp2 = .08. Those who read the fear message had a significantly larger change in perceived
threat (M = 1.43, SD = 2.41) than those who read the neutral message (M = 0.26, SD = 1.70).
There was a main effect of change in severity on the change in perceived threat, F(2, 188)
= 7.74, p = .001, ηp2 = .08. Those in the decrease condition had the largest change in perceived
threat (M = 1.58, SD = 2.55), followed by those in the no change condition (M = 0.78, SD =
1.89), and the increase condition (M = 0.20, SD = 1.77). Post-hocs indicated that those in the
increase condition had a larger change than those in the decrease condition (p < .001), and those
no change condition (p = .03). There was no significant difference between those in the increase
condition and those in the no change condition (p = .10).
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In order to understand how the manipulations influenced perceived threat, the same
analyses were conducted using each sub-variable as the dependent measure.

Severity
There was a significant main effect of decision point on perceived severity, F(2, 376) =
26.75, p < .001, ηp2 = .08. Post-hoc comparisons indicated that perceived severity where highest
at decision point 3 (M = 5.27, SD = 1.80), which was significantly higher than both decision
point 1 (M = 4.77, SD = 1.37; p < .001), and decision point 2 (M = 4.81, SD = 2.01; p < .001).
However, decision point 1 and 2 were not significantly different from each other (p = .66).
There was a significant main effect of change in the hurricane’s severity on perceived
severity, F(2, 188) = 51.00, p < .001, ηp2 = .35. Post-hocs indicated that all conditions were
significantly different from each other (p < .001). Those in the increase condition had the highest
perceived severity (M = 5.90, SD = 0.71), followed by those in the no change condition (M =
5.10, SD = 1.15), and those in the decrease condition (M = 3.87, SD = 1.46).
There was a significant interaction between change in severity and decision point on
perceived severity, F(4, 376) = 72.93, p < .001, ηp2 = .44. Post-hocs from a follow-up paired
samples t-test (see Table 11 and Figure 14) indicated significant differences between all pairs of
the three decision points for those in the decrease condition (p < .001). Perceived severity
significantly decreased from decision point 1 (M = 4.91, SD = 1.37) to decision point 2 (M =
2.95, SD = 1.82), but increased from decision point 2 to decision point 3 (M = 3.77, SD = 1.97).
For those in the no change condition, perceived severity significantly increase from decision
point 1 (M = 4.75, SD =1.36) to decision point 2 (M = 5.03, SD = 1.30; p =.02), and significantly
increased from decision point 2 to decision point 3 (M = 5.51, SD = 1.21; p < .001). Perceived
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severity was significantly higher at decision point 3 than decision point 1 (p < .001). For those in
the increase condition, perceived severity significantly increased from decision point 1 (M =
4.66, SD = 1.39) to decision point 2 (M = 6.47, SD = 0.96). However, there were no significant
differences between decision point 2 and decision point 3 (M = 6.56, SD = 0.64; p = .40).
Perceived severity was significantly higher at decision point 3 than decision point 1 (p < .001)
for those in the increase condition.

Table 11. Perceived Severity, Decision Point by Change in Severity Interaction: Statistics from Follow-up
Paired Samples t-test
Condition
Decrease

Pair

t-statistic

df

p-value

Cohen’s d

Perceived Severity D1 & D2
Perceived Severity D2 & D3
Perceived Severity D1 & D3

9.35
-4.55
5.14

64
64
64

< .001
< .001
< .001

1.42
-0.55
0.57

Perceived Severity D1 & D2
Perceived Severity D2 & D3
Perceived Severity D1 & D3

-2.37
-3.67
-5.65

64
64
64

.02
<.001
< .001

-0.28
-0.47
-0.76

Perceived Severity D1 & D2
Perceived Severity D2 & D3
Perceived Severity D1 & D3

-9.22
-0.85
-10.72

63
63
63

< .001
.40
< .001

-1.00
-0.13
-2.33

No Change

Increase
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Perceived Severity: Decision Point x Change
1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) scale

7

6

5
Decision point 1
4

Decision point 2
Decision point 3

3

2

1
DECREASE

NO CHANGE

INCREASE

Figure 14. Perceived Severity: A Decision Point by Change in Severity Interaction

There was a significant interaction between fear and decision point, F(2, 376) = 4.64, p =
.01, ηp2 = .02. Post-hocs from a paired samples t-test indicated that there were no differences
between the decision points for those in the neutral language condition (p > .05). However, there
were differences between the decision points for those in the fear language condition. Although
perceived severity did not change between decision point 1 (M = 4.80, SD = 1.34) and decision
point 2 (M =4.78, SD = 1.96; p = .93), it did significantly increase from decision point 2 and to
decision point 3 (M = 5.52, SD = 1.50; p < .001). Perceived severity was significantly higher at
decision point 3 than decision point 1 (p < .001). See Table 12 and Figure 15.
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Table 12. Perceived Severity, Decision Point by Fear Language Interaction: Statistics from Follow-up Paired
Samples t-test
Condition
Fear Language

Pair

t-statistic

df

p-value

Cohen’s d

Perceived Severity D1 & D2
Perceived Severity D2 & D3
Perceived Severity D1 & D3

0.09
-5.46
-3.88

98
98
98

.93
< .001
< .001

0.01
-0.67
-0.37

Perceived Severity D1 & D2
Perceived Severity D2 & D3
Perceived Severity D1 & D3

-0.47
-1.92
-1.35

94
94
94

.64
.06
.18

-0.06
-0.20
-0.12

Neutral Language

Perceived Severity: Decision Point x Fear

1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree)

7

6

5

Neutral

4

Fear
3

2

1
Decision point 1

Decision point 2

Decision point 3

Figure 15. Perceived Severity: A Decision Point by Fear Language Interaction

There was no significant 3-way interaction between change in severity, fear, and decision
point, F(4, 376) = 0.97, p = .42, ηp2 = .01, nor was there a change in severity by fear interaction,
F(2, 188) = 1.45, p = .23, ηp2 = .02. There was no main effect of fear, F(1, 188) = 0.81, p = .37,
ηp2 = .01.
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Change Score
A 3 (change in severity: increase, decrease, or no change) x 2 (recommendation: fear
language or neutral language) ANOVA was conducted using the difference score from decision
point 2 to decision point 3 as the dependent measure. There was no fear by change in severity
interaction, F(2, 188) = 2.61, p = .08, ηp2 = .03.
There was a main effect of fear, F(1, 188) = 12.35, p = .001, ηp2 = .06. Those who read
the fear message had a significantly larger change in perceived severity (M = 0.74, SD = 1.34)
than those who read the neutral message (M = 0.18, SD = 0.91).
There was a main effect of change in severity, F(2, 188) = 6.72, p = .002, ηp2 = .07.
Those in the decrease condition had the largest change in perceived severity (M = 0.82, SD =
1.45), followed by those in the no change condition (M = 0.48, SD = 1.05), and the increase
condition (M = 0.09, SD = 0.89). Post-hocs indicated that those in the increase condition had a
larger change than those in the decrease condition (p < .001). However, the difference between
those in the no change condition and the increase condition was only marginal (p = .05). There
was no significant difference between those in the decrease condition and those in the no change
condition (p = .09).

Susceptibility
There was a significant main effect of decision point on perceived susceptibility, F(2,
374) = 13.18, p < .001, ηp2 = .07. Post-hoc comparisons indicated that perceived susceptibility
was highest at decision point 3 (M = 5.16, SD = 1.58), which was significantly higher than both
decision point 1 (M = 4.68, SD = 1.43; p < .001), and decision point 2 (M = 4.74, SD = 1.80; p <
.001). However, decision point 1 and 2 were not significantly different from each other (p = .55).
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There was a significant main effect of change in the hurricane’s severity on perceived
susceptibility, F(2, 187) = 15.46, p < .001, ηp2 = .14. Post-hocs indicated that all conditions were
significantly different from each other (p < .001). Those in the increase condition had the highest
perceived susceptibility (M = 5.48, SD = 1.16), followed by those in the no change condition (M
= 4.84, SD = 1.14), and those in the decrease condition (M = 4.28, SD = 1.38).
There was a significant interaction between change in severity and decision point on
perceived susceptibility, F(4, 374) = 28.81, p < .001, ηp2 = .22. A follow-up paired samples t-test
was conducted. For those in the decrease condition, their perceived susceptibility significantly
decreased from decision point 1 (M = 4.83, SD = 1.45) to decision point 2 (M = 3.62, SD = 1.83;
p < .001), and significantly increased from decision point 2 to decision point 3 (M = 4.38, SD =
1.61, p < .001). Participants’ perceived susceptibility was significantly higher at decision point 3
than decision point 1 (p = .01) in the decrease condition. For those in the no change condition,
there were no differences between decision point 1 (M = 4.55, SD = 1.40) and decision point 2
(M = 4.75, SD = 1.31; p = .18). However, there was a significant increase in perceived
susceptibility between decision point 2 and decision point 3 (M = 5.14, SD = 1.42, p = .02).
Participants’ perceived susceptibility was significantly higher at decision point 3 than decision
point 1 (p = .004) in the no change condition. For those in the increase condition, there was a
significant increase in perceived susceptibility between decision point 1 (M = 4.61, SD = 1.49)
and decision point 2 (M = 5.86, SD = 1.46, p < .001). However, there was no difference between
decision point 2 and decision point 3 (M = 5.97, SD = 1.31; p = .54). Participants’ perceived
susceptibility was significantly higher at decision point 3 than decision point 1 (p < .001) in the
increase condition. See Table 13 and Figure 16.
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Table 13. Perceived Susceptibility, Decision Point by Change in Severity Interaction: Statistics from Follow-up
Paired Samples t-test
Condition
Decrease

Pair

t-statistic

df

p-value

Cohen’s d

Perceived Susceptibility D1 & D2
Perceived Susceptibility D2 & D3
Perceived Susceptibility D1 & D3

5.61
-4.29
2.52

64
64
64

< .001
< .001
.01

0.80
-0.57
0.30

Perceived Susceptibility D1 & D2
Perceived Susceptibility D2 & D3
Perceived Susceptibility D1 & D3

-1.34
-2.35
-2.96

64
64
64

.18
.02
.01

-0.16
-0.30
-0.36

Perceived Susceptibility D1 & D2
Perceived Susceptibility D2 & D3
Perceived Susceptibility D1 & D3

-6.71
-0.62
-8.13

63
63
63

< .001
.54
< .001

-0.85
-0.08
-0.96

No Change

Increase

Susceptibility: Decision Point x Change
1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) scale

7

6

5
Decision point 1
4

Decision point 2
Decision point 3

3

2

1
DECREASE

NO CHANGE

INCREASE

Figure 16. Perceived Susceptibility: A Decision Point by Change in Severity Interaction

There was a significant interaction between fear and decision point, F(2, 374) = 5.59, p =
.01, ηp2 = .03. Post-hocs from follow-up paired sample t-test indicated that there were no
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differences between the decision points for those in the neutral language condition (p > .05).
However, there were differences between the decision points for those in the fear language
condition. Although perceived susceptibility did not change between decision point 1 (M = 4.59,
SD = 1.45) and decision point 2 (M = 4.58, SD = 1.79; p = .96), it did significantly increase from
decision point 2 and to decision point 3 (M = 5.33, SD = 1.44; p < .001). Perceived susceptibility
was significantly higher at decision point 3 than decision point 1 (p < .001). See Table 14 and
Figure 17. The ratings of perceived threat at decision point 3 between those who read the fear
language and the neutral language was not significant (p > .05).

Table 14. Perceived Susceptibility, Decision Point by Fear Language Interaction: Statistics from Follow-up
Paired Samples t-test
Condition
Fear Language

Pair

t-statistic

df

p-value

Cohen’s d

Perceived Susceptibility D1 & D2
Perceived Susceptibility D2 & D3
Perceived Susceptibility D1 & D3

0.06
-4.72
-4.54

98
98
98

.97
< .001
< .001

< 0.01
-0.55
-0.46

Perceived Susceptibility D1 & D2
Perceived Susceptibility D2 & D3
Perceived Susceptibility D1 & D3

-0.87
-0.74
-1.48

94
94
94

.39
.46
.14

-0.10
-0.07
-0.14

Neutral
Language
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Susceptibility: Decision Point x Fear

1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) scale

7

6

5

Neutral

4

Fear
3

2

1
Decision point 1

Decision point 2

Decision point 3

Figure 17. Perceived Susceptibility: A Decision Point by Fear Language Interaction.

There was no significant 3-way interaction between change in severity, fear, and decision
point, F(4, 374) = 1.58, p = .18, ηp2 = .02, nor was there a change in severity by fear interaction,
F(2, 187) = 0.92, p = .40, ηp2 = .01. There was no main effect of fear, F(1, 187) = 0.06, p = .80,
ηp2 = .02.

Change Score
There was a marginally significant fear by change in severity interaction, F(2, 188) =
3.10, p = .047, ηp2 = .03, such that those in the decrease condition who read the fear message had
the largest increase in perceived susceptibility (M = 1.42, SD = 0.23) from decision point 2 to
decision point 3. See Figure 18.
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Change in Perceived Susceptibility: Fear by Change

Change in Perceived Susceptibility

4

3

2

1

Neutral
Fear

0

-1

-2

DECREASE

NO CHANGE

INCREASE

Neutral

0.094

0.219

-0.065

Fear

1.424

0.531

0.273

Figure 18. Change in Perceived Susceptibility: A Fear Language by Change in Severity Interaction

There was a main effect of fear, F(1, 188) = 11.96, p = .001, ηp2 = .06. Those who read
the fear message had a significantly larger change in perceived susceptibility (M = 0.75, SD =
1.56) than those who read the neutral message (M = 0.08, SD = 1.12).
There was a main effect of change in severity, F(2, 188) = 3.98, p = .02, ηp2 = .04. Those
in the decrease condition had the largest change in perceived susceptibility (M = 0.77, SD =
1.45), followed by those in the no change condition (M = 0.58, SD = 1.28), and the increase
condition (M = 0.11, SD = 1.40). Post-hocs indicated that those in the increase condition had a
larger change than those in the decrease condition (p = .01). However, there was no difference
between those in the no change condition and the increase condition (p = .25) and no significant
difference between those in the decrease condition and those in the no change condition (p =
.10).
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Perceived Efficacy
The dependent measure of perceived efficacy was only measured after decision point 3
because the recommended action was delivered prior to this decision and the items that make up
this variable relate to the recommendation. Perceived efficacy is a composite variable comprised
of self-efficacy and response efficacy.
The analysis was a 3 (change in severity: increase, decrease, or no change) x 2 (fear
language or neutral language) between-subjects ANOVA using perceived efficacy as the
dependent measure. There was a significant main effect of change in severity, F(2, 188) = 3.61, p
= .03, ηp2 = .04. Post-hocs indicated that those in the condition where the hurricane increased in
severity (M = 12.11, SD = 1.66) had higher levels of perceived efficacy that those in the no
change condition (M = 11.26, SD = 2.03; p = .01). There was a marginal difference between
those in the increase and decrease conditions (M = 11.48, SD = 1.87; p = .06), but there was no
difference between those in the decrease and no change conditions (p = .51)
There was no main effect of fear, F(1, 188) = 2.37, p = .13, ηp2 = .01, nor was there a fear
by change interaction, F(2, 188) = 0.18, p =.95, ηp2 = .01.
In order to understand how the manipulations influenced perceived efficacy, the same
analysis was conducted using each sub-variable as the dependent measure.

Response Efficacy
There was no main effect of fear, F(1, 188) = 0.18, p = .67, ηp2 = .001, no main effect of
change in severity, F(2, 188) = 1.05, p = .58, ηp2 = .01, nor was there a fear by change in severity
interaction, F(2, 188) = 0.08, p =.92, ηp2 = .001. Across all conditions, response efficacy was
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relatively high (M = 5.53, SD = 1.37), which was significantly different than the midpoint of the
scale, t(193) = 15.47, p < .001, d = 1.12.

Self-Efficacy
There was a main effect of fear, F(1, 188) = 5.63, p = .02, ηp2 = .03, such that those who
read the neutral message had higher ratings of self-efficacy (M = 6.25, SD = 0.79) than those
who read a fear message (M = 5.93, SD = 1.15).
There was a main effect of change in severity, F(2, 188) = 7.12, p = .001, ηp2 = .07.
Those who were in the increase condition had the highest ratings of self-efficacy (M = 6.45, SD
= 0.67), followed by those in the decrease condition (M = 5.95, SD = 1.04), and those in the no
change condition (M = 5.86, SD = 1.13). Post-hocs indicated that the those in the increase
condition had significantly higher ratings of self-efficacy than those in the other two conditions
(p < .001). However, there were no differences for ratings of self-efficacy between those in the
decrease condition and those in the no change condition (p = .58). Lastly, there was no fear by
change in severity interaction, F(2, 188) = 0.24, p = .79, ηp2 = .003.

Discriminating Value
Next, the discriminating value was calculated (only after decision point 3 due to the
measurement of the perceived efficacy variable). A 3 (change in severity: increase, decrease, or
no change) x 2 (fear language or neutral language) between-subjects ANOVA using the
discriminating value as a continuous dependent variable was conducted. There was no significant
fear by change interaction, F(2, 188) = 2.23, p = .15, ηp2 = .02.
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There was a significant main effect of change in severity, F(2, 188) = 18.69, p < .001, ηp2
= .17. Post-hocs indicated that those in the decrease condition had a significantly lower value (M
= -0.65, SD = 1.28) than those in no change condition (M = 0.24, SD = 1.00; p < .001) and the
increase condition (M = 0.42, SD = 0.99; p < .001). However, there was no difference between
those in the no change condition and increase conditions (p = .33). This suggests that those in the
decrease condition were in the fear control process whereas participants in the no change and
increase conditions were in the danger control process. See Figure 19.

Discriminating Values: Main Effect of Change in Severity
1
0.8

Discriminating Value

0.6

0.4
0.2
0
-0.2
-0.4
-0.6
-0.8
-1
Series1

DECREASE

NO CHANGE

INCREASE

-0.659

0.235

0.419

Figure 19. Discriminating Value: Main Effect of Change in Severity

There was a significant main effect of fear, F(2, 188) = 8.89, p = .01, ηp2 =.05. Post-hocs
indicated that those in the fear language condition (M = 0.23, SD = 1.04) had significantly higher
discriminating values than those in the neutral language condition (M = -0.24, SD = 1.29; p <
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.001). This suggests that those in the fear language condition were in the danger control process,
whereas those in the neutral language condition were in the fear control process. See Figure 20.

Discriminating Value: Main Effect of Fear
0.4
0.3

Discriminating Value

0.2
0.1
0

-0.1
-0.2
-0.3
-0.4
Series1

Neutral

Fear

-0.231

0.228

Figure 20. Discriminating Value: Main Effect of Fear Language

Next, the discriminating value was coded into a dichotomous variable, such that all
positive values were coded as “1” and all negative values coded as “0”. A binary logistic
regression was conducted using the enter method of variable entry and using change in severity
and fear language as the independent variables. The first model included the change in severity
independent variable, the second model included both independent variables, and the third model
included both independent variables and their interaction. Model 1 was significant X2(2, N =
194) = 26.36, p < .001. Follow-up analyses confirm that the most participants in the decrease
condition were in fear control process, whereas those in the increase and no change condition
were primarily in the danger control process. See Table 15.
98

Table 15. The Role of Change in Severity Condition on the Fear or Danger Control Process

Fear Control
Danger Control

Decrease
76.9%
23.1%

No Change
40%
60%

Increase
37.5%
62.5%

The block of Model 2 was also significant X2(1, N = 194) = 4.63, p = .03, which
indicated the addition of the fear to the model was significant. Those who were in the neutral
language condition were more likely to be in the fear control process, whereas those in the fear
language condition were more likely to be in the danger control process. See Table 16. The block
in Model 3 was not significant, X2(2, N = 194) = 2.00, p = .37, which indicated a non-significant
interaction.

Table 16. The Role of Fear Language Condition on the Fear or Danger Control Process

Fear Control
Danger Control

Neutral Language
58.9%
41.1%

Fear Language
44.4%
55.6%

Behavioral Intentions
The following analyses were 3 (change in severity: increase, decrease, or no change) x 2
(recommendation: fear language or neutral language) x 3 (decision point) mixed ANOVAs. The
following sections are organized by dependent variables.

Evacuation
There was a significant main effect of decision point on evacuation intentions, F(2, 376)
= 13.48, p < .001, ηp2 = .07. Post-hoc comparisons indicated that evacuation intentions where
highest at decision point 3 (M = 4.78, SD = 2.00), which was significantly higher than both
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decision point 1 (M = 4.21, SD = 1.66; p < .001), and decision point 2 (M = 4.18, SD = 2.05; p <
.001). However, decision point 1 and 2 were not significantly different from each other (p = .82).
There was a significant main effect of change in severity on evacuation intentions, F(2,
188) = 16.47, p < .001, ηp2 = .15. Post-hocs indicated that all conditions were significantly
different from each other. Participants in the increase condition indicated that they were more
likely to evacuate (M = 5.06, SD = 1.44) than those in the no change condition (M = 4.46, SD =
1.29; p =.02), and the decrease condition (M = 3.65, SD = 1.44; p < .001). Those in the no
change condition were significantly more likely than those in the decrease condition to have
evacuation intentions (p = .001).
There was a significant interaction between change in severity and decision point, F(4,
376) = 31.46, p < .001, ηp2 = .25. Post-hocs from a follow-up paired samples t-test indicated
significant differences between all three decision points for those in the decrease condition, such
that evacuation intentions were moderate at decision point 1 (M = 4.45, SD = 1.65) and
significantly decreased at decision point 2, (M = 2.54, SD = 1.66; p < .001) and significantly
increased from decision point 2 to decision point 3 (M = 3.98, SD = 1.90; p < .001). Evacuation
intentions were only marginally different from decision point 1 to decision point 3 (p = .046).
For those in the no change condition, there were no differences between decision point 1 (M =
4.09, SD = 1.47) and decision point 2 (M = 4.32, SD =1 .44; p = .09), but decision point 1 and
decision point 3 (M = 4.97, SD = 1.84) were significantly different (p = .004). Evacuation
intentions significantly increased from decision point 2 and decision point 3 (p < .001) in the no
change condition. For those in the increase condition, there were significant differences between
decision point 1 (M = 4.09, SD = 1.86) and 2 (M = 5.69, SD =1.71; p < .001), and decision point
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1 and 3 (M = 5.39, SD = 2.02; p < .001), but not between decision point 2 and decision point 3 (p
= .24). See Table 17 and Figure 21.

Table 17. Evacuation Intentions, Decision Point by Change in Severity Interaction: Statistics from Follow-up
Paired Samples t-test
Condition
Decrease

Pair

t-statistic

df

p-value

Cohen’s d

Evacuation D1 & D2
Evacuation D2 & D3
Evacuation D1 & D3

10.50
-6.53
2.03

64
64
64

< .001
< .001
.046

1.12
-0.76
0.24

Evacuation D1 & D2
Evacuation D2 & D3
Evacuation D1 & D3

-1.74
-2.97
-3.71

64
64
64

.09
.001
< .001

-0.21
-0.34
-0.42

Evacuation D1 & D2
Evacuation D2 & D3
Evacuation D1 & D3

-7.03
1.19
-4.51

63
63
63

< .001
.24
< .001

-0.93
0.17
-0.59

No Change

Increase

Evacuation: Decision Point x Change
1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) scale

7

6

5
Decision point 1
4

Decision point 2
Decision point 3

3

2

1

DECREASE

NO CHANGE

INCREASE

Figure 21. Evacuation Intentions: A Decision Point by Change in Severity Interaction
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There was no main effect of fear, F(1, 188) = 3.45, p = .07, ηp2 =.02, nor was there a
change in severity by fear interaction, F(2, 188) = 0.28, p = .76, ηp2 = .01. There was no
significant interaction between fear and decision point, F(2, 376) = 1.49, p = .23, ηp2 = .01 or a
significant 3-way interaction between change in severity, fear, and decision point, F(4, 376) =
0.60, p = .66, ηp2 = .01.

Change Score
A 3 (change in severity: increase, decrease, or no change) x 2 (recommendation: fear
language or neutral language) ANOVA was conducted using the difference score from decision
point 2 to decision point 3 as the dependent measure.
There was no fear by change in severity interaction, F(2, 188) = 0.69, p = .50, ηp2 = .007.
There was no main effect of fear, F(1, 188) = 2.64, p = .11, ηp2 = .02. However, those who read
the fear message had a larger change in evacuation intentions (M = 0.81, SD = 1.89) than for
those who read the neutral message (M = 0.39, SD = 2.04).
There was a significant main effect of change in severity, F(2, 188) = 14.65, p < .001, ηp2
= .14. Those who were in the decrease condition had the greatest change in evacuation intentions
(M = 1.45, SD = 1.79), which was significantly greater than the no change condition (M = 0.65,
SD = 1.75; p = .01), and those in the increase condition (M = -0.30, SD = 2.00; p < .001). Those
who were in the decrease condition had significantly higher change scores than those in the
increase condition (p = .004). This suggests that those in the decrease condition had the largest
positive change in evacuation intentions, regardless of the recommendation type. The
recommendation seems to have had a negative influence on those in the increase condition, as
their evacuation intentions decreased.
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Relocation
There was a significant main effect of decision point on relocation intentions, F(2, 376) =
84.13, p < .001, ηp2 = .31. Post-hoc comparisons indicated that relocation intentions where
highest at decision point 3 (M = 5.57, SD = 1.67), which was significantly higher than both
decision point 1 (M = 4.13, SD = 1.70; p < .001), and decision point 2 (M = 3.88, SD = 2.04; p <
.001). However, decision point 1 and 2 were only marginally significantly different from each
other (p = .05).
There was a significant main effect of change in severity on relocation intentions, F(2,
188) = 10.75, p < .001, ηp2 = .10. Post-hocs indicated that participants in the decrease in severity
condition were less likely to relocate (M = 3.94, SD = 1.32) than those in the no change condition
(M = 4.64, SD = 1.18; p =.01), and in the increase condition (M = 5.01, SD = 1.45, p < .001).
However, the increase condition and the no change condition were not significantly different
from each other (p = .11)
There was a significant interaction between change in severity and decision point, F(4,
376) = 9.81, p < .001, ηp2 = .09. Post-hocs from a follow-up paired samples t-test indicated
significant differences between each decision point for those in the decrease condition (p < .001).
Relocation intentions at decision point 1 were moderate (M = 4.18, SD = 1.60), and significantly
decreased at decision point 2 (M = 2.69, SD = 1.76), but significantly increased at decision point
3 (M =4.95, SD = 1.82). For those in the no change condition, relocation intentions significantly
increased from decision point 1 (M = 3.92, SD = 1.62) to decision point 2 (M = 4.28, SD = 1.50;
p = .02), and significantly increased from decision point 2 to decision point 3 (M = 5.69, SD =
1.47; p < .001). Relocation intentions were significantly higher at decision point 3 than decision
point 1 (p < .001) in the no change condition. For those in the condition where the hurricane
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increased, there was no significant increase from decision point 1 (M = 4.30, SD = 1.87) to
decision point 2 (M = 4.67, SD = 2.25; p = .18). However, relocation intentions did increase from
decision point 2 to decision point 3 (M = 6.06, SD = 1.59; p < .001). Relocation intentions were
significantly higher at decision point 3 than decision point 1 (p < .001) for the increase condition.
See Table 18 and Figure 22.

Table 18. Relocation Intentions, Decision Point by Change in Severity Interaction: Statistics from Follow-up
Paired Samples t-test
Condition
Decrease

Pair

t-statistic

df

p-value

Cohen’s d

Relocation D1 & D2
Relocation D2 & D3
Relocation D1 & D3

6.74
-8.97
-3.13

64
64
64

< .001
< .001
.01

0.88
-1.09
-0.42

Relocation D1 & D2
Relocation D2 & D3
Relocation D1 & D3

-2.39
-6.52
-7.06

64
64
64

.02
<.001
< .001

-0.29
-0.82
-0.84

Relocation D1 & D2
Relocation D2 & D3
Relocation D1 & D3

-1.37
-5.21
-6.29

63
63
63

.18
< .001
< .001

-0.19
-0.82
-0.73

No Change

Increase
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Relocate: Decision Point x Change
1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) scale

7

6

5
Decision point 1
4

Decision point 2
Decision point 3

3

2

1
DECREASE

NO CHANGE

INCREASE

Figure 22. Relocation Intentions: A Decision Point by Change in Severity Interaction

There was no main effect of fear, F(1, 188) = 0.53, p = .47, ηp2 = .01, nor was there a
change in severity by fear interaction, F(2, 188) = 0.60, p = .55, ηp2 = .01. There was no
significant interaction between fear and decision point, F(2, 376) = 0.38 p = .68, ηp2 = .01 or a
significant 3-way interaction between change in severity, fear, and decision point, F(4, 376) =
0.52, p = .72, ηp2 = .01.

Change Score
There was no fear by change in severity interaction, F(2, 188) = 0.36, p =.70, ηp2 = .004.
There was no main effect of fear, F(1, 188) = 0.17, p = .68, ηp2 = .001. Although not significant,
those who read the fear message had a larger change for relocation intentions (M = 1.75, SD =
2.11) than for those who read the neutral message (M = 1.63, SD = 1.91).
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There was a significant main effect of change in severity on the change in relocation
intentions, F(2, 188) = 4.03, p = .02, ηp2 = .04. Those who were in the decrease condition had the
largest change (M = 2.26, SD = 2.03), which was significantly higher than the no change
condition (M = 1.42, SD = 1.75; p = .02) and the increase condition (M = 1.39, SD = 2.14; p =
.01). However, there was no significant difference between the no change condition and increase
condition (p = .96). This suggests that those in the decrease condition had the largest positive
change in relocation intentions, regardless of the recommendation type. The recommendation
seems to have had a positive influence on all conditions, as all groups’ relocation intentions
increased.

Shelter-in-Place
There was a significant main effect of decision point on shelter-in-place intentions, F(2,
376) = 50.88, p < .001, ηp2 = .21. Post-hoc comparisons indicated that the three decision points
were significantly different from each other (p < .001). Sheltering intentions where highest at
decision point 1 (M = 4.47, SD = 1.71), followed by decision point 2 (M = 4.11, SD = 1.94), and
decision point 3 (M = 3.12, SD = 1.90).
There was a significant main effect of change in severity on sheltering intentions, F(2,
188) = 8.58, p < .001, ηp2 = .08. Post-hocs indicated that participants in the increase condition
were less likely to shelter (M = 3.32, SD = 1.39) than those in the no change condition (M = 4.13,
SD = 1.38; p = .001), and the decrease condition (M = 4.26, SD = 1.38; p < .001). However, the
decrease condition and the no change condition were not significantly different from each other
(p = .61)
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There was a significant interaction between change in severity and decision point, F(4,
376) =10.51, p < .001, ηp2 = .10. Post hocs from a follow-up paired sample t-test indicated
significant differences between decision points for those in the decrease condition. Shelter-inplace intentions were moderate at decision point 1 (M = 4.26, SD = 1.79), and significantly
increased at decision point 2 (M = 4.85, SD = 1.71; p = .01), and significantly decreased from
decision point 2 to decision point 3 (M = 3.65, SD = 1.93, p < .001). Shelter-in-place intentions
at decision point 3 were significantly lower than decision point 1 for those in the decrease
condition (p = .01). For those in the no change condition, there were no significant differences
between decision point 1 (M = 4.62, SD = 1.64) and decision point 2 (M = 4.46, SD = 1.61; p =
.28). However, there was a significant decrease in shelter-in-place intentions between decision
point 2 and decision point 3 (M = 3.31, SD = 1.82; p < .001). Likewise, there was a significant
difference between decision point 1 and decision point 3 (p < .001). For those in the increase
condition, there was a significant difference between all three decision points. Shelter-in-place
intentions significantly decreased from decision point 1 (M = 4.55, SD = 1.72) to decision point 2
(M = 3.01, SD = 1.82; p < .001), and from decision point 2 to decision point 3 (M = 2.41, SD =
1.72; p = .02). Shelter-in-place intentions at decision point 3 were significantly lower than at
decision point 3 (p < .001). See Table 19 and Figure 23.
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Table 19. Shelter-in-Place Intentions, Decision Point by Change in Severity Interaction: Statistics from
Follow-up Paired Samples t-test
Condition
Decrease

Pair

t-statistic

df

p-value

Cohen’s d

Shelter-in-Place D1 & D2
Shelter-in-Place D2 & D3
Shelter-in-Place D1 & D3

-2.57
4.28
2.50

64
64
64

.01
< .001
.02

-0.31
0.50
0.29

Shelter-in-Place D1 & D2
Shelter-in-Place D2 & D3
Shelter-in-Place D1 & D3

1.08
5.26
5.19

64
64
64

.28
<.001
< .001

0.14
0.61
0.61

Shelter-in-Place D1 & D2
Shelter-in-Place D2 & D3
Shelter-in-Place D1 & D3

5.65
2.50
8.40

63
63
63

< .001
.02
< .001

0.77
0.34
0.56

No Change

Increase

Shelter in Place: Decision Point x Change
1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) scale

7

6

5

Decision point 1
4

Decision point 2
Decision point 3

3

2

1
DECREASE

NO CHANGE

INCREASE

Figure 23. Shelter-in-Place Intentions: A Decision Point by Change in Severity Interaction
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There was no main effect of fear, F(1, 188) = 2.93, p = .08, ηp2 = .02, nor was there a
change in severity by fear interaction, F(2, 188) = 0.15, p = .86, ηp2 = .01. There was no
significant interaction between fear and decision point, F(2, 376) = 1.27, p = .28, ηp2 = .01 or a
significant 3-way interaction between change in severity, fear, and decision point, F(4, 376) =
0.40, p = .80, ηp2 = .01.

Change Score
There was no fear by change in severity interaction, F(2, 188) = 0.80, p =.92, ηp2 = .001.
There was no main effect of fear, F(1, 188) = 0.08, p = .93, ηp2 < .01. Those who read the fear
message had a similar decline in sheltering intentions (M = -1.00, SD = 2.14) to those who read
the neutral message (M = -0.98, SD = 1.87). However, sheltering decisions decreased for both
conditions from decision point 2 to decision point 3.
There was no main effect of change in severity, F(2, 188) = 1.72, p = .18, ηp2 = .02.
Those in the decrease condition had the largest decrease in sheltering intentions (M = -1.20, SD =
2.26), followed by those in the no change condition (M = -1.15, SD = 1.77), and the increase
condition (M = -0.61, SD = 1.95). This suggests shelter-in-place decisions decreased from
decision point 2 to decision point 3, regardless of condition.

Perceptions of the Storm and Warning
Next, additional analyses were conducted with variables related to participants’
perceptions of the storm and the warning. The following analyses were 3 (change in severity:
increase, decrease, or no change) x 2 (recommendation: fear language or neutral language) x 3
(decision point) mixed ANOVAs. The severity and the recommendation were between-subjects
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variables, whereas the decision points were within-subjects variables. The following sections are
divided by dependent variables.

Scariness
There was a significant main effect of decision point on perceived scariness, F(2, 376) =
14.48, p < .001, ηp2 = .07. Post-hocs indicated that perceptions that the storm was scary were
highest at decision point 3 (M = 4.79, SD = 1.85) and lowest at decision point 2 (M = 4.26, SD =
1.94; p < .001). Decision point 1 (M = 4.38, SD = 1.55) and decision point 3 were not
significantly different from each other (p = .29), but decision point 1 and decision point 2 were
different (p < .001).
There was a main effect of change in severity, F(2, 188) = 15.98, p < .001, ηp2 = .15.
Those in the decrease condition had the lowest perceptions that the hurricane was scary (M =
3.74, SD = 1.41), followed by those in the no change condition (M = 4.61, SD = 1.39), and those
in the increase condition had the highest perceived scariness (M = 5.09, SD = 1.36). Those in the
decrease condition had significantly lower perceptions that the hurricane was scary compared to
the other conditions (p < .001). Those in the no change condition had significantly lower ratings
of perceived scariness than those in the increase condition (p = .04).
There was a change in severity by decision point interaction on perceived scariness, F(4,
376) = 44.09, p < .001, ηp2 = .32. A follow-up paired samples t-test was conducted. For those in
the decrease condition, there was a significant difference between the perceived scariness of the
hurricane between decision point 1 (M = 4.58, SD = 1.50) and decision point 2 (M = 2.78, SD =
1.69, p < .001), and a significant increase between decision point 2 and decision point 3 (M =
3.86, SD = 1.91, p < .001). The rating of perceived seriousness was significantly lower at
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decision point 3 than at decision point 1 (p = .01). For those in the no change condition, there
was no significant difference between perceptions at decision point 1 (M = 4.43, SD = 1.47) and
decision point 2 (M = 4.45, SD = 1.56; p = .91). However, there was a significant increase in
perceived scariness between decision point 2 and decision point 3 (M = 4.94, SD = 1.62; p =
.001). Likewise, there was a significant difference between decision point 1 and 3 (p = .001). For
those in the increase condition, there was a significant difference from decision point 1 (M =
4.13, SD = 1.67) to decision point 2 (M = 5.58, SD = 1.45; p < .001), but not from decision point
2 to decision point 3 (M = 5.58, SD = 1.60; p = 1.00) However, ratings of perceived scariness
were significantly higher at decision point 3 than decision point 1 (p < .001). See Table 20 and
Figure 24.

Table 20. Perceived Scariness, Decision Point by Change in Severity Interaction, Statistics from Follow-up
Paired Samples t-test
Condition
Decrease

Pair

t-statistic

df

p-value

Cohen’s d

Perceived Scariness D1 & D2
Perceived Scariness D2 & D3
Perceived Scariness D1 & D3

8.79
-5.74
3.23

64
64
64

< .001
< .001
.002

1.17
-0.68
0.36

Perceived Scariness D1 & D2
Perceived Scariness D2 & D3

-0.11
-3.34

64
64

.92
.001

-0.02
-0.40

Perceived Scariness D1 & D3

-3.37

64

.001

-0.41

Perceived Scariness D1 & D2
Perceived Scariness D2 & D3
Perceived Scariness D1 & D3

-7.92
0.00
-7.75

63
63
63

< .001
1.00
< .001

-1.12
0.00
-0.97

No Change

Increase
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Perceived Scariness: Decision Point x Change in Severity

1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) scale

7

6

5
Decision point 1
4

Decision point 2
Decision point 3

3

2

1
DECREASE

NO CHANGE

INCREASE

Figure 24. Perceived Scariness: A Decision Point by Change in Severity Interaction

There was no main effect of fear language, F(1, 188) = 1.85, p = .18, ηp2 = .01, and no
interaction between fear and change in severity F(2, 188) = 1.97, p = .14, ηp2 = .02. There was no
fear language by decision point interaction, F(2, 376) = 2.23, p =.11, ηp2 = .01 and no 3-way
interaction, F(4, 376) = 0.95, p = .44, ηp2 = .01.

Change Score
A follow-up 3 (change in severity: increase, decrease, or no change) x 2
(recommendation: fear language or neutral language) ANOVA was conducted using the
difference score from decision point 2 to decision point 3 as the dependent measure. There was
no fear by change in severity interaction, F(2, 188) = 2.35, p =.09, ηp2 = .02.
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There was a main effect of fear, F(1, 188) = 4.18, p = .04, ηp2 = .02. Those who read the
fear message had a significantly larger change in perceived scariness (M = 0.71, SD = 1.57) than
those who read the neutral message (M = 0.34, SD = 1.07).
There was a main effect of change in severity, F(2, 188) = 11.49, p < .001, ηp2 = .11.
Those in the decrease condition had the largest change in perceived scariness (M = 1.08, SD =
1.51), followed by those in the no change condition (M = 0.49, SD = 1.19), and the increase
condition (M = 0.00, SD = 1.12). Post-hocs indicated that those in the decrease condition had a
larger change than those in the increase condition (p < .001) and the no change condition (p =
.01). Those in the no change condition had a larger change than those in the increase condition (p
= .03).

Seriousness
There was a significant main effect of decision point on perceived seriousness, F(2, 376)
= 20.14, p < .001, ηp2 = .10. Post-hocs indicated that perceptions that the storm was serious were
highest at decision point 3 (M = 5.64, SD = 1.58) and lowest at decision point 2 (M = 5.07, SD =
1.88; p < .001). Decision point 1 (M = 5.51, SD = 1.24) and decision point 3 were not
significantly different from each other (p =.15), but decision point 1 and decision point 2 were
different (p < .001).
There was a main effect of change in severity, F(2, 188) = 36.08, p < .001, ηp2 = .28. All
conditions were significantly different from each other (p < .001). Those in the decrease
condition had the lowest perceptions that the hurricane was serious (M = 4.56, SD = 1.43),
followed by those in the no change condition (M = 5.53, SD = 0.98), and those in the increase
condition had the highest perceived seriousness (M = 6.15, SD = 0.72).
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There was a change in severity by decision point interaction on perceived seriousness,
F(4, 376) = 63.60, p < .001, ηp2 = .40. A follow-up paired samples t-test was conducted. For
those in the decrease condition, there was a significant difference between perceived seriousness
of the hurricane between decision point 1 (M = 5.74, SD = 1.15) and decision point 2 (M = 3.42,
SD = 1.91; p < .001), and a significant increase between decision point 2 and decision point 3 (M
= 4.51, SD = 1.93; p < .001). The rating of perceived seriousness was significantly lower at
decision point 3 than at decision point 1 (p < .001). For those in the no change condition, there
were no differences between perceptions at decision point 1 (M = 5.45, SD = 1.28) and decision
point 2 (M = 4.37, SD = 1.17; p = .58). However, there was a significant increase in perceived
seriousness between decision point 2 and decision point 3 (M = 5.78, SD = 1.05; p < .001).
Likewise, there was a significant difference between decision point 1 and 3 (p = .001). For those
in the increase condition, there was a significant difference from decision point 1 (M = 5.33, SD
= 1.23) to decision point 2 (M = 6.45, SD = 0.94; p < .001), but not from decision point 2 to
decision point 3 (M = 6.66, SD = 0.57; p = .06). However, ratings of perceived seriousness were
significantly higher at decision point 3 than decision point 1 (p < .001). See Table 21 and Figure
25.
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Table 21. Perceived Seriousness, Decision Point by Change in Severity Interaction: Statistics from Follow-up
Paired Samples t-test
Condition
Decrease

Pair

t-statistic

df

p-value

Cohen’s d

Perceived Seriousness D1 & D2
Perceived Seriousness D2 & D3
Perceived Seriousness D1 & D3

11.29
-6.29
5.86

64
64
64

< .001
< .001
< .001

2.04
-0.77
0.63

Perceived Seriousness D1 & D2
Perceived Seriousness D2 & D3
Perceived Seriousness D1 & D3

0.56
-3.52
-2.25

64
64
64

.58
.001
.03

0.07
-0.46
-0.31

Perceived Seriousness D1 & D2
Perceived Seriousness D2 & D3
Perceived Seriousness D1 & D3

-6.60
-1.94
-8.88

63
63
63

< .001
.06
< .001

-0.46
-0.36
-2.08

No Change

Increase

Perceived Seriousness: Decision Point x Change
1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) scale

7

6

5
Decision point 1
4

Decision point 2
Decision point 3

3

2

1
DECREASE

NO CHANGE

INCREASE

Figure 25. Perceived Seriousness: A Decision Point by Change in Severity Interaction

There was no main effect of fear language, F(1, 188) = 1.85, p = .18, ηp2 = .01, and no
interaction between fear and change in severity F(2, 188) = 1.97, p = .14, ηp2 = .02. There was no
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fear language by decision point interaction, F(2, 376) = 12.85, p = .06, ηp2 = .02 and no 3-way
interaction, F(4, 376) = 0.94, p = .44, ηp2 = .01.

Change Score
There was a main effect of fear, F(1, 188) = 6.87, p = .01, ηp2 = .04. Those who read the
fear message had a significantly larger change in perceived seriousness (M = 0.77, SD = 1.27)
than those who read the neutral message (M = 0.37, SD = 0.98).
There was a main effect of change in severity, F(2, 188) = 12.10, p < .001, ηp2 = .11.
Those in the decrease condition had the largest change in perceived seriousness (M = 1.09, SD =
1.40), followed by those in the no change condition (M = 0.42, SD = 0.95), and the increase
condition (M = 0.20, SD = 0.84). Post-hocs indicated that those in the decrease condition had a
larger change than those in the increase condition (p < .001) and the no change condition (p <
.001). Those in the no change condition did not differ from those in the increase condition (p =
.26). There was no fear by change in severity interaction, F(2, 188) = 2.24, p =.11, ηp2 = .02.

Persuasiveness
There was a significant main effect of decision point on perceived message
persuasiveness, F(2, 376) = 57.73, p < .001, ηp2 = .24. Post-hoc comparisons indicated that
perceived severity where highest at decision point 3 (M = 5.74, SD = 1.31), which was
significantly higher than both decision point 1 (M = 4.82, SD = 1.48; p < .001), and decision
point 2 (M = 4.69, SD = 1.77; p < .001). However, decision point 1 and 2 were not significantly
different from each other (p = .23).
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There was a significant main effect of change in the hurricane’s severity on perceived
message persuasiveness, F(2, 188) = 11.74, p < .001, ηp2 = .11. Post-hocs indicated that those in
the increase condition found the message more persuasive (M = 5.53, SD = 1.12) than those in
the decrease condition (M = 4.57, SD = 1.25; p < .001). Likewise, those in the no change
condition (M = 5.16, SD = 1.07) found the message more persuasive than those in the decrease
condition (p =.01). There was no significant difference between those in the increase condition
and the no change condition (p = .06).
There was a significant interaction between change in severity and decision point on
perceived message persuasiveness, F(4, 376) = 20.19, p < .001, ηp2 = .18. A follow-up paired
samples t-test was conducted. For those in the decrease condition, there was a significant
decrease between the perceived persuasiveness of the warnings between decision point 1 (M =
4.92, SD = 1.49) and decision point 2 (M = 3.54, SD = 1.77; p < .001), and a significant increase
between decision point 2 and decision point 3 (M = 5.25, SD = 1.52; p < .001). However, there
were no differences between decision point 1 and decision point 3 (p = .12). For those in the no
change condition, there were no differences between perceptions at decision point 1 (M = 4.82,
SD = 1.32) and decision point 2 (M = 4.92, SD = 1.37; p = .46). However, there was a significant
increase in perceived persuasiveness of the message between decision point 2 and decision point
3 (M = 5.74, SD = 1.09; p < .001). Likewise, there was a significant difference between decision
point 1 and 3 (p < .001). For those in the increase condition, there were significant differences
between all pairs (p < .001). Perceived persuasiveness of the message increased from decision
point 1 (M = 4.73, SD = 1.63) to decision point 2 (M = 5.63, SD = 1.48), and from decision point
2 to decision point 3 (M = 6.23, SD = 1.10). See Table 22 and Figure 26.
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Table 22. Perceived Message Persuasiveness, Decision Point by Change in Severity Interaction: Statistics
from Follow-up Paired Samples t-test
Condition
Decrease

Pair

t-statistic

df

p-value

Cohen’s d

Persuasiveness D1 & D2
Persuasiveness D2 & D3
Persuasiveness D1 & D3

6.63
-7.47
-1.58

64
64
64

< .001
< .001
.12

0.91
-1.01
-0.20

Persuasiveness D1 & D2
Persuasiveness D2 & D3
Persuasiveness D1 & D3

-0.74
-5.89
-5.94

64
64
64

.46
< .001
< .001

-0.09
-0.85
-0.82

Persuasiveness D1 & D2
Persuasiveness D2 & D3
Persuasiveness D1 & D3

-4.85
-3.46
-7.44

63
63
63

< .001
.001
< .001

-0.58
-0.51
-1.20

No Change

Increase

Persuasiveness: Decision Point x Change
1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) scale

7

6

5
Decision point 1
4

Decision point 2
Decision point 3

3

2

1
DECREASE

NO CHANGE

INCREASE

Figure 26. Perceived Message Persuasiveness: A Decision Point by Change in Severity Interaction

There was a significant interaction between fear and decision point, F(2, 376) = 5.84, p =
.01, ηp2 = .03. Post-hocs were computed using a follow-up paired samples t-test. For those in the
neutral language condition, there was no difference in perceived message persuasiveness
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between decision point 1 (M = 4.85, SD =1.62) and decision point 2 (M = 4.87, SD = 1.78; p =
.95). However, there was a significant increase from decision point 2 to decision point 3 (M =
5.56, SD = 1.37; p < .001). Perceptions at decision point 3 were significantly higher than
decision point 1 (p < .001). For those in the fear language condition, there was no difference in
perceived message persuasiveness between decision point 1 (M = 4.79, SD = 1.34) and decision
point 2 (M = 4.52, SD = 1.75; p = .14). However, there was a significant increase from decision
point 2 to decision point 3 (M = 5.91, SD = 1.23; p < .001). Perceptions at decision point 3 were
significantly higher than decision point 1 (p < .001). See Table 23 and Figure 27. The difference
between those who read the fear language and those who read the neutral language at decision
point 3 was only marginally significant (p = .06). Although the mean for perceived message
persuasiveness is larger for those in the neutral condition than those in the fear condition, this
different was not significant (p > .05).

Table 23. Perceived Message Persuasiveness, Decision Point by Fear Language Interaction: Statistics from
Follow-up Paired Samples t-test
Condition
Fear Language

Pair

t-statistic

df

p-value

Cohen’s d

Persuasiveness D1 & D2
Persuasiveness D2 & D3
Persuasiveness D1 & D3

1.50
-8.52
-6.98

98
98
98

.14
< .001
< .001

0.18
-1.08
-0.73

Persuasiveness D1 & D2
Persuasiveness D2 & D3
Persuasiveness D1 & D3

-0.06
-4.79
-4.39

94
94
94

.95
< .001
< .001

-0.01
-0.59
-0.50

Neutral Language
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Persuasiveness: Decision Point x Fear
1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) scale

7

6

5
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4
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3
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1
Decision point 1

Decision point 2

Decision point 3

Figure 27. Perceived Message Persuasiveness: A Decision Point by Fear Language Interaction

There was no main effect of fear, F(1, 188) = 0.04, p = .84, ηp2 < .01, nor was there a
change in severity by fear interaction, F(2, 188) = 1.72, p = .18, ηp2 = .02. There was not a
significant 3-way interaction between change in severity, fear, and decision point, F(4, 376) =
1.44, p = .22, ηp2 = .02.

Change Score
There was a main effect of fear, F(1, 188) = 11.99, p = .001, ηp2 = .06. Those who read
the fear message had a significantly larger change in perceived message persuasiveness (M =
1.49, SD = 1.63) than those who read the neutral message (M = 0.68, SD = 1.39) from decision
point 2 to decision point 3.
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There was a main effect of change in severity, F(2, 188) = 10.68, p < .001, ηp2 = .10.
Those in the decrease condition had the largest change in perceived message persuasiveness (M
= 1.71, SD = 1.84), followed by those in the no change condition (M = 0.82, SD = 1.11), and the
increase condition (M = 0.60, SD = 1.41). Post-hocs indicated that those in the decrease
condition had a larger change than those in the increase condition (p < .001) and the no change
condition (p = .001). There were no significant differences between those in the increase
condition and those in the no change condition (p = .39). There was no fear by change in severity
interaction, F(2, 188) = 2.07, p =.13, ηp2 = .02.

Need for Cognition
Discriminating Value
The next goal of the analysis was to better understand the relationship between the
language in the warning message, the change in the hurricane’s severity, and participants’ Need
for Cognition. A median split was conducted on Need for Cognition to transform it into a
dichotomous variable (Mdn = 14.00). First, a planned 2 (fear language or neutral language) x 3
(change in severity) x 2 (low Need for Cognition or high Need for Cognition) between-subjects
ANOVA was conducted using the discriminating value (i.e., continuous variable) as the
dependent variable to determine whether the effect that fear stimuli has on whether people
undergo the danger or fear control process depends on one’s Need for Cognition.
There was no significant 3-way interaction, F(2, 182) = 1.15, p = .32, ηp2 = .01, no
interaction between Need for Cognition and fear language, F(1, 182) = 1.11, p = .30, ηp2 = .01,
and no interaction between change in severity and Need for Cognition, F(2, 182) = 0.16, p = .85,
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ηp2 = .01. There was also no main effect of Need for Cognition, F(1, 182) = 0.13, p = .72, ηp2 =
.01.
In a series of follow-up exploratory analyses, Need for Cognition was examined to
understand whether those low or high in Need for Cognition were more likely to have a
significant change in their ratings of the storm and the warning from decision point 2 to decision
point 3.
The analyses were 3 (change in severity: increase, decrease, or no change) x 2
(recommendation: fear language or neutral language) x 2 (low Need for Cognition or High Need
for Cognition) ANOVAs using the difference score from decision point 2 to decision point 3 as
the dependent measure. The following sections are organized by dependent variable.

Perceived Threat
There was no 3-way interaction, F(2, 182) = 0.10, p = .90, ηp2 = .01, no interaction
between fear and Need for Cognition, F(1, 182) = 1.08, p = .30, ηp2 = .01, and no interaction
between change in severity and Need for Cognition, F(2, 182) = 0.56, p = .58, ηp2 = .01. There
was also no main effect of Need for Cognition, F(1, 182) = 0.64, p = .69, ηp2 = .01. Due to the
lack of significance, the variables that comprise perceived threat (i.e., perceived severity and
perceived susceptibility) were not further explored.

Evacuation Intentions
There was no 3-way interaction, F(2, 182) = 0.70, p = .50, ηp2 = .01, no interaction
between fear and Need for Cognition, F(1, 182) = 0.03, p = .88, ηp2 < .01, and no interaction
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between change in severity and Need for Cognition, F(2, 182) = 0.06, p = .95, ηp2 = .01. There
was also no main effect of Need for Cognition, F(1, 182) = 0.15, p = .70, ηp2 = .01.

Relocation Intentions
There was no 3-way interaction, F(2, 182) = 0.02, p = .98, ηp2 < .01, no interaction
between fear and Need for Cognition, F(1, 182) = 0.14, p = .71, ηp2 = .01, and no interaction
between change in severity and Need for Cognition, F(2, 182) = 0.26, p = .77, ηp2 = .01. There
was also no main effect of Need for Cognition, F(1, 182) = 0.58, p = .45, ηp2 = .01.

Shelter-in-Place Intentions
There was no 3-way interaction, F(2, 182) = 1.10, p = .33, ηp2 = .01, no interaction
between fear and Need for Cognition, F(1, 182) = 0.70, p = .40, ηp2 < .01, and no interaction
between change in severity and Need for Cognition, F(2, 182) = 0.41, p = .67, ηp2 = .01. There
was also no main effect of Need for Cognition, F(1, 182) = 0.01, p = .92, ηp2 < .01.

Scariness
There was no 3-way interaction, F(2, 182) = 0.37, p = .69, ηp2 = .01, no interaction
between fear and Need for Cognition, F(1, 182) = 0.95, p = .33, ηp2 = .01, and no interaction
between change in severity and Need for Cognition, F(2, 182) = 2.37, p = .09, ηp2 = .03. There
was also no main effect of Need for Cognition, F(1, 182) = 0.20, p = .65, ηp2 = .01.

Seriousness
There was no 3-way interaction, F(2, 182) = 0.37, p = .69, ηp2 = .01, no interaction
between fear and Need for Cognition, F(1, 182) = 0.56, p = .46, ηp2 = .01, and no interaction
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between change in severity and Need for Cognition, F(2, 182) = 1.52, p = .19, ηp2 = .02. There
was also no main effect of Need for Cognition, F(1, 182) = 0.03, p = .85, ηp2 < .01.

Persuasiveness
There was no 3-way interaction, F(2, 182) = 0.62, p = .54, ηp2 = .01, and no interaction
between change in severity and Need for Cognition, F(2, 182) = 0.24, p = .79, ηp2 = .01. There
was also no main effect of Need for Cognition, F(1, 182) = 0.03, p = .77, ηp2 < .01.
However, there was an interaction between fear and Need for Cognition, F(1, 182) =
4.80, p = .03, ηp2 = .03. Those who read the fear message and had a high Need for Cognition had
a larger change in perceived message persuasiveness (M = 1.58, SD = 1.70) than those with a
low Need for Cognition (M = 1.21, SD = 1.54). The opposite pattern existed for those who read
the neutral message, such that those with a low Need for Cognition had a larger change (M =
0.81, SD = 1.31) than those with a high Need for Cognition (M = 0.58, SD = 1.46). See Figure
28.
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Change in Perceived Message Persuasiveness: Fear Language
x Need for Cognition
Change in Perceived Message Persuasiveness
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Figure 28. Change in Perceived Message Persuasiveness: Fear Language by Need for Cognition Interaction

Sex Differences
Discriminating Value
First, a 3 (change in severity: increase, decrease, or no change) x 2 (recommendation:
fear language or neutral language) x 2 (sex: male or female) ANOVA was conducted using the
discriminating value as the dependent measure. There a significant 3-way interaction, F(2, 182)
= 4.14, p = .02, ηp2 = .04. Women who read the neutral message in the decrease condition (M = 1.60, SD = 0.98) had a larger negative discriminative value than women who read the fear
message in the decrease condition (M = -0.13, SD = 1.33; p < .001). Although men in the
decrease condition had negative values, they did not differ on whether they read the fear (M = 0.39, SD = 0.78) or neutral message (M = -0.54, SD = 1.44). This suggests that women, in
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particular, who read the neutral message were likely to be in the fear control process. Men (M =
0.34, SD = 1.21) and women (M = 0.16, SD = 0.80) in the no change condition and men (M =
0.41, SD = 1.12) and women (M = 0.43, SD = 0.88) increase condition were likely to be in the
danger control process, regardless of the language in the recommendation. See Figures 29 and
30.

Discriminating Value: Men
1
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Figure 29. Men’s Discriminating Value: An Interaction between Fear Language, Change in Severity, and Sex
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Discriminating Value: Women
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Figure 30. Women’s Discriminating Value: An Interaction between Fear Language, Change in Severity, and Sex.

There was no interaction between fear and sex, F(1, 182) = 0.16, p = .69, ηp2 = .01 and no
interaction between change in severity and sex, F(2, 182) = 0.64, p = .53, ηp2 = .01. There was
also no main effect of sex, F(1, 182) = 1.33, p = .25, ηp2 = .01.
In a series of exploratory analyses, sex differences were examined to understand whether
men or women were likely to have a significant change in their ratings of the storm and the
warning from decision point 2 to decision point 3. The analyses were 3 (change in severity:
increase, decrease, or no change) x 2 (recommendation: fear language or neutral language) x 2
(sex: male or female) ANOVAs using the difference score from decision point 2 to decision
point 3 as the dependent measure. The following sections are organized by dependent variable.
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Perceived Threat
There was no 3-way interaction between sex, fear language, and change in severity on
perceived threat, F(2, 182) = 1.53, p = .22, ηp2 = .02. There was also no fear language by sex
interaction, F(1, 182) = 0.82, p = .37, ηp2 = .01, or a change in severity by sex interaction, F(2,
182) = 0.93, p = .40, ηp2 = .01. However, there was a main effect of sex, F(1, 182) = 7.10, p =
.01, ηp2 = .04, such that women had a larger change (M = 1.22, SD = 2.22) in perceived threat
than men (M = 0.45, SD = 2.04).

Perceived Severity
There was no 3-way interaction between sex, fear language, and change in severity on
perceived severity, F(2, 182) = 1.24, p = .29, ηp2 = .01. There was also no fear language by sex
interaction, F(1, 182) = 1.31, p = .26, ηp2 = .01, or a change in severity by sex interaction, F(2,
182) = 1.50, p = .23, ηp2 = .02. There was also no main effect of sex, F(1, 182) =0.38, p = .54, ηp2
= .01. Although not significant, women had a higher change (M = 0.52, SD = 1.18) in perceived
severity than men (M = 0.41, SD = 1.14).

Perceived Susceptibility
There was no 3-way interaction between sex, fear language, and change in severity on
perceived susceptibility, F(2, 182) = 0.82, p = .44, ηp2 = .01. There was also no fear language by
sex interaction, F(1, 182) = 0.41, p = .52, ηp2 = .01, or a change in severity by sex interaction,
F(2, 182) = 0.06, p = .94, ηp2 = .01. However, there was a main effect of sex, F(1, 182) = 13.98,
p < .001, ηp2 = .07, such that women had a larger change (M = 0.75, SD =1.31) in perceived
susceptibility than men (M = 0.04, SD = 1.41).
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Evacuation Intentions
There was no 3-way interaction between sex, fear language, and change in severity on
evacuation intentions, F(2, 182) = 0.91, p = .41, ηp2 = .01. There was also no fear language by
sex interaction, F(1, 182) = 0.65, p = .42, ηp2 = .01, or a change in severity by sex interaction,
F(2, 182) = 0.59, p = .55, ηp2 = .01. However, there was a main effect of sex, F(1, 182) = 5.67, p
= .02, ηp2 = .03, such that women had a larger change (M = 0.89, SD = 1.79) in evacuation
intentions than men (M = 0.27, SD = 2.11).

Relocation Intentions
There was no 3-way interaction between sex, fear language, and change in severity on
relocation intentions, F(2, 182) = 0.56, p = .57, ηp2 = .01. There was no change in severity by sex
interaction, F(2, 182) = 2.44, p = .09, ηp2 = .03, or main effect of sex, F(1, 182) = .01, p = .96,
ηp2 < .01. However, there was a significant fear language by sex interaction, F(1, 182) = 5.92, p
= .02, ηp2 = .03, such that women had a larger change (M = 2.08, SD = 1.89) in evacuation
intentions when fear language was present compared to men (M = 1.37, SD = 2.06), but men had
a larger change (M = 2.00, SD = 2.06) in relocation intentions when neutral language was present
compared to women (M = 1.30, SD = 1.71). See Figure 31. However, it should be noted that men
and women’s intentions to relocate were not significantly different when they read the neutral
message (p > .05), whereas women had a significantly higher intention to relocate than men
when fear language was present (p = .03).
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Change in Relocation Intentions: Fear Language by Sex
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Figure 31. Change in Relocation Intentions: A Fear Language by Sex Interaction

Shelter-in-Place Intentions
There was no 3-way interaction between sex, fear language, and change in severity on
sheltering intentions, F(2, 182) = 1.97, p = 149, ηp2 = .02. There was also no fear language by
sex interaction, F(1, 182) = 0.05, p = .83, np2 < .01, or a change in severity by sex interaction,
F(2, 182) = 0.37, p = .70, ηp2 = .01. There was also no main effect of sex, F(1, 182) =0.05, p =
.83, ηp2 = .00. Although not significant, women had a larger decrease in their sheltering
intentions (M = -1.02, SD = 2.04) than men (M = -0.96, SD = 1.98).

Scariness
There was no 3-way interaction between sex, fear language, and change in severity on
perceived scariness, F(2, 182) = 2.13, p = .12, ηp2 = .02. There was no significant fear language
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by sex interaction, F(1, 182) = 1.45, p = .23, ηp2 = .01 or main effect of sex, F(1, 182) = 3.31, p =
.07, ηp2 = .02. However, there was a significant change in severity by sex interaction, F(2, 182) =
4.51, p = .01, ηp2 = .05, such that women had the largest increase in perceived scariness in the
decrease condition (M = 1.59, SD = 1.60), which was significantly greater than men (M = 0.52,
SD = 1.20; t(63) = -3.03, p = .01, d = 0.76) according to a follow-up independent samples t-test.
In the increase condition, there were no differences between women (M = 0.06, SD = 1.54) and
men (M = -0.07, SD = 0.78; t(62) = -0.44, p = .66, d = 0.11). In the no change condition, men and
women were approximately equal (t(63) = 0.89; p = .38, d = 0.22), but men (M = 0.63, SD =
1.45) had a larger change than women (M = 0.37, SD = 0.91).

Seriousness
There was no 3-way interaction between sex, fear language, and change in severity on
perceived scariness, F(2, 182) = 0.37, p = .69, ηp2 = .01. There was no significant fear language
by sex interaction, F(1, 182) = 0.02, p = .88, ηp2 < .01 and no significant change in severity by
sex interaction, F(2, 182) = 1.79, p = .17, ηp2 = .02. Additionally, there was no significant main
effect of sex, F(1, 182) = 2.10, p = .15, ηp2 = .01.

Persuasiveness
There was no 3-way interaction between sex, fear language, and change in severity on
perceived message persuasiveness, F(2, 182) = 0.09, p = .92, ηp2 = .01. There was no significant
fear language by sex interaction, F(1, 182) = 0.05, p = .82, ηp2 = .01. However, there was a
significant change in severity by sex interaction, F(2, 182) = 4.64, p = .01, ηp2 = .05, such that
women had the largest increase in perceived message persuasiveness in the decrease condition
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(M = 2.29, SD = 1.90), which was significantly greater than men (M = 1.06, SD = 1.57; t(63) = 2.83, p = .01, d = 0.71) according to a follow-up independent samples t-test. In the increase
condition, women had a larger increase (M = 0.97, SD = 1.55) in perceived message
persuasiveness than men (M = 0.20, SD = 1.13; t(62) = -2.25, p = .03, d = 0.57). In the no change
condition, men and women were approximately equal (t(63) = 1.01; p = .32, d = 0.25), but men
(M = 0.97, SD = 1.35) had a larger change than women (M = 0.69, SD = 0.87). See Figure 32.

Change in Perceived Message Persuasiveness: Change in
Severity by Sex
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Figure 32. Change in Perceived Message Persuasiveness: Change in Severity by Sex Interaction.

Additionally, there was a significant main effect of sex, F(1, 182) = 7.43, p = .01, ηp2 =
.04, such that women (M = 1.31, SD = 1.64) had larger changes in perceived message
persuasiveness than men (M = 0.75, SD = 1.40).

132

Need for Cognition and Sex Differences on Persuasion
The next goal of the analysis was to examine the combined effect of participants’ Need
for Cognition and biological sex on participants’ change in perception that the message was
persuasive from decision point 2 to decision point 3. See Table 24 for a frequency distribution of
those high and low on Need for Cognition by sex. An exploratory 2 (fear language or neutral
language) x 3 (change in severity) x 2 (participants’ biological sex) x 2 (low Need for Cognition
or high Need for Cognition) between-subjects ANOVA was conducted.

Table 24. Frequency Distribution of Need for Cognition by Sex

Low Need for Cognition
High Need for Cognition

Men
43
48

Women
49
54

There was no significant 3-way interaction between fear, sex, and Need for Cognition,
F(1, 170) = 1.06, p = .35, ηp2 = .01. However, there was a significant 4-way interaction, F(2,
170) = 3.38, p = .04, ηp2 = .04. See Table 25 for a summary of means and standard deviations.

Table 25. Means and Standard Deviations Summary Table for Change in Perceived Message Persuasiveness
Change in
Severity

Language
Men Low NFC

Women Low NFC

Men High NFC

Women - High
NFC

Neutral
Fear

-0.20 (0.84)
1.90 (2.08)

2.14 (1.68)
2.33 (1.73)

0.91 (0.83)
1.00 (1.58)

1.44 (2.24)
3.22 (1.72)

Neutral
Fear

1.00 (1.20)
0.22 (1.09)

0.80 (0.84)
1.00 (0.89)

1.00 (1.67)
1.86 (1.21)

0.46 (1.05)
0.73 (0.65)

Neutral
Fear

0.00 (0.00)
0.67 (1.03)

0.69 (1.25)
0.78 (0.67)

-0.40 (1.17)
0.67 (1.22)

-0.33 (0.58)
2.00 (2.24)

Decrease

No Change

Increase
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Comparison of Low Need for Cognition and High Need for Cognition Individuals
In order to interpret the 4-way interaction, two 3-way ANOVAs were conducted. The file
was split by the Need for Cognition (i.e., low vs. high) and a 2 (fear language or neutral
language) x 3 (change in severity) x 2 (participants’ biological sex) ANOVA was conducted.

Low Need for Cognition
Looking first at those with a low Need for Cognition, there was no 3-way interaction,
F(2, 80) = 2.11, p = .13, ηp2 = .05, no interaction between fear and sex, F(1, 80) = 0.78, p = .38,
ηp2 = .01, no interaction between change in severity and fear, F(2, 80) = 2.09, p = .13, ηp2 = .05,
and no interaction change in severity and sex, F(2, 80) = 1.52, p = .23, ηp2 = .05. There also was
no main effect of fear, F(1, 80) = 2.08, p = .15, ηp2 = .03.
There was a main effect of sex, F(1, 80) = 5.92, p = .02, ηp2 = .07, such that women with
a low Need for Cognition (M = 1.26, SD = 1.40) had a larger change in perceived message
persuasiveness than men with a low Need for Cognition (M = 0.74, SD = 1.47). There also was a
main effect of change in severity, F(2, 80) = 4.47, p = .01, ηp2 = .11. Those with a low Need for
Cognition had the largest change in the decrease condition (M = 1.74, SD = 1.88), which was
significantly greater than those no change (M = 0.71, SD = 1.05; p = .03) and increase conditions
(M = 0.61, SD = 0.97; p = .01). The no change and increase conditions were not significantly
different from each other (p = .53).
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High Need for Cognition
For high Need for Cognition individuals, there was no 3-way interaction, F(2, 90) = 1.42,
p = .25, ηp2 = .03, no interaction between fear and sex, F(1, 90) = 1.64, p = .20, ηp2 = .02, and no
interaction between change in severity and fear, F(2, 90) = 1.12, p = .33, ηp2 = .02.
There was a significant interaction between change in severity and sex, F(2, 90) = 5.02, p
= .01, ηp2 = .10. For High Need for Cognition individuals, women in the decrease condition (M =
2.33, SD = 2.14) had a significantly larger change in perceived message persuasiveness than men
(M = 0.94, SD = 1.06). Similarly, women (M = 1.42, SD = 2.19) had a larger change than men
(M = 0.10, SD = 1.29) in the increase condition. However, high Need for Cognition men in the
no change condition (M = 1.46, SD = 1.45) had a larger change in perceived message
persuasiveness than high Need for Cognition women in the no change condition (M = 0.58, SD =
0.88). See Figure 33.
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High Need for Cognition: Change in Severity by Sex
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Figure 33. High Need for Cognition Individuals’ Change in Perceived Message Persuasiveness: Change in Severity
by Sex Interaction

There was no main effect of sex, F(1, 90) = 1.81, p = .18, ηp2 = .02. There was a main
effect of fear, F(1, 90) = 12.01, p = .001, ηp2 = .12, such that individuals with a high Need for
Cognition had a larger change in perceived message persuasiveness if they read the fear message
(M = 1.58, SD = 1.70) than if they read the neutral message (M = 0.58, SD = 1.46). There also
was a main effect of change in severity, F(2, 90) = 4.54, p = .01, ηp2 = .09. Those with a high
Need for Cognition who were in the decrease condition had the largest change in perceived
message persuasiveness (M = 1.68, SD = 1.84), which was significantly greater than those in the
increase condition (M = 0.62, SD = 1.78; p = .01). However, there was no differences between
the decrease condition and the no change condition (M = 0.89, SD = 1.17; p = .08) or the no
change condition and the increase condition (p = .17).
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Comparison of Men and Women
In order to interpret the 4-way interaction, two additional 3-way ANOVAs were
conducted. The file was split by the Sex (i.e., men vs. women) and a 2 (fear language or neutral
language) x 3 (change in severity) x 2 (low Need for Cognition and high Need for Cognition)
ANOVA was conducted.

Men
First, the 3-way ANOVA for men was examined. There was a significant 3-way
interaction, F(2, 79) = 3.62, p = .03, ηp2 = .08. Low Need for Cognition men had a large change
in the decrease condition if they read the fear message (M = 1.90, SD = 2.08), whereas low Need
for Cognition men had a small negative change in their perception decrease condition if they
read the neutral message (M = -0.20, SD = 0.84). Men in the no change and increase conditions
were approximately equal in their change in perceptions, regardless of whether they read the fear
message. It should be noted that men in the increase condition who read the neutral message had
no change in their perceptions that the message persuasive. See Figure 34.
High Need for Cognition men are clearly distinguished in the increase condition, where
men had a larger positive increase in their perceptions that the message was persuasive if they
read the fear message (M = 0.67, SD = 1.22), whereas men who read the neutral message had a
negative change in their perceptions (M = -0.40, SD = 1.17). High Need for Cognition men are
approximately equal in the decrease and same conditions, regardless of message type. See Figure
35.
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Low Need for Cognition Men: Fear x Change in Severity
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Figure 34. Low Need for Cognition Men's Change in Perceived Message Persuasiveness: Fear by Change in
Severity Interaction
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High Need for Cognition Men: Fear x Change in
Severity
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Figure 35. High Need for Cognition Men's Change in Perceived Message Persuasiveness: Fear by Change in
Severity Interaction

There was no interaction between fear and Need for Cognition, F(1, 79) = 0.00, p = .99,
ηp2 < .01, no interaction between change in severity and Need for Cognition, F(2, 79) = 1.18, p =
.31, ηp2 = .02, and no interaction between change in severity and fear, F(2, 79) = 1.33, p = .27,
ηp2 = .03. There was no main effect of change in severity, F(2, 79) = 3.05, p = .05, ηp2 = .07.
There was a significant main effect of fear, F(1, 79) = 5.65, p = .02, ηp2 = .07, such that men who
read the fear message (M = 1.07, SD = 1.53) had larger changes in perceived message
persuasiveness than men who read the neutral message (M = 0.42, SD = 1.20).
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Women
Next, the 3-way ANOVA for women was examined. There was no significant 3-way
interaction, F(2, 91) = 1.05, p = .35, ηp2 = .02, no interaction between change in severity and
Need for Cognition, F(2, 91) = 0.19, p = .83, ηp2 = .01, and no interaction between change in
severity and fear, F(2, 91) = 0.89, p = .41, ηp2 = .02.
There was a significant interaction between fear and Need for Cognition, F(1, 91) = 4.39,
p = .04, ηp2 = .05, such that low Need for Cognition women who read the neutral message (M =
1.12, SD = 1.42) had a larger change in their perceptions that the massage was persuasive than
high Need for Cognition women (M = 0.72, SD = 1.62). However, high Need for Cognition
women who read the fear message (M = 1.90, SD = 1.88) had a larger change in their perceptions
that the massage was persuasive than low Need for Cognition women (M = 0.52, SD = 1.38). See
Figure 36.
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Women's Change in Perceived Message Persuasiveness: Fear
x Need for Cognition (NFC)
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Figure 36. Women's Change in Perceived Message Persuasiveness: Fear by Need for Cognition Interaction

There was main effect of change in severity, F(2, 91) = 11.48, p < .001, ηp2 = .20, such
that women in the decrease condition (M = 2.29, SD = 1.90) had the largest change in their
perceptions that the massage was persuasive, which was significantly greater than the no change
(M = 0.69, SD = 0.87) and increase condition (M = 0.97, SD = 1.55; p < .001). The increase and
no change condition were not significantly different (p = .93).
There was a significant main effect of fear, F(1, 91) = 6.80, p = .01, ηp2 = .07, such that
women who read the fear message (M = 1.67, SD = 1.67) had larger changes in perceived
message persuasiveness than women who read the neutral message (M = 0.92, SD = 1.52).
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Discussion
The experiment for study 3 involved three decision points after participants received
information. The first decision point was the same for all participants, they were informed that a
category 3 hurricane would soon be approaching. Right before decision point 2, participants
were informed that either the hurricane decreased to a category 1 hurricane, increased to a
category 5 hurricane, or stayed the same (i.e., change in severity manipulation). Then, right
before decision 3, participants received the protective action recommendation that contained fear
language or neutral language (i.e., fear manipulation).
Participants’ discriminating value (i.e., whether they were in the fear or danger control
process) could only be calculated after decision point 3 because it relates to their perception of
the recommendation. Overall, the data suggested that those in the decrease condition were in the
fear control process whereas those in the increase or no change condition were in the danger
control process. Additionally, those who read the neutral message were in the fear control
process and those who read the fear message were in the danger control process. These results
suggest two important findings. First, those who read re-worded fear recommendations based on
Morss et al. (2018) were more likely to be in the danger control process, which often leads
people to follow the recommendations because they are thinking about how they can deal with
the threat (i.e., efficacy), as opposed to thinking about their fear of the threat. The fear language
appearing in the protective action recommendation positively influenced participants’
perceptions that the storm was serious and their perceptions of their self-efficacy to avoid the
danger. Those who read the neutral message or were in the decrease condition were in the fear
control process, which suggests that they felt more threatened and less able to handle the threat.
This may have been due to a sense of ambiguity or uncertainty in the message, such that the
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statement of consequences was vague in the neutral message (i.e., “dangerous conditions”)
compared to the fear message (i.e., “life threatening conditions; injured or die from winds”).
Therefore, having to deal with uncertainty may have caused people to feel unable to deal with
the threat (i.e., low perception of efficacy) and deny the threat as a way to deal with their fear.
Additionally, this may have been due, in part, to confusion. Participants’ in the decrease
condition were instructed to relocate, although the hurricane had downgraded to a category 1
hurricane. This may have made them feel threatened, but unsure that the recommended action
was appropriate (i.e., response efficacy). However, there were no differences between conditions
on the measure of response efficacy.
The change from decision point 2 to decision point 3 was of particular interest and will be
further discussed. For participants’ perceived threat, the largest increase was seen for those who
read the fear recommendation in the decrease condition. In terms of behavioral intentions, those
in the decrease condition had the largest increase from decision point 2 to decision point 3 in
their evacuation and relocation intentions. Overall, this suggests that the situation where fear
language might be most effective is in the case of a hurricane that has decreased in intensity, but
still requires people to take action of some type (e.g., get supplies, secure outdoor furniture,
avoid certain locations). It should be noted that evacuation intentions and relocation intentions
were high at decision point 3, for all conditions. However, it is also worth noting that those in the
increase condition saw no change in their evacuation intentions from decision point 2 to decision
point 3, likely because their evacuation intentions were already extremely high at decision point
2 (i.e., after learning the hurricane was projected to be a category 5). All conditions had a
significant, positive change in relocation intentions, which is precisely what the recommendation
stated. This in an optimistic finding because it suggests that participants were compliant with the
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warning. Similarly, shelter-in-place intentions decreased from decision point 2 to decision point
3 in all conditions. This, too, is a positive finding because it suggests that participants understood
some action needed to be taken due to the approaching storm.
Participants’ perceptions that the storm was scary, serious, and that the message was
persuasive was measured. The participants who read the fear message had a larger change for all
three variables than those who read the neutral message. Additionally, the participants in the
decrease condition had the largest change in these perceptions, whereas those in the increase
condition had the smallest change. The hurricane increasing in intensity may be fear provoking
enough that a fear appeal does not add anything to increase the perceptions that the storm is
threatening. Those in the decrease condition had the largest opportunity for change in their
perceptions, and it seems that the fear appeal was the factor motivating behind this positive
change. The fear appeal also improved perceptions for those in the no change condition, but it
was not as impactful as it was for those in the decrease condition.
Next, analyses were conducted to get a better understanding of how the effects of fear
language and a hurricane’s change in intensity might depend on one’s Need for Cognition. There
was no effect of Need for Cognition on the discriminating value, change in perceived threat,
behavioral intentions, perceived scariness, or perceived seriousness. For participants change in
perceived message persuasiveness, there was a fear by Need for Cognition interaction. Those
who read the fear message and had a high Need for Cognition had a larger change than those
who read the fear message and had a low Need for Cognition. However, those who read the
neutral message and had a low Need for Cognition had a larger change than those who read the
neutral message and had a high Need for Cognition. This contradicts past research which
suggests that individuals high in Need for Cognition are less likely to change their attitude
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(Haugtvedt & Petty, 1992). However, it may be the case that those with a high Need for
Cognition were motivated by the fear appeal, which aligns with other research (Ruiter,
Verplanken, De Cremer, & Kok, 2004). Based on the analyses of the discriminating value, it
seems that the fear appeal did not lead to a sense of denial or avoidance. Therefore, it may be the
case that fear messages are a useful tactic to employ in dynamic situations for those high in Need
for Cognition, not those low in Need for Cognition.
Next, sex differences were examined. In terms of the discriminating value, women who
read the neutral message in the decrease condition were most likely to be in the fear control
process. Women in the decrease condition who read the fear message, or men in the decrease
condition who read the fear message or the neutral message all had negative discriminative
values (i.e., fear control), but women who read the neutral message in the decrease condition had
a significantly larger negative, discriminating value. Women, who often experience more stress
during emergencies than men (Weber, Blais, & Betz, 2002), may have felt more vulnerable than
men and therefore were unsure of how relocating was an appropriate response to a weakening
storm. Men and women in the no change condition and men and women increase condition were
likely to be in the danger control process, regardless of the language in the recommendation.
Overall, women had larger changes in perceived threat (i.e., which again seems to be
driven by perceived susceptibility) and evacuation intentions than men. In terms of relocation
intentions, women who read the fear message had a greater change in relocation intentions then
men who read the fear message. In contrast, men who read the neutral message had a greater
change in relocation intentions than women who read the neutral message. Women had the
largest change in perceived scariness if they were in the decrease condition, which was
significantly higher than men. In both the decrease and increase conditions, women had a larger
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change in perceived message persuasiveness than men. The fear messages may have been more
effective on women than men for a few reasons. In addition to having different mental models of
risk due to past experience (Gustafod, 1998; Whitmer, Sims, & Torres, 2017), women have less
experience with emergencies (Whitmer, Sims, & Torres, 2017) which may make them feel more
at risk. The fear language may have been more salient to women as they are generally more riskaverse than men (Cutter, Tiefenbacher, & Solecki, 1992).
Next, participants’ change in perception that the message was persuasive from decision
point 2 to decision point 3 was examined using the combination of Need for Cognition and sex
differences. There was a significant 4-way interaction between the fear language, change in
severity, Need for Cognition, and sex. Due to the complexity of interpreting a 4-way interaction,
low Need for Cognition and high Need for Cognition individuals were first examined more
closely in two follow-up 3-way ANOVAs. For low Need for Cognition individuals, women had a
larger change perceived message persuasiveness than men. Additionally, low Need for Cognition
individuals had the largest change in the decrease condition, compared to the no change and
decrease conditions. Next, high Need for Cognition individuals were examined. Individuals with
a high Need for Cognition had a larger change in perceived message persuasiveness if they read
the fear message than if they read the neutral message. Additionally, high Need for Cognition
individuals who were in the decrease condition had the largest change, followed by the no
change condition, and the increase condition. However, when examining sex differences and the
change in the hurricane’s severity, high Need for Cognition women had larger changes than men
in perceived message persuasiveness if they were in the decrease condition or increase condition.
However, high Need for Cognition men in the no change condition had larger changes in
perceived message persuasiveness than high Need for Cognition women.
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Lastly, men and women were compared in two follow-up 3-way ANOVAs. Both men
and women were positively influenced by fear language. However, this was dependent on Need
for Cognition. Low Need for Cognition men seem most influenced to change their perception
that the message was persuasive if they were in the decrease condition and read the fear message,
whereas high Need for Cognition men were most influenced by fear language in the increase
condition. Women with a high Need for Cognition were most influenced to change their
perception that the message was persuasive if they read the fear message.
There was a pronounced effect of high Need for Cognition women having a large,
positive change in perceived message persuasiveness if they read a fear appeal in the decrease
and increase conditions. Women who have a high Need for Cognition may not just be more
vulnerable to risk but may also be more motivated by fear to consider the message in a
systematic way. Although the creators of the Need for Cognition scale (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982)
did not find sex differences on their original scale (see also Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis,
1996), there has been one reported difference in the literature. Tanaka, Panter, and Winborne
(1988) found that women enjoy engaging in cognitive tasks more than men (based on a factor
analysis of the Need for Cognition scale). There is support for this notion in the advertisement
literature (as cited by Darley & Smith, 1995), that men tend to rely more on heuristics more than
women and women engage in more effortful processing. It may be the case that there are sex
differences in Need for Cognition, depending on the context that they read a fear appeal or are
presented with potentially persuasive messages. It appears that future research is needed to
understand sex differences and Need for Cognition, and what conditions might bring about these
differences.

147

CHAPTER SEVEN: GENERAL DISCUSSION
The goal of this dissertation was to answer three research questions, which will be
reviewed first. It should be noted that the overall goals of study 1 and study 2 were to provide an
empirical rationale for the stimuli used in study 3. The goal of study 3 was to examine the
phrasing of protective action recommendations in the context of fluctuating hurricane
projections. Next in the general discussion, the theoretical implications of this dissertation will
be discussed with a focus at revisiting and responding to the impact-based warning literature and
the Extended Parallel Process Model (Witte, 1992). Then, the practical implications will be
discussed in order to provide emergency management with phrasing guidelines. Likewise, a
discussion of the findings related to individual differences in risk perception will be discussed in
both the theoretical and practical implication sections. Lastly, suggestions for future research will
be discussed.

General Summary and Review of Research Questions
1. Are pairs of hurricanes significantly different from one another in terms of perceived
severity?
In study 1, participants were asked to rate each hurricane category in terms of severity,
seriousness, and scariness. The data suggested that participants believed each category was
uniquely different, as each pair was significantly different across the three dependent measures.
However, this understanding was an implicit one, as participants were not able to define the
storms based on wind speed, which is the defining characteristic of hurricane categories.
Participants were also asked to make these ratings for a tropical depression and tropical
storm, which revealed an interesting finding. Participants believed that these storms were more
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severe, scary, and serious than a category 1 hurricane, but about as severe as a category 2
hurricane. However, this effect was explained by individual differences in cognition. In
particular, participants with a low Need for Cognition rated a tropical depression and tropical
storm higher than those with high Need for Cognition. This is likely due to low Need for
Cognition individuals’ reliance on simple cues, such that any storm is likely to be perceived as
severe. Likewise, it is likely that high Need for Cognition individuals were motivated to seek this
information in a previous real-world experience (e.g., Google the characteristics of tropical
depression or a tropical storm) and store this information in memory.
2. Does fear language and the use of pronouns in a protective action recommendation lead
to an increased likelihood that people will follow the recommendation in a hurricane
warning? Are these tactics persuasive, such that they increase the likelihood that people
will interpret the emergency as a threat and have adaptive behaviors, instead of
maladaptive behaviors?
In study 2, the presence of fear language and second-person personal pronouns were
manipulated in a protective action recommendation. Fear language positively influenced
participants’ perceived threat, perceived scariness of the hurricane, and perception that the
warning was persuasive. However, there were no differences between the fear language and
neutral language in regard to behavioral intentions. It should be noted that intentions to evacuate
and relocate were high but there was no ceiling effect. It seems that fear language motivated
individuals to interpret the emergency as a threat and the warning as persuasive. However, it was
unclear whether fear language would result in adaptive behaviors, as there were no differences in
participants’ discriminating value, which would explain whether they were in the fear control or
danger control process.
There was only one effect of second-person personal pronouns on perceptions and behavioral
intentions. In general, the data suggested that the use of nouns (e.g., “People should relocate…”)
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was more effective than second-person personal pronouns. The one significant difference was
that those who read the recommendation containing a noun thought the hurricane was more
severe than those who read the recommendation with a pronoun. These findings informed study
3, in which the presence of fear language and neutral language was manipulated using only the
version of the recommendation containing the noun.
When examining sex differences, women were more likely than men to evacuate and believe
the hurricane was scary and serious. In terms of perceived message persuasiveness, fear
motivated participants to believe the message was persuasive. In particular, low Need for
Cognition individuals were more likely to believe the message was persuasive than high Need
for Cognition individuals. In addition, it seems that the low Need for Cognition women were
more likely to believe the message was persuasive than high Need for Cognition women. This
finding may have been due to limited amount of information presented, as high Need for
Cognition women may need more information and context in order to be motivated by fear
appeals. This issue was further addressed in study 3.
3. Does the context of a hurricane with changing intensity influence one’s risk perception of
the storm and of a protective action recommendation over time?
In order to understand how context might influence risk perceptions, participants in study 3
received information at three different points and had to make decisions after each piece of
information. First, all participants received information that a category 3 hurricane was projected
to make landfall in a few days and made their first decisions. Second, they were informed that
the hurricane’s intensity had changed (i.e., increased, decreased, or no change) and made their
second round of decisions. Third, they received the protective action recommendation that
contained fear language or neutral language and made their final decisions.
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As a review of the discriminating value, positive values serve to describe the danger control
process which is the cognitive appraisal of a present threat and confidence in one’s self-efficacy.
In other words, those in the danger control process have a high degree of perceived threat and
perceived efficacy, such that they think the threat is serious and they believe they are able to
avert the danger by following the protective action recommendation. Negative values describe
the fear control process, which is the emotional appraisal of the threat. The fear control process is
a result of an excessive amount of fear, which drives people to become defensive because their
self-efficacy is low. Those in the fear control process deny the threat as serious because they
believe they are unable to handle the threat and use this denial a way to cope with their fear.
Those who read the fear message were more likely to be in the danger control process
than the fear control process. This suggests that the fear language in the protective action
recommendation was a positive influence on participants’ perceptions and would likely result in
them following the protective action recommendation (i.e., relocate). The context of the situation
that involves the protective action recommendation is also significant. Although these variables
did not interact, those in the no change and increase condition were more likely to be in the
danger control process whereas those in the decrease condition were more likely to be in the fear
control process. This suggests that hurricane’s changing intensity can lead to emotional
appraisals, such that those in the decrease condition were unsure how they would be able to deal
with a threat that was diminishing over time. It should be noted, however, that a category 1
hurricane is still a serious threat with wind speeds between 74 to 95 miles per hour which can
result in significant damage to homes, tress, power lines, and result in power outages. Therefore,
it is important that protective action recommendations for category 1 hurricanes promote
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confidence in one’s ability to do the appropriate behavior to stay safe. Specific guidelines will be
reviewed in the practical implications section.
Overall, participants’ compliance with the warning was high in all conditions. When
examining participants’ perception of the storm and the warning, it seems the that context of the
storm changing in intensity was, in some cases, more influential than the language in the
protective action recommendation. The protective action recommendation influenced perceptions
of the storm and the warning, regardless of language type, for those in the decrease condition the
most. However, the fear language influenced participants’ perception that the warning was
persuasive more than the neutral language. Otherwise, the protective action recommendation did
not significantly improve the perceptions that the storm was severe and serious in the no change
or increase conditions. This lack of significant change in the no change and increase conditions
was likely due to the fear evoked by the intensity of the hurricanes themselves. This might
suggest that these effects are additive, as opposed to interactive, as these perceptions of severity
and seriousness were already high in the no change and increase conditions.
Lastly, individual differences were examined to determine for whom a fear appeal is most
effective and under what conditions. Women with a high Need for Cognition were most
influenced to change their perception that the message was persuasive if they read the fear
message. In particular, high Need for Cognition women had larger changes than high Need for
Cognition men in perceived message persuasiveness if they were in the decrease condition or
increase condition. Low Need for Cognition men seemed most influenced to change their
perception that the message was persuasive if they were in the decrease condition and read the
fear message, whereas high Need for Cognition men were most influenced by fear language in
the increase condition. These findings that individual differences influence perceptions of fear
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appeals under specific contexts highlight that a “one-size-fits-all” approach to emergency
communication may not be suitable for all individuals and all contexts. This will be further
discussed in the practical implications section.

Response and Contributions to the Literature
Impact-based Warnings
Currently, there is a strong impetus for “impact-based warnings” in the emergency
warning literature (Casteel, 2016, 2018; Morss et al., 2018; Ripberger et al., 2015a, 2015b) and
from the National Weather Service (“Impact Based Warning Goals,” n.d.). These types of
warnings emphasize the severity and impact that the hazard could potentially have by describing
the hazard with specific details. However, these impact-based warnings are written in incomplete
sentences, appear in all uppercase letters, and are hard to read. If the research in the area of
phrasing risk communication is to progress, it is crucial that these investigations be on readable
warnings for the layperson.
There were three papers in the area of impact-based warnings that were influential to the
methodology of this dissertation. The first two come from Casteel (2016, 2018), who found that
impact-based warnings influenced participants to follow protective action recommendations. In
his 2016 paper, he suggested that the impact-based warnings may have aroused fear and
motivated participants to follow the recommendations, but Casteel did not measure fear. In his
follow-up work, Casteel (2018) manipulated the presence of “fear tags” (e.g., “catastrophic”) in
impact-based warnings and found no effect. However, it is unclear if participants noticed this
language due to the readability issues of these warnings. Likewise, Casteel argues that this
language was too extreme but has no evidence to suggest the language was perceived as such or
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even detected by participants. An important change to Casteel’s methodology was that the
protective action recommendation was to relocate to another university building, not shelter-inplace. It was hypothesized that sheltering in place was an “easy” action to take relative to
moving oneself to another location and might be an inappropriate behavior during extreme
weather events. The data showed that participants were less likely to shelter-in-place, in general,
as the hurricanes became more severe.
The third influential paper to this dissertation comes from Morss and colleagues (2018).
Their findings suggest that fear language led to perceptions that the communication was
overblown. Clearly, the fear language was too strong (i.e., suggesting people would die), which
other researchers have shown can be detrimental to those who need to take protective actions
(Wei, Lindell, & Prater, 2014). The fear language used in study 2 and study 3 of this dissertation
was adapted from Morss et al. (2018) in two ways: 1) The phrasing was re-worded to deemphasize one’s mortality and 2) the fear language appeared in the protective action
recommendation, not in a statement describing the storm.
Drawing from the social psychology literature’s investigation of fear appeals,
participants’ perceived threat and perceived efficacy were measured in order to understand what
types of cognitions might arise from fear language. This is an important dependent measure that
is missing from the emergency warning literature, as it is unclear from the aforementioned
studies if fear motivated people to take certain actions. Based on the modifications just described,
it seems that fear language can have a positive effect on the likelihood that people will take
protective action recommendations. However, that claim must be taken with caution. The fear
appeal was carefully crafted to de-emphasize an implication of death and it placed in the
protective action recommendation which suggested relocation would be the appropriate behavior
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to take. There is a risk associated with over-warning (i.e., cry wolf effect; Breznitz, 1984) and
overusing fear appeals in emergency communication may come with that same risk. Therefore,
fear appeals must be used thoughtfully. Likewise, they should not be used in all situations as it
does not appear to be a useful tactic in frightening situations (e.g., a category 5 hurricane).
The impact-based warning literature needs to shift focus from emphasizing specific
details of the crisis. This dissertation showed that the crisis itself can implicitly evoke fear, if it is
severe enough (e.g., category 5 hurricane) and that extra description may not benefit risk
perception. Instead, the emphasis should be on improving the phrasing of protective action
recommendations, which tell people what to do stay safe during crisis. Another contribution of
the present research involves the investigation of risk perception involving hurricanes, as the
impact-based warning literature has only examined tornados. Moving forward, this literature
needs to investigate linguistic tactics that persuade people to follow protective action
recommendations, not the descriptive details that “paint a picture” of destruction and examine
different weather related crises. Likewise, this literature needs to include additional measures
from the social psychology literature (e.g., perceived threat and perceived efficacy in order to
calculate the discriminating value) to coalesce the findings from the different literatures.

Extended Parallel Process Model
The Extended Parallel Process Model (Witte, 1992) has been used extensively in the
literature as the framework to research the utility of fear appeals in persuasive messaging. The
idea behind this model is that fear motivates people to take action to reduce the unpleasant
feelings associated with being afraid. The Extended Parallel Process Model suggests that it is
important to control the amount of fear messaging used because too much fear may lead people
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to think they are unable to handle the threat and change their perspective from a cognitive one
(i.e., danger control) to an emotional one (i.e., fear control). If people think they cannot
effectively avoid a danger, it is likely they will try to control their fear by engaging in
maladaptive coping behaviors (e.g., denial, avoidance) instead of following protective action
recommendations.
However, most of the research using this framework has been in the area of health
campaigns (e.g., McKay, Berkowitz, Blumberg, & Goldberg, 2004; Rimal & Real, 2003).
Therefore, the present research contributes to literature by applying the methodology typically
used in the health psychology literature (i.e., measuring the likelihood of the fear control or
danger control process) to identify conditions under which fear messaging can have motivational
qualities in a protective action recommendation in the context of fluctuating hurricanes. The risk
communication literature has suggested that the motivation to comply with a warning is crucial
(e.g., Lindell & Perry, 2012; Wogalter et al., 1987), but have yet to investigate the motivational
cognitions associated with the phrasing of risk communications. Specifically, the risk
communication literature has focused on the design hazard labels (Heaps & Henley, 1999;
Wogalter et al., 1987) and describing crises with extreme detail (i.e., impact-based warnings).
However, the protective action recommendation has received little attention from these
literatures, especially in terms of phrasing the recommendation (Lindell & Perry, 2012). I argue,
however, that the protective action recommendation is a crucial component of the warning
because it suggests what to do in the face of crisis. Therefore, any investigation of motivation or
persuasive tactics must include the protective action recommendation because it is the action
component of warnings.
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In summary, the risk communication literature argues that motivation to comply is
important and the health psychology literature argues that regulated fear messaging can motivate
people to do the appropriate behaviors to stay safe. The present research has identified contexts
under which fear messaging in a protective action recommendation may be most motivating.

Individual Differences
Witte and Allen (2000) had a strong assertion that individual differences did not
influence risk perception or moderate the effects of fear appeals “except on rare occasions.”
Popova (2012) made a similar argument, but because findings of individual differences
influencing risk perception have mixed support. However, these types of claims do not advance
the literature or help identify for whom a fear appeal may be most effective. The findings of this
dissertation suggest the opposite of Witte and Allen’s (2000) and Popova’s (2012) claims:
individual differences did, in fact, influence risk perceptions across three studies.
An exploratory approach was used to examine the interactive effects of Need for
Cognition and sex differences in the contexts of fluctuating hurricanes and fear appeals. In study
2, low Need for Cognition women thought the protective action recommendation was persuasive
than other groups whereas high Need for Cognition women in study 3 thought the thought the
protective action recommendation was persuasive than other groups. It is possible that these
contradictory findings are inherent to the methodological differences between study 2 and 3.
Participants in study 2 were quickly presented with the protective action recommendation, which
may have left high Need for Cognition women wanting more information and context whereas
low Need for Cognition women used heuristics (e.g., “injury” or “die”) to make their assessment.
In contrast, participants in study 3 received several pieces of information over a period of
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approximately 10 minutes. Therefore, the high Need for Cognition women had more information
and background of the situation at hand, resulting in higher degrees of perceived message
persuasiveness. This highlights an important contribution that investigating the role Need for
Cognition and sex differences on the perceptions of fear appeals may bring about different
findings, depending on the nature of the study and how much detail or information is provided.
Overall, the findings from this dissertation support the notion that Need for Cognition is a
type of intrinsic motivation to process information more deeply (Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, &
Jarvis, 1996) and that threatening information motivates individuals high in Need for Cognition
to follow protective action recommendations (Ruiter et al., 2004). However, unlike past research
(Haugtvedt & Petty, 1992), those with a high Need for Cognition were more likely to change
their attitudes than those with a low Need for Cognition, as high Need for Cognition individuals
were more likely to think the protective action recommendation was persuasive when it
contained fear language than a low Need for Cognition individuals.
Sex differences corroborated findings from past research than women are generally more
susceptible to fear language (Leventhal, Jones, & Trembly, 1966) and more likely to follow
protective action recommendations (Bateman & Edwards, 2002). The unique contribution to the
literature, however, is the examination of the Need for Cognition and sex differences together.
These individual differences highlighted for whom a fear appeal may be most effective: women
with a high Need for Cognition. It may be the case that having a high Need for Cognition and
being a typically risk-averse female are qualities that motivate one to consider the fear message
systematically. As previously noted, there has not been much support for sex differences in Need
for Cognition (Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996), but it may be the case that these
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differences are due to the context under which a high Need for Cognition female is exposed to a
fear appeal.

Storm Fear Questionnaire
It was originally intended that participants’ score on the Storm Fear Questionnaire
(Nelson, Vorstenbosch, & Antony, 2014) would be used a covariate in the analyses of this
dissertation. However, homogeneity of regression slopes was violated in study 3, where the
independent variable of change in severity interacted with this covariate. A follow-up analysis
showed that there were differences between conditions in their levels of storm fear, such that
those in the no change condition had the highest degree of storm fear, followed by the increase
condition, and the decrease condition.
There are several important things to consider with this variable of storm fear. First,
participants were not pre-tested on storm fear, which might suggest that participants’ storm fear
varied by condition. However, this lack of pre-testing storm fear was intentional because it could
have primed participants to think about their potential phobia of storms. For instance, one of the
items on this questionnaire asks people to rate their agreement with “I worry about being injured
or dying as a result of a storm.” Therefore, it would not have been advantageous to use this as a
measure before participants completed the experimental task, as it may have heightened
participants’ fear of the warnings (e.g., causing them to ruminate about fearful events), which
would not have been a result of the manipulation. The second consideration relates to the utility
of this variable in future research. It is unclear based on the original article detailing the creation
of this questionnaire or the articles that have cited it since whether this is a state-based or traitbased measure. It may also be the case that this questionnaire is measuring a construct different
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from intrinsic storm phobia (i.e., lacking face validity). The present research presents preliminary
evidence that this measure may be a state-based measure that fluctuates based on the situation at
hand. In other words, it may be that individuals’ storm fear is dependent on the information they
receive, not based on inherent characteristics of the individual. Future research needs to collect
more experimental data to corroborate this finding that the Storm Fear Questionnaire is a statebased measure.

Practical Implications and Phrasing Recommendations
This research has practical implications for emergency management, by addressing their
need for warning guidelines. Public universities in Florida do not have a systematic template for
their emergency warnings but have suggested that that guidelines based on empirical evidence
would be beneficial (J. Thalheimer, personal communication, December, 2017). Currently, the
only guidelines provided to emergency management for warning communication are based on
the Clery Act (1990), which mandates that federally funded universities distribute timely
emergency warnings. Federally funded universities that do not comply with these guidelines are
ordered to pay large financial fines. Although compliance with the federal mandate is extremely
important, public policy initiatives should move towards supporting higher institutions’ need for
improved warning communications. In particular, there are currently no specific requirements
about the protective action recommendation in the Clery Act, or whether it needs to be included.
Given that this is the component that tells people what to do, there is a need for public policy
makers to make the case for guidelines concerning the protective action recommendation.
The results of this dissertation make one thing clear: a “one-size-fits-all” approach cannot
be applied to risk communication. The context of the situation prompting an emergency warning
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to be distributed to constituents must be considered. Therefore, the guidelines suggested were
constructed with this consideration in mind and with which certain phrasing may be most
appropriate. See Table 26 for these guidelines. It should be noted that the example provided in
Table 26 is not meant to generalize the results of the present research to all emergencies, but to
provide a real-world interpretation of the results for emergency management professionals.
The impact-based warning literature would suggest that emergency management should
“paint a picture” with as many details as possible to describe the severity of the crisis. However,
this is not a realistic recommendation for emergency management to craft these types of
descriptions in time-sensitive situations. Likewise, if emergency management was to re-use these
detailed descriptions, it may not have the intended effect over time as users may become too
accustomed to these descriptions.

161

Table 26. Guidelines for Protective Action Recommendations
Situational Changes
of the Emergency

Suggested Language of
the Protective Action
Recommendation

Rationale

Example

Fear

Fear appeals increase
perceptions of the
threat: perceptions
that the threat is scary
and serious; increases
evacuation intentions.

“The fire in the student union has
subsided but is still active. People
in nearby locations should avoid
the area to avoid life threatening
conditions. People may be injured
or die from the flames or smoke
inhalation.”

Fear or Neutral

Fear appeals have a
marginal increase in
risk perceptions
compared to neutral
language. Use fear
appeals with caution
in static situations.

“The fire in the student union is
still active with no change to its
volume. People in nearby locations
should avoid the area to avoid life
threatening conditions. People
may be injured or die from the
flames or smoke inhalation.”

Decrease

No Change

OR
“The fire in the student union is
still active with no change to its
volume. People in nearby locations
should avoid the area to avoid
dangerous conditions.”
Increase
Neutral

Fear appeals do not
increase risk
perceptions of
intensifying
situations.

“The fire in the student union is
still active and increasing in
volume. People in nearby locations
should avoid the area to avoid
dangerous conditions.”

Although there have been suggestions from the research community for emergency
management to tailor warnings to the individual (Aloudat, Michael, & Abbas, 2009; McGinley,
Turk, & Bennett, 2006; Schroeder, Whitmer, & Sims, 2017), this has been met with reluctance
by emergency management. For instance, emergency management at the University of Central
Florida has tried this approach by trying to provide alerts with respect to students’ location.
However, this requires students to provide the location where they are taking classes (e.g., main
campus, or satellite campuses), which has not been a successful effort yet because users bypass
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this input field and it requires users to provide this information every semester. Although it
seems like it should be easy to pull these data from the registrar’s office, the software that
generates class schedule records cannot currently communicate with emergency management
software. As a result, emergency management does not seem optimistic that users would be
willing to fill out psychological measures (e.g., Need for Cognition). There is a need to reconcile
this issue: there is evidence that individual differences influence risk perception but it is currently
not practical to provide recommendations to emergency management for individualized
warnings. This will be further discussed in the future research section.
Based on the practical implications discussed, it may be useful and constructive to
provide training to those in emergency management who write warning messages. It is
imperative that these messages be crafted carefully and thoughtfully, with a focus on phrasing
the protective action recommendation in a systematic way. Likewise, it is imperative that this
type of training is a collaborative effort that includes researchers to design the training and that
these researchers provide recommendations from an empirical standpoint while considering
emergency management’s current limitations (e.g., federal regulations, user engagement) and
resources (e.g., time, cost). For instance, this training would be valuable if it conveyed situations
under which fear messages would be advantageous, with a note of caution: that fear messages
should be regulated in an effort not to overuse this tactic. However, the need for this type of
training (i.e., about the phrasing of the protective action recommendation) is an initiative that
public policy makers could advance, in addition to including protective action recommendation
requirements in the Clery Act guidelines.
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Limitations
There are limitations to the present research. The first involves the simulation of a
hurricane and measuring participants’ behavioral intentions. However, this is a standard practice
in the literature (Casteel, 2016; Schultz et al., 2010; Wogalter & Dingus, 1999) because it would
otherwise be unethical and dangerous to expose research participants to a real hazard. While
real-world data are reported in the literature (e.g., Huang, Lindell, & Prater, 2016; Kopel, Sims,
& Chin, 2014; Lindell et al., 2015; Parker, Whitmer, & Sims, 2018), it is difficult to make strong
causal conclusions due to the lack of control in these studies. Likewise, it would be problematic
to attribute findings to the effects of real-world warnings, given that people in real-world
emergencies likely seek out information from several sources other than the warning (Griffin,
Neuwirth, Dunwoody, & Giese, 2004). In fact, Lindell (2014) suggested that more experimental
work in this area was needed. While some researchers have designed complex, virtual
simulations of hurricanes scenarios and argued that experimental work is necessary to provide an
understanding about emergency decision-making (Meyer, Broad, Orlove, & Petrovic, 2013), the
experimental work in this area has still not examined the phrasing of protective action
recommendations.
Another limitation of the present work involves the phrasing of the situation and the
questions, as it is unclear if these factors contributed to participants’ ratings. Participants were
asked to imagine that they were a resident assistant responsible for making decisions on behalf of
themselves and students in living in a dorm. However, this was done to partially replicate
Casteel’s (2016, 2018) methodology and to provide college students with an ecologically valid
task (i.e., instead of being responsible for a manufacturing production line). It is likely that
college students are accustomed to their parents making decisions on their behalf during

164

hurricanes or other emergencies. Therefore, leadership positions, such as resident assistants, may
be an opportunity for college students to take control in making such decisions themselves.
However, asking participants to think about being responsible for other people may have
influenced their ratings, and potentially strengthened their feelings of susceptibility. For instance,
people show an optimistic bias (i.e., a belief that bad things will not happen) towards themselves
but less so to others (Weinstein, 1980). In other words, people often think other people are more
susceptible to threat than themselves. Likewise, the questions asked participants about their
personal feelings of susceptibility and threat, which may have been incongruent with the
situation.

Future Research
There are several possibilities for future research in this field. The first involves bridging
the gap between the theoretical implications that individual differences influence risk perception
and the practical limitations of addressing these real-world concerns with emergency
management. Tailoring emergency warnings to the individual is not currently a realistic
endeavor (as discussed in the practical implications section), however, there is room for future
research to reconcile this problem if psychologists and emergency management professionals
work together to provide real-world solutions. For instance, the frequency rate of the general
population being high or low in Need for Cognition is not reported in the literature. If emergency
management can only send one type of warning with the goal of impacting the greatest amount
of people, should they direct their efforts towards low or high Need for Cognition individuals?
Much of the research on Need for Cognition is done with college samples, which may have a
larger population of high Need for Cognition individuals than the general public of the same age
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group (i.e., not enrolled in college). Likewise, should emergency management write warnings
aimed at men or women? On behalf of a family or a household, are men or women more likely to
make decisions regarding when to evacuate? There is insufficient research on this topic,
however, some research in the area of gender roles suggest that women are crucial before and
after a crisis as family decision-makers (Able & Nelson, 1990) whereas men are more likely to
dismiss warnings (Drabek, 1969; Turner, Nigg, Paz, & Young, 1981). However, certain
populations with lower socioeconomic statuses have demonstrated more traditional gender roles
during crises, such that women defer to their husbands for decision-making (Ashkraf & Azad,
2015). Although the literature suggests women are more likely to follow protective action
recommendations (Bateman & Edwards, 2002), future research is needed to understand who
makes decisions on behalf households or communities in order to better guide emergency
management to write warnings for these decision-makers.
Another potential opportunity for future research is to investigate additional persuasive
tactics in protective action recommendations. The present study investigated the effects of fear
appeals, but there are many other strategies that could be explored to increase the persuasiveness
of a message. For instance, using language to encourage perceptions of self-efficacy in addition
to perceived threat, and manipulating the number of messages one receives or the trustworthiness
of the message source might provide valuable evidence of additional factors that increase the
likelihood of someone following a protective action recommendation.

Conclusion
The present research was inspired by the social psychological literature’s investigation of
persuasive messaging and integrated these methodologies with the present state of the risk
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communication literature’s aim at improving risk communication for the public. In summary,
this dissertation suggests that the language used in protective action recommendations can
influence risk perceptions. Fear appeals in risk communication can be effective in certain
contexts. The severity of the emergency must be considered when writing protective action
recommendations, as extremely severe crises may not benefit from fear appeals. However, fear
appeals may be most useful in the cases of serious but deescalating crises, as it may make the
severity of the crisis more salient. Additionally, individual differences in cognition and
biological sex seem to influence these risk perceptions and interpretations of risk
communication. The present research suggests that high Need for Cognition women are most
receptive to fear appeals in protective action recommendations. While individual differences are
important predictors of warning interpretation and compliance, future research needs to reconcile
the conundrum of emergency management’s current limitations regarding individualized
warnings.
It is challenging to get the public to heed warnings. Although it is unlikely that all people
will follow protective action recommendations, the goal of emergency managers and researchers
is to make a positive impact on the public’s decision-making during these stressful events. This
can be achieved by additional systematic evaluations and collaborative efforts to improve the
phrasing of protective action recommendations.
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APPENDIX A: DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONNAIRE
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Demographic Questionnaire:
1. Do you have experience with hurricanes? YES or NO
a. If YES, did you ever evacuate? YES or NO
i.
If so, why did you evacuate? __________
2. The zip code now of your current residence: ________
3. The zip code of your residence in high school: __________
4. Do you have any leadership experience? YES or NO
a. If YES, what is it? ______
5. Have you been a resident assistant before? YES or NO
6. Sex: MALE or FEMALE
7. Age: _______
8. Race: (select all that apply)
a. White,
b. Black or African American
c. Asian, American Indian and Alaska Native
d. Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander
e. Other
9. Year in College
a. Freshman
b. Sophomore
c. Junior
d. Senior
**Questions 4 and 5 only appeared in study 2 and 3**
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APPENDIX B: “KNOWLEDGE OF HURRICANES” QUESTIONNAIRE
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“Knowledge of Hurricanes” Questionnaire:
For each storm listed below, please indicate the levels of sustained winds (measured in mph)
correspond to each storm. You may indicate a range of values (e.g., 1-10 mph) or an average (5
mph.
● Tropical depression: _______ mph
● Tropical storm: _______ mph
● Category 1 hurricane: _______ mph
● Category 2 hurricane: _______ mph
● Category 3 hurricane: _______ mph
● Category 4 hurricane: _______ mph
● Category 5 hurricane: _______ mph
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Need for Cognition Scale (from Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984)
For each of the statements below, please indicate whether or not the statement is characteristic of
you or of what you believe.
You should use the following scale as you rate each of the statements below.
1
2
extremely
somewhat
uncharacteristic uncharacteristic

3
uncertain
characteristic

1.
2.
3.
4.

4
somewhat
characteristic

5
extremely
characteristic

I prefer complex to simple problems.
I like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot of thinking.
Thinking is not my idea of fun.**
I would rather do something that requires little thought than something that is sure to
challenge my thinking abilities.**
5. I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is a likely chance I will have to think
in depth about something.**
6. I find satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours.
7. I only think as hard as I have to.**
8. I prefer to think about small daily projects to long term ones.**
9. I like tasks that require little thought once I’ve learned them.**
10. The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top appeals to me.
11. I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems.
12. Learning new ways to think doesn’t excite me very much.**
13. I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles I must solve.
14. The notion of thinking abstractly is appealing to me.
15. I would prefer a task that is intellectual, difficult, and important to one that is somewhat
important but does not require much thought.
16. I feel relief rather than satisfaction after completing a task that requires a lot of mental
effort.**
17. It’s enough for me that something gets the job done; I don’t care how or why it works.**
18. I usually end up deliberating about issues even when they do not affect me personally
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Storm Fear Questionnaire
Instructions: Please rate the extent to which each statement is true for you by circling any
number from 0 (not at all true) to 4 (almost always true). There are no right or wrong answers.
0
Not at

1
All A little

2
Moderately

3
Very Almost

4
Always

1. I worry about storms more than other people.
2. I avoid being in a car during a storm for fear that something bad may happen.
3. I tend to monitor the weather on the radio, TV, internet or in the newspapers to ensure that I
know when a storm is coming.
4. I tend to get anxious when I hear about a storm approaching, even when the storm is a few
days away.
5. I avoid leaving home during a storm to protect myself from possible harm.
6. I tend to get so anxious about a storm system approaching that I have a hard time functioning
normally (for example, difficulty concentrating or sleeping at night).
7. When there is a storm, my anxiety is so high that I question whether I can cope.
8. I feel frightened when I see or hear signs of a storm (for example, dark clouds, heavy rain,
wind, thunder, or lightening).
9. When there is a storm approaching, my fear prevents me from going to school, work, or social
events.
10. When there is a storm approaching, I tend to seek safety in a specific room (for example, a
basement, bathroom or hallway).
11. I worry about being injured or dying as a result of a storm (for example, being struck by
lightning).
12. I try to distract myself (for example, listening to music, watching television or reading)
during a storm to reduce my anxiety.
13. I worry that I am going to be harmed or die because of the physical sensations (for example,
pounding heart or dizziness) experienced during a storm.
14. I avoid being near windows or open doors during a storm to ensure my safety.
15. I use medication, alcohol or drugs to help me cope during a storm.
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